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- Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The main concern of this thesis is to examine how public enforcement of competition law 
should be assessed. This thesis offers the theoretical, analytical and empirical perspective for 
why and how public enforcement should be assessed, and the importance of the assessment 
process itself in revealing enforcement problems. Public enforcement of competition law 
means for the purpose of this thesis is the application of competition law to anticompetitive 
practices and to unilateral conduct practices; which means that Mergers and state aid issues 
are outside the scope of the thesis.  
Over the last decade, the issue of assessing/ evaluating competition enforcement has become 
more noticeable. In one of its policy papers the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) states “Considerable work remains to be done to refine the 
methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of completed competition policy 
interventions.”1 In addition, Competition Authorities (CAs), policy makers, conferences and 
academics have paid extra attention and have spent a lot on assessment studies that aim to 
identify the benefits and the drawbacks of competition enforcement and how it can be 
improved. For example, Kovacic explained, “the lack of widely accepted, consistently 
applied standards for assessing the quality of agency performance has beset the field of 
competition policy throughout its history. This absence severely impedes the achievement of 
consensus on what competition agencies ought to be doing”.2   
                                                          
1
 OECD (2005) ‘Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition Authorities’.  DAF/COMP(2005)30 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/15/35910995.pdf , accessed 20 April 2012. P. 10 
2
 William E. Kovacic et al, ‘How does your Competition Agency Measure Up?’ (2011) 7 European Competition 
Journal 30. 
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Despite these efforts, as it will be demonstrated below and more extensively in chapter 2, 
there is no consensus on what could constitute a good performance by CAs, or how public 
enforcement should be assessed.
3
  
Thus, this thesis investigates the issue of assessing public enforcement of competition law by 
suggesting criteria for the assessment process and to apply the suggested criteria to data 
collected by the author from the UK, EU and France. The period under examination starts 
from May 2004and up to December 2012. The period starts when Regulation 1/2003
4
  came 
into force which has decentralised the application of EU competition provisions, where 
National Competition Authorities are required to apply EU competition law alongside 
national competition provisions. This period would allow to have a good number of 
observations while at the same time would give a good overview about the outcome of 
appeals.  
In addition, a different but much related issue that has to be taken to account when discussing 
the issue of assessing public enforcement of competition law is deterrence. Measuring 
deterrence is a very controversial issue that many scholars tried to find a way to measure 
deterrence and what matters when measuring deterrence.
5
 Tell now there is no agreed way to 
                                                          
3
 Mats A. Bergman, ‘QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? OR Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Competition Enforcement’ (2008) 156 De Economist 387; and  William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post 
Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation 
Law 503. 
4
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Now 101 and 102 TFEU).   
5
 See for example, Wouter P.J. Wils ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ (2006) 29(2)World 
Competition, 183 ; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, ‘Antitrust sanctions’ (2010) 6(2) Competition 
Policy International 3; Chris Harding ‘Cartel Deterrence: The search for evidence and argument', 56 (2011) The 
Antitrust Bulletin 345; Alberto Heimler and Kirtikumar Mehta, ‘Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal 
Level of Fines for Achieving Deterrence’ (2012) 35 World Competition, 103. 
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measure deterrence.
6
 The levels of deterrence in any given jurisdiction are very important to 
be considered when assessing the CA because it affects the levels of enforcement. It is argued 
in this thesis that issues related to what could constitute optimal deterrence should be dealt 
with after agreeing on how to assess public enforcement of competition law. The role of 
deterrence will be discussed in further detail in chapter 2.  
The gap that this thesis aims to fill is to establish implementable criteria for assessing public 
enforcement of competition law. One aim is to learn from the criticisms that the previous 
studies have received.7 This will be done by employing a methodology, which has not been 
used before in this area, when testing and applying the criteria.  The criteria aim to cover as 
many aspects as possible that may affect the CA performance. Furthermore, there is a lack of 
empirical comparative studies that this thesis aims to do.8 In addition, the collection and the 
analysis of data is another contribution that this thesis offer, because there is a need for 
statistical studies for the jurisdiction examined in the thesis; the data presented in the thesis 
may facilitate to other researchers reaching different aims that are not covered here, 
empirically.  
                                                          
6
 Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale, ‘Deterrence in 
Competition Law’, Discussion Paper SP II 2009 – 14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2009. 
7
 Many of the methodologies/ criteria have been criticised, for example; for not including issues other than case 
number (concluded/ initiated); for not being comparative; or for not taking into account the budget and the 
human capital into account. This issue is examined in detail in chapter 2. See for example, Mats A. Bergman, 
‘QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? OR Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition 
Enforcement’ (2008) 156 De Economist 387, 404; and  William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post Evaluations to 
Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 503, 542 
and 543 (Calling for comparative studies to be conducted in the area of assessing public enforcement of 
competition law); see also, Peter Ormosi and Stephen Davies “A comparative assessment of methodologies used 
to evaluate competition policy”  (2012) 8 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 769 (critical assessment 
of  evaluations methodologies). 
8
 Ibid. 
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Thus, there are two clear gaps in this area: (1) researching for acceptable criteria for the 
assessment of public enforcement of competition law; (2) applying the assessment criteria to 
actual data collected form CAs. This thesis aims to fill the aforementioned gaps by asking 
and answering the research question(s) in the next section.   
 
1-1: Existing literature
9
 
There have been many studies that can be considered as assessment studies. In these studies, 
the criteria employed differ from work to another, as a result of having different criteria there 
were different outcomes of the studies depending on the criteria employed and the aim of 
each study. It is noted, that there many studies that are either very specific or very general; 
for example, studies that examine a single case and its impact vs. Studies that examine a large 
number of jurisdictions but with very brief results. For the purpose of this thesis and to build 
credible criteria, any study that can be considered as an assessment study is investigated in 
order to understand the criteria employed and learn from it.    
There have been many studies/reports/ rankings that have aimed to assess/ evaluate or rank 
CAs or its actions. In those efforts there were no consistent standards (criteria)/ or no clear 
criteria for the assessment process, as it will be shown below.  
To start with the studies that aimed to establish an evaluation/assessment methodology or call 
on what have to be considered when assessing CAs’ performance.  The contributions to this 
type of studies came from international organisations (e.g. OECD), policy makers and 
                                                          
9
 It has to be noted that there is an extensive literature review about the topic of the thesis in Chapter 2. 
However, it is important to highlight one of the main motivations of this work, namely the lack of consistent 
criteria for the assessment of public enforcement of competition law.  
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academics.
10
 This type of literature can be seen as good advisory work for those who want to 
assess CA’s performance. The main criticism for such type of literature is that it offers some 
suggestions that are practically very difficult  to apply, or the information needed are very 
difficult to obtain or measure.
11
  
The only ranking available for CAs is the Global Competition Review (GCR) ranking. The 
GCR has been ranking a number of CAs since 2004.  For their ranking there are no clear 
criteria (standards), it mainly depends on responses collected from surveys distributed that 
are distributed to competition officials (decision makers) and competition experts in the 
countries included in their ranking. It has to be noted the GCR ranking do not offer analysis 
of the results they reach, it merely presents the results of the survey. 
12
 
There is also another form for the assessment of competition law enforcement is by creating 
indexes to examine competition laws and their affects.
13
 To date, there are no studies that aim 
                                                          
10
 See for example: Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of 
Chicago Law Review 165; William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of 
Competition Policy Authorities” (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 503;  William E Kovacic, ‘Rating the 
Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?’ (2009) 16 George Mason Law Review 903; Kai 
Hüschelrath and Nina Leheyda, ‘A Methodology for the Evaluation of Competition Policy’ Discussion Paper 
No. 10-081, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim; Peter Ormosi and Stephen Davies “A 
comparative assessment of methodologies used to evaluate competition policy”  (2012) 8 Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 769 
11
 This issue is dealt with in Chapter 2. See for example, Peter Ormosi and Stephen Davies “A comparative 
assessment of methodologies used to evaluate competition policy”  (2012) 8 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 769 (for the differences between evaluation methodologies); William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post 
Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities” (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation 
Law 503; Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago 
Law Review 165. 
12
 Global Competition Review ranking studies “Rating Enforcement”, from  2004 until 2013 
13
 Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, ‘Antitrust around the world: An Empirical analysis of the Scope of 
competition laws and their effects’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 271; Michael W. Nicholson, ‘An Antitrust 
6 
 
to examine the CAs’ performance.14 The criteria used in each study in order to create the 
index are different in these studies.  
CAs have contributed to the area of the assessment of public enforcement of competition law, 
but in a more specific nature. For example, some CAs have commissioned some studies to 
evaluate its actions in a particular area or about a particular case that the CA have 
concluded.
15
  
In addition, there are academic publications where it examines particular cases and its impact 
on competition enforcement. These studies are characterised to be very detailed with regard 
the selected case or group of cases however, it is not comprehensive because it does not cover 
the whole activities of the CA.
16
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International Competition Policy’ (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 1009. 
14
 The only study that partially deals with developing countries CAs application of the law (NOT performance), 
the aim of this study were to examine if developing countries applying their competition laws (therefore, cannot 
be considered as an assessment study); see Dina I. Waked, ‘Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust 
Laws? A Statistical Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries’ (2012), available at SSRN 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2044047  
15
 The UK office of Fair Trading (OFT), now the UK Competition and Market Authority (CMA), has been very 
active in this area where it has commissioned some studies to assess certain areas of its activities. The Studies 
where commissioned either on behalf of the OFT or by the UK department of Industry and Trade. See for 
example, OFT 1391 A study by London Economics (2011) OFT 1391 available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1391.pdf; Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 
‘Ex Post Evaluation of Mergers’ (2001) Report for the UK Office of Fair Trading, Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Competition Commission; KPMG (2004), ‘Peer Review of Competition Policy’, Report for the 
UK Department of Trade and Industry. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file32813.pdf    
16
 A good example of this is, Bruce Lyons (ed), Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009). In this edited collection, the respected authors provided an 
economic analysis for a number of cases in the EU. 
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There is another form of studies that assess the success rate on appeal for the CA. To date 
there are only two studies that have done so explicitly in the competition law arena.
17
 Success 
rate on appeal is very important to be considered as it determines the rightness of the CA 
decision making. However, it only covers a partial part of the CA activities.  
Table 1 below presents the approaches employed in the existing literature and what are the 
criteria (if any) used in the studies.    
Study (approach) Criteria used 
 Suggested criteria  
(methodologies/ principles)   
- Mainly based on critical thinking suggesting set of 
criteria and guiding principles on how to assess 
public enforcement. 
 Success rate on appeal - Full review of the CA’s decisions. 
- It assesses substantive and procedural issues.  
- Calculating how successful the CA is. 
 Case studies - Critical analysis 
- Previous case law 
- Economic modelling  
 Indexes  - Collecting data about the competition law, i.e. 
competition law on the books and their 
completeness. 
- Codifying key features of the law. 
- Scoring  
 Rankings  - Mainly based on describing the results of a survey 
distributed in the jurisdictions under examination.   
Table 1: List of studies that aimed to assess public enforcement of competition law and 
the criteria employed. 
 
Form what has been said earlier and what the table presented, it can be seen very clearly that 
there is no consistency with the selection of the criteria employed. More importantly, one can 
notice that there are no clear and systematic criteria employed in the studies (approaches).  
1-2: Methodology 
The thesis relies on a mix of methodologies in order to answer the research questions stated 
above. It relies on analytical, comparative and empirical methodologies.  For the criteria 
                                                          
17
 Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 1995-2004’ 
(2005) 30 European Law Review 349; Joshua D. Wright and Angela Diveley ‘Do Expert Agencies Outperform 
Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission’.  Available at SSRN 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990034. 
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chapter (chapter 2), it employs an analytical method where it critically analyses existing 
literature and adds to it in order to reach the criteria for the assessment. Then, the suggested 
criteria will be applied and tested empirically to the three jurisdictions under examination (in 
the subsequent chapters 3, 4 and 5). The application of the criteria require data collection 
form the jurisdictions under examination, and then to analyse and interpret the data for each 
jurisdiction in the country’s chapters. In the final chapter of the thesis, the criteria will be 
applied again but in a comparative sense, where this chapter aims to compare and contrast the 
three jurisdictions, to draw some conclusions and to highlight the advantages and the 
disadvantages of each jurisdiction and how it can be improved.  In the conclusion, refined 
criteria are offered in light of the testing that have been undertaken in the previous four 
chapters by highlighting what are the important issues that have to be considered when 
assessing public enforcement of competition law.  
As it has been highlighted earlier, this thesis only deals with anticompetitive practices and 
unilateral conduct cases. Hence, merger and state aid are outside the scope of this thesis.  The 
reason of excluding merger and state aid, as explained in Chapter 2, is that these cases require 
separate criteria because of the very different way in enforcing the related legal provisions 
and the aim of the enforcer. Mergers and state aid cases are usually notified to the enforcer 
and the enforcer aims to predict the future; whereas in anticompetitive practices and 
unilateral conduct cases, the enforcer has to investigate and discover these practices and aims 
to investigate the past or the present conduct of the investigated parties. 
The period investigated in this thesis is from 1 May 2004 and up to 31 December 2012. The 
data collected for this period are original and collected manually by the author. The 
information needed and employed to carry out the research in the thesis are from a variety of 
resources. The main source of the information are: data collected by the author form the cases 
9 
 
concluded by the CAs; data collected from the appealed decisions to appeal courts; data 
collected about the capabilities (budget and human capital) of the CAs, this data are obtained 
from the CA’s annual report and website also results from previous related studies are taken 
into consideration for comparison purposes. In addition to the data described, the thesis takes 
into account academic work in order to interpret the analysed data.   
The size and the uniqueness of the datasets has been a major motivation for conducting the 
present work.  There are nearly 500 cases between the three jurisdictions with over 15 
variables. For the appealed judgments, over 200 cases have been appealed where data have 
also been obtained and analysed. Over 100
18
 of the appealed cases have been analysed and 
studied in order to interpret the results gleaned from the data.  
One of the main challenges that the author faced when conducting this research, is the 
difficulty with controversial issues such as the levels of deterrence and the difficulties 
associated with its measurement when interpreting the results. In such situations, the thesis 
relied on established principles in the literature in order to draw sound and reasoned 
interpretations.  
1-3: Structure  
The structure of the thesis is quite systematic where all of the chapters follow a fairly similar 
structure. This has be done because the suggested criteria in the thesis and how it have been 
applied throughout the thesis. Before stating the structure of the thesis, it is important to 
highlight the research question and how it will be answered in the chapters.  
The main and the general question that the thesis aims to answer: How and why public 
enforcement of competition law should be assessed? 
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 Cases issued by the CAs and the outcome of appeals.  
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In order to answer this question the following questions will be addressed and answered: (i) 
What matters the most when assessing public enforcement of competition law? In other 
words, what are the best criteria that have to be taken into account when assessing public 
enforcement of competition law? (ii) What is the role of the ‘enforcement and non-
enforcement activities (Outcomes)’ and ‘the budget and human capital (Capabilities)’ of the 
CAs and the ‘surrounding circumstances’ in the jurisdiction on the performance of the CA? 
(iii) Why the UK, Europe and France are representative jurisdictions for the analysis 
undertaken in the thesis? (iv) What are the obstacles that each jurisdiction faces and how it 
could overcome these issues; and what each jurisdiction/ CA can learn from the others? (v) 
What are the general issues that any CA should take into account when enforcing competition 
law? 
Chapter 2 is the foundation of the thesis and consists of two parts and answers question (i) 
and (ii). The first part provides an extensive literature review about the subject matter of the 
thesis and the second part offers the suggested criteria for the assessment of public 
enforcement of competition law. Part one, starts the discussion about public enforcement in 
general and then it talks about the relationship about public and private enforcement of 
competition law. The discussion then moves on to discuss the literature that deals with 
optimal enforcement issues, in particular optimal deterrence, fines and structure; where it has 
been argued that optimal enforcement issues should be dealt with after assessing the CA and 
finding the weaknesses. Subsequently, the literature review continues with the studies that 
can be considered as an assessment studies, including statistical studies and specific studies 
that deal with narrow issues (e.g. studies that deal with leniency programs or fining 
guidelines). Part two of Chapter 2 offers the suggested criteria based on what have been 
gleaned from the literature review and what can be added when constructing the criteria. This 
11 
 
part starts with setting out some assumptions and highlighting the strengths and the 
weaknesses with the possible measures that have been suggested in the existing literature. 
This part consists of three main sections: (1) Enforcement and non-enforcement activities of 
CAs (outputs), (2) Capabilities of CAs (budget and human capital), (3) Surrounding 
circumstances and facts about the CA and the jurisdiction. The outputs category includes: 
number of cases; nature of cases; duration of investigations; sources of investigations; 
complexity of cases; dimensions of cases; success rate on appeal; market/ sector 
investigations/studies; guidelines; studies conducted by the CA. The Capabilities category 
includes Staff; specialist; budget, among other issues. The surrounding circumstances 
category takes into account the following issues: case studies, peer reviews, competiveness 
reports, among other issues. Chapter 2 concludes with how the criteria should be applied and 
what are the possible implications for the criteria theoretically. 
 Chapter 3, 4 and 5 deals with public enforcement of competition law in the EU, UK and 
France, respectively. At the beginning, it provides key facts about the competition regime in 
each jurisdiction and the appeal process; it then discusses literature that has dealt specifically 
with public enforcement in each jurisdiction. Then the criteria are applied as described in 
Chapter 2 (outputs, capabilities and surrounding circumstances), where the data are presented 
and analysed. After the data presentation and analysis, key legislations that have possible 
impact on public enforcement are discussed; and the possible consequences of these 
legislations on the results obtained from the data are offered. Furthermore, any changes in the 
legislations or the institutional structure of the CAs that have occurred within the period 
under examination (May 2004 to December 2012) are scrutinised. In addition, each of the 
chapters links the presented results to the policies adopted by each CA (for example, it links 
the results to leniency procedure and to settlements procedures...etc.) The chapters then 
12 
 
concludes while taking into account that further analysis are undertaken in the comparative 
chapter (Chapter 6) examine CAs from a comparative perspective.  
Chapter 6 conducts a comparative investigation of the three jurisdictions in order to 
understand outstanding issues from the previous chapters and to help in exposing any 
problems. This chapter follows the same structure of the previous three chapters, where it 
presents comparative results according to the order of the suggested criteria.  In addition to 
the discussion associated with the presentation of the comparative results; further analysis 
and discussion is undertaken afterwards with issues that have not been discussed before (such 
as, deterrence, selection of cases and non-ordinary routes for ending investigations). This 
chapter concludes with summing up the findings and the observations gleaned from the 
analysis.   
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It presents the main findings of the thesis and what each 
jurisdiction has to change or maintain. It also offers a final standpoint on the suggested 
criteria.   
13 
 
- Chapter 2- Assessing Public Enforcement of Competition Law: Proposed Criteria 
“The lack of widely accepted, consistently applied standards for assessing 
the quality of agency performance has beset the field of competition policy 
throughout its history. This absence severely impedes the achievement of 
consensus on what competition agencies ought to be doing”.1  
 
2-1: Introduction  
The main aim of this chapter is to establish an acceptable, implementable and comparative 
criterion for the assessment of public enforcement of competition law. The aim of the 
proposed criteria is not only to assess public enforcement of competition law, but also to 
examine if Competition Authorities (CAs) are doing what they ought to be doing
2
 and how 
CAs can improve their performance. This will be done by comparatively highlighting how 
the CA in question may enhance its performance and what are the possible feasible solutions 
for the CA, in light of its capabilities, which can be learnt from other CAs.  
Consequently, when constructing the proposed criteria, this chapter will pay particular 
attention to the suitability of the criteria to comparative studies where CAs can learn from 
each other. Many commentators have highlighted the value and the need of comparative 
assessment studies on many occasions.
3
 Comparative studies may be seen highly useful in the 
                                                          
1
 William E. Kovacic et al, ‘How does your Competition Agency Measure Up?’ (2011) 7 European Competition 
Journal  30, 30. 
2
 Although it is difficult to assess this matter in its own right, but commentators suggested that the lack of an 
assessment method would make knowing what CAs are doing or should do even more difficult. This will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
3
 Mats A. Bergman, ‘QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? OR Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Competition Enforcement’ (2008) 156 De Economist 387, 404; and  William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post 
Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation 
Law 503, 542 and 543 
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arena of assessing CAs’ performance, particularly, when one compares CAs at the same level 
of development (i.e. CA in a developed country vs. CA in a developed country) with 
similarities in the institutional design of CAs.  
The aim of this chapter is not to rank or classify CAs into categories based on the quality of 
enforcement. This chapter aims to provide a tool that facilitates comparative studies between 
CAs. Thus, the aim of such a tool is to help to reveal enforcement problems that may delay or 
prevent the enhancement of enforcement mechanisms. 
The usefulness of having criteria that assess CAs’ enforcement activities could benefit CAs 
and firms who are subject to competition rules from different angles. For example, assessing 
CAs would result, certainly, in evaluating the CA and, hence, identifying what has to be 
modified and what has to be maintained. Furthermore, the assessment process may produce 
other important implications other than assessing the application of the law. The assessment 
process may help in achieving consistent application of the law, as if one has a clear idea of 
what the CA has done or what it may do, it would result in consistent application of the law 
and, thus, legal certainty. Consequently, this would result in setting the boundaries of the law 
and where the rules would apply, as a result this would benefit players in the market by 
setting the limits for them. In addition, assessing public enforcement of competition law 
would help the CA in identifying enforcement problems; as a result, the ability of the CA in 
setting its enforcement priorities more precisely and avoid the problems revealed from the 
assessment process. 
Competition laws are enforced in two ways. The first way is the enforcement of competition 
laws by public agencies, public enforcement. The other way, is the enforcement of 
competition law by private parties who seek remedy as a result of a competition law 
infringement (s), private enforcement. Although the main focus of this thesis is to assess 
15 
 
public enforcement of competition law, studying the existence of private enforcement is very 
important to be considered because it may affect the levels of public enforcement, and indeed 
the levels of deterrence. In addition, it is suggested that public and private enforcement are 
complementary and not separate; hence, each type of enforcement may affect the other. 
In this chapter, it is believed that public enforcement of competition law is superior to private 
enforcement of competition law (in Europe), because private enforcement is weak and public 
enforcement is the most effective and the established form of enforcement in Europe. 
Therefore, the burden on CAs to keep markets as competitive as possible is much higher than 
in other jurisdictions; thus, monitoring public enforcement is of great importance, as there are 
no other form of enforcement that may compensate any ‘slips’ by the public enforcer. 
Because of this, a tool for assessing public enforcement is very important in order to report to 
CAs how they may enhance their performance. 
Currently, according to many scholars and policy makers, there are no acceptable, agreed or 
testable methods for assessing CAs’ performance. Kovacic stated, “The lack of widely 
accepted, consistently applied standards for assessing the quality of agency performance has 
beset the field of competition policy throughout its history. This absence severely impedes 
the achievement of consensus on what competition agencies ought to be doing”.4 From 
Kovacic’s words, it can be understood that the absence of an agreed criteria has led to 
creating uncertainty and confusion in the application of competition rules around the world 
and impedes the enhancement of the application of competition law. This is because neither 
CAs nor other stakeholders are sure if CAs are doing what they are supposed to be doing. In 
another instance, Kovacic addressed a question about how CAs’ performance should be 
                                                          
4
 William E. Kovacic et al, ‘How does your Competition Agency Measure Up?’ (2011) 7 European Competition 
Journal 30. 
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assessed. He replied “Absolutely fundamental question that receives too little attention”.5 
Consequently, this has lead, as stated earlier, to creating enforcement problems and 
difficulties to find the accurate mechanisms to enforce antitrust rules.  Furthermore, the 
problem of not having an agreed standard has been discussed at international level, in 2005 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has called for more 
work to be done in this area, it stated “Considerable work remains to be done to refine the 
methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of completed competition policy 
interventions.”6 Thus, it can be concluded that an agreed criteria is of crucial importance for 
the enhancement of antitrust enforcement.  
However, as it has been pointed out and as it will be discussed later in the chapter, to date 
there has been no agreed method for assessing CAs’ performance; this chapter questions the 
reasons behind this; it then aims to introduce a criteria, the application of which is mainly 
based on publicly available information. In order to cover as many aspects as possible that 
may affect the CA’s performance, the proposed criteria will examine what the CA has 
produced, including enforcement and non-enforcement activities. At the same time, it shall 
look at the capabilities and the institutional characteristics of the CA and seek to further 
clarify surrounding circumstances and facts about the CA and/or the jurisdiction under 
examination.    
The scope of this chapter is limited to assess CAs’ performance in antitrust enforcement, i.e. 
agreements and unilateral conduct cases. This means merger cases are outside the scope of 
this chapter. This is because there are many differences between mergers and non-merger 
cases.  First, the way in which CAs deal with merger and non-merger cases. In the case of 
                                                          
5
 William E. Kovacic Presentation delivered at GCLC, Brussels 1 December 2011. available at 
http://chillingcompetition.com/2011/12/01/slides-evening-policy-talk-bill-kovacic/ accessed 20 December 2011 
6
 OECD (2005) ‘Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition Authorities’.  DAF/COMP(2005)30 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/15/35910995.pdf , accessed 20 April 2012. see P. 10 
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mergers, there is an ex-ante application of the law and in most jurisdictions merging parties 
have to notify their transaction to the CA. Whereas, in non-merger cases there is an ex- post 
application of the law and firms involved in anti-competitive practices try to hide their 
conduct and it is the CA task to find out about such practices. Second, from the regulation of 
each type of conduct; in most jurisdictions merger and non- merger cases are regulated with 
different legislations.
7
 Finally, in antitrust enforcement, mostly CAs set priorities to its 
antitrust enforcement, while in merger cases the CA has to deal with any notified merger and 
it cannot decide which mergers it will examine or not.  For the reasons given, merger cases 
will not be considered when constructing the proposed criteria. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part one provides a literature review that 
highlights the importance of public enforcement of competition law, then it discusses the 
relationship between private and public enforcement of competition. Afterwards, literature 
that deals with optimal enforcement will be discussed, where it will be argued that the area of 
optimal enforcement should be dealt with after assessing the application of competition law; 
it will also be argued that each jurisdiction (CA) should have its own ‘optimal enforcement 
package’. Then this chapter will narrow the focus down and reviews studies that can be 
considered as assessment studies. Part one concludes with what has been observed from the 
literature review. Part two of this chapter introduces proposed criteria for the assessment of 
public enforcement of competition law. Part two consists of three main sections, where each 
of them is a main part of the proposed criteria. The application of the proposed criteria relies 
mainly on three sets of information (outputs of the CA, capabilities and surrounding 
circumstances and facts about the jurisdiction or the CA). Each set of information is 
discussed in a section in part two of this chapter. Part two also discusses other issues, inter 
                                                          
7
 For example, in Europe non-merger cases are regulated by Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), while the European Merger Regulation regulates merger cases, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. 
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alia, the lack of an agreed standard for assessing CAs; it also sheds light on the requirements 
for the application of the criteria and how it should be applied.  
2-2: Part One: Literature review  
The main concern of this thesis is to assess public enforcement of competition law. Part one 
provides a literature review of literature that deals with the enforcement of competition law, 
either by public agencies or by private parties. The examination of private enforcement, 
alongside public enforcement, is important because both types of enforcement may affect one 
another; hence, the levels of enforcement by the public authority in the examined jurisdiction 
may be affected and, indeed the levels of deterrence. Thus, this part will look at literature that 
discusses enforcement issues; it then will examine literature that deals with optimal 
enforcement issues. Then, a review of studies that can be considered as assessment studies 
will be considered. After that, the chapter will narrow the focus into literature that calls for 
establishing an assessment standard for CAs’ performance.  
When discussing the enforcement of competition law, it is difficult to determine where to 
start the discussion with, shall one start by discussing the objectives of competition law, or 
shall one start with the enforcers of competition law (competition agencies), or with the 
optimal design of competition agencies or what is the optimal strategies for enforcing 
competition laws. In fact, all of these issues are of considerable importance for the 
implantation of competition laws, and these issues are inter-related to one another and a 
discussion of any of these issues will lead to the other. Furthermore, all of the mentioned 
issues are debatable issues, for example, many scholars have contributed to the area of 
objectives of competition laws with different views on this topic, and the same can be said to 
the area of optimal enforcement.  
19 
 
However, because the main concern in this thesis is to assess the application of competition 
law by CAs, the issues of the objectives of competition law and the optimal design of CAs 
will be discussed briefly in this chapter. This is because, such issues are to be observed after 
assessing the application of the law, so one can identify what are the objectives of the laws on 
practice and on the basis of this one can determine if the CA meets the objectives of the law.
8
 
The same can be said for the design of the CA, where one needs to assess the authority and 
then decide what has to be changed. It should be made clear in this respect that the objectives 
of the CA differ from the objectives of the law. The objectives of the CA, if stated clearly, 
may affect the CAs outputs.  For example, if the CA embraces a certain enforcement policy 
(ies) this may affect the application of the law and may provide explanations for the levels of 
enforcement. 
First, this part starts the discussion with literature that dealt with public enforcement of 
competition law. Then a review of literature that dealt with private enforcement of 
competition law and its effect on public enforcement will be provided subsequently.  
 
2-2-1: Enforcement of competition law in general  
At the outset, if one looks at the general textbooks that deal with competition law, they 
generally have a chapter about public enforcement of competition law; mostly the 
information about public enforcement is about how public agencies enforce the law and the 
procedures that should be followed by the CA when enforcing the law. For example, 
information on how to initiate an investigation, powers given to CAs during the course of the 
investigation, options at the end of the investigation...etc.
 
For example, Whish and Bailey,
9
 
                                                          
8
 For example Korah has talked about the conflicts of goals of competition law; see Valentine Korah An 
introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (9
th
 edn, Hart, Oxford, 2007)  16. 
9
 Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law (7
th
 edn, OUP, Oxford, 2012), Chapter 7 
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Dabbah,
10
 and Goyder and Albors-Llorens
11
 highlighted in a descriptive manner how CAs 
enforces competition law in Europe and the UK. In the same way, the respected authors 
described how competition may be enforced privately, i.e.  How private parties may bring a 
claim as a result of an anti-competitive practice. However, none of the mentioned authors has 
provided analytical views on public or private enforcement of competition law, their work 
can be seen as a guide on the enforcement of competition law.
12
 
Another way of explaining public and private enforcement has been provided by Ezrachi.
13
 
He explains both types of enforcement, though separately, by reference to the leading cases in 
Europe. In respect to public enforcement, he considered most of the actions that the European 
Commission has to take from the point on how the Commission prioritises its enforcement 
activities (i.e. whether to initiate an investigation or not) to the point in which it issues its 
final decision. The same can be said in respect of private enforcement, where Ezrachi 
explains how private parties, with reference to case law, can enforce EU competition law 
before national courts.  
In addition, other textbooks provided analytical and critical views in these areas. Monti,
14
 in 
the context of European competition law, has dealt with both types of enforcement in a very 
critical manner in a chapter entitled ‘institutions’. In respect of public enforcement, Monti 
highlights the major differences between the abolished regulation (regulation 17/62
15
) and the 
                                                          
10
 Maher M. Dabbah EC and UK Competition Law  (CUP, Cambridge, 2004) chapter 14, 627- 677 
11
 Joanna Goyder and Albertina Albors-Llorens Goyder’s EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2009) 
chapter 19,  502-528, (discussing the history(the origins) and the current situation of competition law 
enforcement) 
12
 However, in other parts of the mentioned books, some of the authors provided critical views toward specific 
issues of public or private enforcement.  
13
Ariel Ezrachi EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (2
nd
 edn, Hart, Oxford, 2010) 
chapter 10 
14
  Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) Chapter 11, 392- 438. 
15
 Council Regulation No 17 (EEC): First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (at present 
Articles 101 and 102) [Official Journal No. 013, 21.02.1962] 
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current regulation (Regulation 1/2003
16
) that is used to enforce competition law in Europe, he 
then carries on by bringing to light on the possible ‘side effects’ of Regulation 1/2003, 
describing it as ‘far from being necessary and revolutionary’17. Monti has two main concerns 
over Regulation 1/2003.
18
 First, the risk of under enforcement because a well-placed national 
competition authority may take no action because either of national interest, or because it 
lacks resources to intervene. Second, Monti is worried about the danger of duplication of 
enforcement. In the context of private enforcement, Monti has been critical as well. The main 
criticism was toward the practical difficulties for claimants when attempting to claim 
damages, especially in the case of commitment decisions and leniency applications, because 
national courts are not bound by these decisions.
19
  
2-2-2: Public and Private Enforcement of competition law 
When talking about the assessment of public competition law enforcement, one needs to take 
into account the existence of private enforcement of competition law. For example, in the US, 
there are very few public enforcement cases compared to private enforcement, some studies 
have claimed that the ratio between private enforcement to public enforcement is between 10 
to 1 and 20 to 1.
20
 So, the decrease of public enforcement is compensated by private 
enforcement. However, there are major differences between the functionality of public 
agencies on both sides of the Atlantic.
21
  
                                                          
16
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Now 101 and 102 TFEU)   
17
 Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 419 
18
 Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 417 
19
 Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 437 
20
 See CA Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, (OUP, Oxford, 1999).  Found 
in, Assimakis P Komninos ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?’ 
(2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review, 10 
21
 For an illustration See, Ilya Segal and  Michael Whinston, ‘Public vs private enforcement of  antitrust law: a 
survey’ (2007) 28(5), European Competition Law Review, 306 ( highlighting the differences between public 
and private enforcement in Europe and the US; providing information about  the effective role of private 
antitrust in the US, and the lack of private enforcement on Europe. They then went on to highlight the pros and 
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The relationship between public and private enforcement of competition has received 
attention in the literature.
22
 It has been argued that private enforcement of competition law 
helps in achieving the objectives of competition enforcement that cannot be achieved solely 
by relying on public enforcement.
23
 These objectives are injunctive, restorative/ 
compensatory and penal. According to Monti, public enforcement does not achieve the 
restorative/ compensatory aspect in its present form, and he sees the European Commission 
sees private enforcement operates to achieve all three goals.
24
 Hence, in Monti’s eyes, private 
enforcement complements public enforcement of competition law.  
In a different context, Hviid
25
 argued that when considering re-designing or talking about the 
optimal design of the public enforcement regime, one should not dismiss the role of private 
enforcement in achieving deterrence and compensation; hence, seeing the relationship 
between private and public enforcement a complementary one.
26
 In the same vein, 
Rosochowicz argues that private and public enforcement of competition law should work 
together in order to reach an optimal level of enforcement, this is because, CAs do not have 
enough human and financial resources in their disposal to reach an optimal level of 
enforcement. Hence, private enforcement would help in filling the gaps left by public 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cons of each type of enforcement, they also discuss issues regarding the effects of the institutional design and 
highlighting the objectives, goals and the problems associated with each type of enforcement.) 
22
 It should be noted that the arguments made here are in the context of Europe unless otherwise stated. For an 
example of studies that dealt with the relationship between public and private actions in the US, see David 
Rosenberg and James P. Sullivan, ‘Coordinating private class action and public agency enforcement of   
antitrust law’ (2006)  2(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 159; see also, R. Preston McAfee, Hugo 
M. Mialon, and Sue H. Mialon, ‘ Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis’ (2008) 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=775245 (highlighting economically under which circumstances which type 
of enforcement (or both types)  is desirable under US law)  
23
 Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 436. 
24
 Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 436. 
25
 Morten Hviid, ‘Why private enforcement should be reformed alongside public enforcement’ Competition 
Policy Blog (3 May 2011). available at http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/why-private-
enforcement-should-be-reformed-alongside-public-enforcement/ Accessed 20 May 2012. 
26
 Hviid made this point as an advice for the UK government when it dismisses private enforcement when 
reforming the public enforcement regime.  However, the UK government has consulted, separately, on how to 
improve private enforcement latter.  
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enforcement because of its compensatory and deterrent nature.
27
 Komninos has contributed to 
this area differently, however with similar conclusions. He, for example, highlighted the 
reasons for treating private enforcement for being independent from public enforcement, he 
then went on to shed light on practical difficulties in the interrelationship between public and 
private enforcement; and how issues such as settlements by CAs and leniency applications, 
may hamper private enforcement. Komninos
28
 concluded by observing that in Europe there is 
no primacy of public enforcement over private enforcement of competition law.
29
 
Furthermore, competition officials have supported the complementary relationship between 
private and public enforcement, where, in a recent speech, the Director General of DG Comp 
highlighted this issue.
30
  
In contrast to the above opinions, Wils adopts a very different view regarding the relationship 
between private and public enforcement. He argued that the lack of private antitrust 
enforcement is very desirable and that he cannot find a single situation, where private 
enforcement complements public enforcement. Wils argues that private antitrust enforcement 
is driven by private profit motives, which fundamentally diverge, from the general interest, 
and because of the high cost of private antitrust enforcement. He suggested that public 
enforcement is more effective because of the existence of more powerful instigative and 
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 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, ‘Deterrence and the relationship between public and private enforcement of 
competition law’ Unpublished work. Available at 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=deterrence%20and%20the%20relationship%20between%20public
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Accessed 20/05/2012.  
28
 Assimakis P Komninos ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 
3(1) Competition Law Review. 
29
 With reference to Masterfoods case and Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. Arguing that, the primacy (in the 
named case and article 16) is for acts of a community organ over the decisions of national organs and not 
necessarily to be understood as primacy of public over private enforcement. 
30
 Alexander Italianer, ‘Public and private enforcement of competition law’ speech delivered at the 5th 
International Competition Conference 17 February 2012, Brussels,  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2012_02_en.pdf  accessed 20 May 2012. 
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sanctioning abilities.
31
 More recently, Wils sticks to his views, where he highlighted the 
relationship and the interactions between public and private enforcement. Wils argues that the 
role of private enforcement should be limited to compensation; the public enforcer’s task 
should be clarifying and developing competition law prohibitions, and deterring and 
punishing violations.
32
 
Most of the above-mentioned literature highlighted the complementary role of private 
enforcement to public enforcement, and vice- versa.
33
  
 
2-2-3: Why Private Enforcement Matters (especially in the EU) 
Private enforcement of competition law in Europe can be described as a ‘work- in-progress’, 
where CAs in Europe aiming to encourage the enforcement of competition law privately. 
This can be demonstrated by guidance papers produced by CAs in Europe. To name a few, 
the European Commission’s White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules of 2008,
34
 and the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) recommendations on private 
damages actions in competition law of 2007.
35
 However, the existence of private enforcement 
is a matter that is difficult to assess, particularly with stand-alone cases where it is difficult to 
find out about cases. Hence, this may affect some side of the analysis because of the lack of 
information about private enforcement.  
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 Wouter P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ (2003) 26(3) World 
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 European Commission, ‘White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ (2008)  
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In the case of lack of information about the existence of private enforcement, the importance 
of assessing public enforcement becomes greater. Because if there is a lack of private 
enforcement in Europe, then, the burden is on CAs to tackle anti-competitive behaviour in 
markets is much higher. As a result, CAs should be aiming to fill in the gap left from the lack 
of private enforcement of competition law.  
In this respect, it is important to highlight the studies that aim to study the existence of private 
enforcement of competition law in Europe. The number of studies that attempted to quantify 
the existence of private enforcement is limited. There have been two studies conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission: the Ashurst
36
 and the welfare impact studies.
37
 Both 
studies provide information about private enforcement at a European and national level; these 
studies also provides information on the ways in which claims can be calculated and how 
private enforcement can be encouraged, both studies also highlight how can private 
enforcement add to public enforcement and how it enhances welfare.
3839
 Barry Rodgers has 
examined the existence of private enforcement in the UK between 2000 and 2008 in six 
articles. He has done so, by looking for cases and settlements that occurred in the UK.
40
 
                                                          
36
 Ashurst, a study prepared by Emily Clark, Mat Hughes and David Wirth, ‘Study on the conditions of claims 
for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules’ (2004) available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/economic_clean_en.pdf  accessed 20 May 2012  
37
 Report for the European Commission ‘Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare 
impact and potential scenarios’ (2007) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf accessed 20 May 
2012. 
38
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Payer examined the existence of private enforcement in Germany between 2005 and 2007.
41
 
For the mentioned above, it can be seen that there are not too many studies about private 
enforcement of competition law in Europe. 
Hence, despite the established relationship between public and private enforcement of 
competition law; the lack of empirical studies for both types of enforcement makes it 
necessary to deal with each type separately because of the lack of information of the other 
type, and the way in which each type is assessed is different as well. For example, in the case 
of private enforcement, researchers have been trying to find the existence of it. While, in the 
case of public enforcement, most of the research is attempting to assess or evaluate the 
actions of CAs. Furthermore, the assessment of public enforcement of competition law can be 
more precise, because of the ability to capture what the CA has done and the ability to assess 
its outcomes. 
42
 It is also important to mention that there are only a limited number of 
analytical empirical studies about public enforcement in Europe.
43
  
Another important aspect that makes examining public enforcement important is that public 
agencies cannot deal with all infringement of competition law or even the necessary ones for 
many different of reasons. If this is the case, then the CA has to be selective with its 
enforcement activities; in such a scenario, assessing the CA’s selections (outputs) becomes 
even more important, i.e. assessing public enforcement.  Lande and Davis illustrate the role 
of public authorities, in the context of competition agencies, they state: 
 
“As a practical matter the government cannot be expected to do all or even most 
of the necessary enforcing for various reasons including: budgetary constraints; 
undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of industry conditions; overly 
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 Sebastian Peyer, ‘Myths and Untold Stories - Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany’ CCP Working Paper 
10-12.  
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 Bearing in mind the existence of private enforcement, where such information is available. 
43
 This will be shown later when reviewing studies that can be considered as assessment studies. 
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suspicious views about complaints by “losers” that they were in fact victims of 
anticompetitive behaviour; higher turnover among government attorneys, and the 
unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or non-
enforcement) decisions are at times politically motivated.”44 
 
In addition to this, the enforcement mechanisms used in competition law have been criticised. 
In this regard, Posner states: “it is not enough to have good doctrine; it is also necessary to 
have enforcement mechanisms that ensure, at reasonable cost, a reasonable degree of 
compliance with the law. Antitrust is deficient in such mechanisms.”45  
Thus, from reviewing the literature above about public enforcement, private enforcement and 
the relationship between them; it can be said that at the current state of both types of 
enforcement in Europe, more focus should be given to public enforcement. This is because of 
the following reasons. First, private enforcement in Europe is weak and still underdeveloped 
according to academics, policy makers and competition officials. Therefore, public 
enforcement is the only major (effective) tool for enforcing competition law and tackling 
anti-competitive behaviours in markets.  Second, public enforcement is the most developed 
and well-equipped enforcement tool (in Europe and its member states).
46
 That is why, a tool 
for the assessment of public enforcement is of crucial importance, given that, CAs may not be 
able to deal with all competition law infringements; and we do not know what optimal 
enforcement is or what CAs should be doing, as it will be shown below. A comparison 
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 edn University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001) 266. 
46
 This as well has been observed by Advovate General MAZÁK In his opinion in Pfleiderer AG V  
Bundeskartellamt Case C-360/09Para 40. This as well has been adopted by Angus MacCulloch and Bruce 
Wardhaugh in a presentation delivered at the 8
th
 CCP annual conference; a review of their presentation is 
available at Research at CCP Blog (18 June 2012) by Ali Massadeh, available at 
http://researchatccp.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/2012-conference-review-session-four/ accessed 20 June 2012. 
28 
 
between CAs can provide solutions for each other, and insights may be observed from this 
where CAs can learn from each other. 
To conclude on the aspects related to public and private enforcement and its relation to the 
assessment of public enforcement. Public and private enforcement are complementary and 
not separate, hence, it is important to take into account each type of enforcement when 
assessing the other. However, because of the lack of information and sufficient studies about 
the existence of private competition law enforcement in Europe; when assessing public 
enforcement of competition law, one needs to assume the lack of private enforcement and 
focus on public enforcement so that CAs aim to fill the gap left by the lack of private 
enforcement. Of course if any information available about private enforcement in a given 
country, this shall be taken into account as this will give clearer explanations about the 
application of competition law in that country.  
 
2-2-4: Optimal Enforcement Literature (fines, deterrence, structure) 
Another form of literature that can be seen, although indirectly, as a pathway for assessment 
studies, is the literature that calls for optimal enforcement of competition law. The area of 
optimal enforcement of competition law represents one of the hotly debated topics in antirust 
scholarship. The contributions to this area vary.
47
 Some scholars have attempted to deal with 
the issue of optimal enforcement of competition rules in general terms,
48
 while others dealt 
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with more specific issues, such as optimal sanctions, optimal institutional structure/ design or 
optimal deterrence. Such debates are of great importance to the enhancement of competition 
law enforcement.  
However, in order to reach an optimal level of enforcement, at the outset one should try to 
identify what prevents optimal enforcement from taking place. More specifically, one should 
aim to expose enforcement problems in any given jurisdiction by taking into consideration 
the specifics of each enforcement authority and the country in question before trying to 
scrutinise what could constitute optimal enforcement. Furthermore, what is considered, as an 
optimal practice in a given country might not be the case in another country. Therefore, in 
order to investigate what is optimal enforcement for a given regime, one needs a tool that 
helps in examining the antitrust regime in question and helps in exposing what may prevent 
optimal enforcement from taking place. However, as it will be shown below, more research 
has been done in the area of optimal enforcement than in the area of assessing CAs.  
To start with the issue of optimal design of CAs. It can be argued, that the optimal design of 
CAs is the only type of optimal research that can be dealt with before assessing the 
application of the law, because these studies are designed to newly established CAs where the 
assessment of how the CA has applied the law is very difficult if not impossible, because 
there will be no enforcement within such CAs. With regard to the optimal design of the CA, 
in 2003 the OECD stated that there is no single optimal design for CAs, it stated:  
 
“Evidently there is no one optimal design given the objectives that have been 
adopted for the competition agency or the functions that have been allocated to it. 
There appears to be a considerable variety in the solutions chosen in different 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deterrence. See Wouter P.J. Wils The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Kluwer Law International, 
2002). 
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jurisdictions, and it is difficult to ascertain whether these alternative approaches 
are optimal without also looking at country specific factors such as its legal and 
administrative traditions, stage of economic development, political realities, 
etc.”49  
Hence, it could be argued that the case with optimal enforcement studies in general, weather 
it is about sanctions, deterrence or enforcement in general, has to be decided according the 
needs of the CA and indeed the jurisdiction in question.  
Unlike the area of optimal design of CAs, other optimal enforcement issues have received 
more attention. One of the earliest contributions to the area of optimal enforcement is the 
seminal paper of Landes,
50
 where he discusses the optimal sanctions for antitrust violations. 
Landes discusses not only the optimal sanctions for antitrust infringements but also highlights 
other issues, such as, the choice between private and public enforcement of antitrust law. In 
his discussion about optimal enforcement, he states that optimal enforcement does not mean 
prohibiting all antitrust, as there are some ‘efficient’ violations, where the gains to the 
offender exceeds the harms to the victim, such violations should not be prohibited even if the 
cost of enforcement is very low.
51
 Landes dealt with antitrust violations separately, i.e., he 
dealt with cartels, joint ventures, predatory pricing... etc. differently; then he recommended 
an optimal sanction for each type of violation separately.  From Landes’s approach, it can be 
seen that optimal sanctions have to be decided on area-by-area basis and, indeed, if this is the 
case, then this can be seen that there is no single way to optimal enforcement that can 
accommodate all types of enforcement. Based on this, then an optimal enforcement policy 
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cannot be generalised to all jurisdictions, as each country has its own specifics and its own 
circumstances. This is why assessing the application of competition by CAs is of crucial 
importance before trying to establish what is an optimal practice and what is not.  
In the area of optimal fines, questions have been raised about what could be the optimal fine 
that may deter an offender from committing an antitrust violation. Some researchers 
distinguish between infringements committed by a single offender (unilateral conduct cases) 
and a group of offenders (anti-competitive agreements or cartels). On this matter, Wils
52
 
concluded that there are impracticalities in reaching an optimal fine in both scenarios, and 
even if an optimal fine has been identified, there is as well impracticality in imposing such a 
fine. However, he highlighted the importance of researching the area of antitrust optimal 
fines, as this would be helpful in measuring fines against antitrust violations. Wils stated, 
“Even if it thus appears unfeasible in practice to measure econometrically the theoretically 
optimal fine for a given antitrust violation, the theory on optimal fines certainly remains 
useful as general guidance for the practice of fixing the amount of antitrust fines.”53  
Heimler and Mehta took a similar approach to Wils. They suggested that distinct ways should 
be taken to cartel and abuse of dominance cases when setting the amount of fine because of 
the differences in the probability of detecting these infringements.
54
  
In a widely cited paper by Ginsburg and Wright 
55
about what could be the appropriate 
antitrust sanction to achieve optimal deterrence. They argue that the optimal sanction (for 
price fixing and other cartel activities) should be guided mainly by two principles: “(1) the 
total sanction must be great enough, but no greater than necessary, to take the profit out of 
price-fixing; and (2) the individuals responsible for the price fixing should be given a 
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sufficient disincentive to discourage them from engaging in the activity.”56 In this context, 
they highlighted the sources of antirust sanctions; they stated that law enforcement and the 
market are the main sources for antitrust sanctions. Ginsburg and Wright illustrate this by 
stating  “There two sources of antitrust sanctions: Law enforcement, which may fine both 
types of offenders, incarcerate individuals, and, as we propose, debar them from serving as 
corporate officers or directors; and the market, which imposes reputational penalties upon 
both types of offenders. The challenge for antitrust law is to coordinate these various 
corporate and individual sanctions to achieve the optimal total sanction”.57  They concluded 
that increasing the fines imposed on corporations is not the likely answer to solve the 
problem of optimal deterrence, and hence deter cartel activity; what is needed (besides fines 
on corporations) is sanctions against individuals, as those need to be deterred as well. It can 
be understood from Ginsburg and Wright the challenging nature of deciding what optimal 
sanctions can be (or the difficulty in reaching it) for antitrust violations.  
Motta
58
 contributed to the area of optimal deterrence and fines by examining the approach 
and the practice of the European Commission based on the 2006 fining guidelines
59
 with 
regard to cartels. Motta described the fining guidelines as far from being optimal. However, 
he suggested that deterrence can be improved through the following. First, by introducing a 
settlement procedure in cartel cases,
60
 so the Commission can redirect its resources and save 
time. Second, to have an effectively designed mechanism for private actions for damages. 
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Third, to introduce sanctions and administrative fines for managers were involved in a cartel. 
Fourth, the promotion of compliance programs to be adopted by firms, and to be compulsory 
in the case of repeat offenders.  
An example of how competition officials evaluate their CAs’ work and how they measure it, 
is a very recent speech by the European Commissioner for competition policy, titled higher 
duties for competition enforcers.
61
 From the title of the speech, it seems that competition 
officials in Europe are not convinced enough of what they are doing. In his speech, the 
Commissioner promised that the European Commission would be more aggressive and set 
higher fines,
62
 showing a bit of frustration that the Commission did not impose high fines in 
the year 2011 compared to the year of 2010.
63
 These statements from Joaquín Almunia can be 
interpreted that the European commission itself (DG COMP) does not see itself applying 
competition law optimally. Therefore, he evaluates the work of the European Commission 
based on the number of cases and the amount of fine imposed compared to previous years.
64
 
However, one may questions the basis of the dissatisfaction of the European Commission of 
its enforcement; the European Commission has measured its success based on fines; because 
the amount fines imposed has decreased from a year to the subsequent year it has seen itself 
as underperforming. Competition officials should raise such points only after assessing the 
application competition law by their CA; they need to consider other activities done by the 
CA. The CA task is not only to fine but also to raise awareness and the levels of deterrence in 
its jurisdiction.  
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To conclude on the matter of optimal enforcement, as many of the authors mentioned earlier 
found difficulties in reaching what constitutes optimal enforcement, optimal deterrence, 
optimal fines or optimal institutional design;  one needs to focus on issues that may lead to 
better enforcement of competition law instead of optimal enforcement. This may be achieved, 
as this thesis argues, through a proper assessment of competition law enforcement, which is 
based on clear and flexible criteria. Furthermore, because of the impractically of discussing 
specific issues (or cases) about competition law enforcement, it is better to look at the whole 
enforcement activities of the CA and aims to assess it. 
If deterrence, which is one of the undisputable aims of competition law, is immeasurable, or 
even the matter of deciding what could constitute optimal deterrence/fine/ enforcement, is a 
very debatable issue. Then one may compare optimal enforcement issues to perfect 
competition, where it is very difficult if not impossible to attain. Thus, it can be concluded 
that it is more practical and feasible to look for better enforcement instead of optimal 
enforcement.  
 
2-2-5: Studies that can be considered as Assessment studies 
To turn to the literature that is closer to the topic of this thesis. In what follows studies that 
attempted to assess  CAs’ enforcement activities (whether directly or indirectly) , studies that 
suggested methods for assessing CAs but without trying to test these methods and studies that 
suggested best practices that are to be taken into account when assessing the performance of 
CAs, will be reviewed.   
35 
 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies that set out criteria and test the proposed 
criteria to actual data. In other words, there are no studies exist that have a testable criteria for 
assessing the performance of CAs or the application of competition law.
65
  
 
2-2-5-1: Statistical and Empirical Studies  
To start with general studies that aim to provide statistical analysis about a given jurisdiction. 
Such statistical studies aim to give information about a given CA, but without testing the 
results against a criteria or criteria to show how their results can enhance the performance of 
the examined CA, however, some of the studies links such number to certain events, such as, 
the enactment of a new law or the introduction (or abolish) of certain procedure.  An example 
of such studies is Carree et al’s paper where they analysed the European Commission’s 
decisions from 1957 until 2004.
66
 
67
This study provides a historical overview that summarises 
the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust, the authors also links the statistics to changes 
in legislation and administrative implementation.
68
 For the period of the study there were 538 
formal antitrust decisions concluded by European Commission pursuant to Articles 81, 82, 86 
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EC
69
 and Council Regulation 17.
70
 
71
The authors collected many variables from these cases, 
such as: length of decision, duration of the investigation, nationality of firms, nature of the 
alleged offence, level of fines imposed, the Commissioner who signed the decision and 
whether there was an appeal of the case or not.  
Such studies can be considered as a valuable source for the understanding of certain events 
that occurred within the years of the study and the history of the examined CA in numbers. 
However, it does not say anything about the overall performance of the authority in question 
and how the CA may improve its performance.  
There are other empirical studies that examine a particular issue or event. For instance, 
examining the effectiveness of leniency or fining policies in a particular jurisdiction.
72
 For 
example, Stephan
73
 examines the 1996 European leniency notice
74
 empirically. He examines 
horizontal cartel cases in Europe, which have been opened as a result of the 1996 leniency 
notice. Stephan finds that the leniency notice was of limited success because it did not help in 
uncovering active cartels but failed cartels. This mainly because around three quarters of the 
examined cartels were subject to prior or simultaneous investigations in the US; and most of 
the cartels were in the chemicals industry (67%) where many of the cartels were connected to 
one another.
75
  
Brenner,
76
 however, has a positive view on the 1996 leniency notice. Brenner examined a 
sample of 61 cartel cases investigated and prosecuted by the European Commission between 
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1990 and 2003; he compares cartels that were detected after leniency adoption with cartels 
detected before the leniency notice came into force. He found that under the 1996 leniency 
notice investigation and prosecution becomes faster by about 1.5 years. Furthermore, he finds 
evidence indicating that the program provides incentives to reveal information on criminal 
activities in the sense that agencies are better informed about the cartel conduct than they 
would be absent the program.  
The concerns with these studies are self-evident as it can be seen from the examples given 
above; where two studies assess the same piece of legislation but ended up with very 
different views from the authors.  This is mainly because of the intention and the purpose of 
each study, and what each author is aiming to achieve. However, from a purely assessment 
perspective, this is very confusing, because such studies do not give an overall assessment of 
the application of competition law by the CA. This as well can be a dilemma for policy 
makers when they want to reform a certain policy. If an overall assessment of the law was 
applied to the CA, then a judgment on what to reform or keep would be easier.   
Similar studies have conducted in other areas as well. Geradin and Henry
77
 consider the 
fining policy of the European Commission.  The authors reviewed all the Commission 
decisions and CFI judgments dealing with fines, which have been adopted since the 
publication of the 1998 fining Guidelines.
78
 The main findings of this work are: (1) most of 
the infringement  are treated as severe infringement, including cartels and non-cartel cases; 
(2) the Commission seems to be looking at the effects of the conduct and it did not rely on 
legal standards when setting the amount of fine;( 3) the CFI never increased the fine imposed 
by the Commission and it has been reluctant principles behind the Commission’s fining 
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decision, it only reviewed whether the fining guidelines were correctly applied or not.
79
 
Whatever the outcome of such studies, i.e. positive or negative, it do not say anything about 
the performance of the authority as a whole. One may also argue that the outcome of such 
studies have some ambiguous effects on the CA in general. For example, if the outcome of a 
certain study is positive, then this may create a perception that overall performance of the CA 
is good (and vice versa), especially in the case where there are no studies in other areas of the 
CA enforcement activities, while the CA may be doing well (or not well) in other areas that is 
not considered.  
Another type of studies, are those which employ a standard to test empirical findings against. 
A standard that has been used in the literature is success rate on appeal.  Basically, such 
studies count the number of appealed decisions and the outcomes of the cases for a given 
period of time. Afterwards, they calculate the overall success rate on appeal, and based on 
this, they decide whether the CA is doing a good job or not. For example, Wright and 
Diveley
80
 used appeals outcomes as their primary quality measure to determine the quality of 
decision making between expert agencies and generalist judges. Harding and Gibbs,
81
 in the 
European context, employed a similar measure for cartel cases. 
Furthermore, other studies can be categorised as assessment studies that aim to introduce an 
index to assess competition laws and/or policies, by and large, for a large number of 
jurisdictions. However, to date there are no studies that assess CAs’ performance; instead, 
                                                          
79
 Geradin, D. and D. Henry, ‘The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical Review 
of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts Judgments’ (2005) 1(2) European 
Competition Journal 401. Working paper version p. 58. 
80
Joshua D. Wright and Angela Diveley ‘Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary 
Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission’.  Available at SSRN 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990034. 
81
 Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 1995-2004’ 
(2005) 30 European Law Review 349. 
39 
 
these studies, mostly, examine laws and their effects. For example, Hylton and Deng
82
 
offered an index for the assessment of competition law and their effects in 102 countries, 
which represent the number all of the competition regimes existing for the time period of the 
study, the time period of this study is from 2001 to 2004. They offer the “scope index” to 
measure the breadth of the overall competition law and other subparts, such as the law on 
dominance or mergers. The “scope index” gives score to competition laws/ regimes from 0 to 
29, where the higher the score the better is the law/regime. In terms of the overall scope of 
competition law (regional level), they found that Europe is the strongest region in the world; 
the weakest regions are South America and Central America.
83
 The highest score (for 
countries) according to the “scope index” scores is 28 and is allocated to European 
countries.
84
 The lowest score is given to Paraguay (2).
85
 With regard to the effects of 
competition law on the intensity of local competition, the authors’ analysis offers mild 
preliminary support for the claim that competition law has a positive, though quite limited, 
effect on the intensity of competition within a nation.   The authors acknowledge the 
limitations of their study and admitting that the results, especially on the effects of 
competition law on the intensity of local competition, are preliminary because more data is 
needed.
86
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 Similarly, Nicholson
87
 presented an “Antitrust Law Index” that measures the presence and 
the complexity of competition laws, in countries where competition laws were in effect in 
2003 (52 jurisdictions).
88
 The “Antitrust Law Index” gives scores to jurisdiction between 0 
and 21. The United States is on the top of the “Antitrust Law Index”, it scores 21, and many 
transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe dominated the top of the “Antitrust Law 
Index”; the lowest score is given to Malta and Chile (4).89 One of the main conclusions that 
Nicholson offered is that strong laws do not necessarily represent effective antitrust policy. 
As it can be seen, such type of research mainly looks at the comprehensiveness (scope and 
effectiveness) of the law in each jurisdiction and at the powers given to the CA in that 
jurisdiction. The main concern of these studies, which looks at the content of competition law 
on paper, is that enforcement is assumed but not measured whatsoever. The first index, the 
“Scope Index” measures the comprehensiveness and the other index, the “Antitrust Law 
Index”, measures the presence of certain key provisions. If one compares the values of both 
indexes, one will be able to find the variation of the outcomes of each index because it 
depends mainly on the criteria employed in each index. As mentioned earlier, Hylton and 
Deng employ completeness of the law and Nicholson employs measuring the presence of key 
provisions. 
Another concern with indexes studies is that they do not highlight the problems in the 
examined jurisdiction or why the country’s score is high or low. Hence, such methods do not 
help the country (CA) on how to improve its performance or what should be modified. This is 
                                                          
87
 Michael W. Nicholson, ‘An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International Competition Policy’ 
(2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1009.  
88
 For an excellent and critical overview of the studies that introduce an index for measuring competition law 
and/or policy, see Dina I. Waked, ‘Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical Study 
of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries’ (2012) p 9-20, available at SSRN. 
89
 Michael W. Nicholson, ‘An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International Competition Policy’ 
(2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1009, 1021. 
41 
 
mainly because, as stated earlier, that enforcement of competition law is assumed but not 
measured or given any attention.     
 
2-2-5-2: Studies discussing Assessment/ evaluation methodologies 
Closer to what thiis chapter is discussing, there is relevant literature that reviews evaluations 
methods; such literature highlights the benefits and the shortcomings of widely used methods 
for evaluating CAs. This literature reviews all methods, i.e., merger and non-mergers (mainly 
about mergers or specific area), qualitative and quantitative methods. Examples of such 
studies are: Begraman, 
90
Davis, Omrsi
91
 and Kovacic,
92
 where they reviewed widely used 
evaluation methods by highlighting the pros and cons of each methodology. However, their 
reviews include methods used for evaluating mergers, methods used to estimate consumer 
savings as a result of the CA action(s), methods used to estimate the impact of CAs 
interventions. Therefore, such literature can be seen as a very useful source when 
constructing a criteria or method for evaluating CAs performance. In the same vein, 
Kovacic
93
 critically reviewed ex-post evaluation methodologies. Kovacic followed this by 
suggestions that should be taken into account when constructing a methodology for 
conducting performance evaluations.  
Furthermore, there are studies that deal with the best practices that CAs should take into 
account when measuring their performance and how CAs can improve their performance, 
weather the assessment conducted internally (by the authority itself) or externally. For 
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example, Muris
94
 highlights ‘principles for a successful competition agency’. Some of the 
principles that Muris called for are: developing  a proper understanding of the CA’s role; the 
integration  of competition and consumer protection policy; a broad range of policy tools and 
remedies; not dismissing institutional capabilities of the CA; the CA has to be transparent of 
how the law is enforced.
95
 These principles can be seen as the basics for a successful CA and 
what it is desirable for CAs to take into account when thinking about reforms. However, it is 
unclear how these principles would determine the quality of competition law enforcement; 
such studies may help in understating how CA may operate. For example, if the CA has clear 
goals and it is transparent enough on how the law is applied, then this would help us in 
assessing the authority’s enforcement of the law. In the given example, one would be able to 
identify the goals of the CA and if the CA achieved its goals.  
Similarly, Kovacic
96
 highlighted the importance of assessing CAs’ performance, emphasising 
that the rating of CAs should not be based on enforcement activities; instead it should be 
based on the impact of enforcement as it is more important than the activity levels of 
enforcement.
97
 Kovacic highlights the lack of an appropriate criteria for rating agencies 
performance; and points out the importance of having such criteria in order to properly assess 
CAs’ enforcement activities and how one should not dismiss the capabilities of CAs 
(however, regarding this point reference was made to mergers).
98
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However, the main concern with such studies is that they do not take into consideration the 
specifics of CAs and they are not necessarily realistic. This is because such studies calls for 
certain practices that is to be taken into account without considering the capabilities of CAs. 
In addition, the principles or the best practices suggested by such studies are very wide.  Such 
studies shall be carried out after reviewing and assessing the CA in question. It should be 
noted, however, that such studies may be very useful for inexperienced CAs but not for CAs 
where assessing its application of competition law is possible. Therefore, these studies may 
offer solutions for CAs where certain concerns have been identified as a result of assessing 
the authority’s performance.  
Another type of studies that can be considered as assessment studies are rankings.  The only 
example that exists in competition law arena is the Global Competition Review (GCR) 
ranking.
99
 The GCR ranks the leading CAs around world based on surveys sent out to 
competition officials and practitioners, the results are driven form the responses received, 
subsequently, it ranks CAs into four ratings: Elite, very good, good and fair. However, in 
ranking studies it is not clear how such rankings would benefit CAs examined. If a CA got a 
Fair rating, the survey does not say how it can improve its performance or where the 
problems lie, or on what basis a given CA has got an ‘elite’ rating. Having said that, the way 
in which the results of the survey presented gives good information about many aspects of the 
authorities examined, which helps in cross-countries comparisons and constitute a very good 
source for additional information when conducting assessment studies.  Furthermore, the 
GCR rating has been criticised by commentators. Kovacic criticises the GCR rating 
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describing it as a poor measure for CAs’ performance, because it mainly focus on levels of 
activity a proxy for effectiveness. 
100
  
Furthermore, Nicholson stated that ‘These rankings provide basic ordinal rankings for broad 
comparisons among jurisdictions, but are neither intended for nor effective in the empirical 
analysis of international competition policy.’101   
2-2-5-3: Introducing Assessment Methodology  
More closely to the topic of this chapter, there are a handful number of studies that attempted 
to introduce methods for evaluating CAs’ performance, however, without testing such 
methods. For instance, Hüschelrath and Leheyda
102103
 introduced a three steps methodology 
to evaluate competition policy:  preparation, execution and reporting, where each of the three 
stages is subdivided into three building blocks. The preparation stage consists of: (1) 
identification of the evaluation object; (2) determination of the functions, the aims and the 
context of the evaluation; (3) timing of the evaluation. The execution stage consists of: (1) 
derivation of evaluation criteria; (2) definition of the counterfactual; (3) selection and 
application of indicators and methods. The third, and the final, stage consists of:  (1) 
derivation and interpretation of results; (2) appraisal of the significance of the results; (3) 
derivation of conclusions.  
When looking at the stages and the sub-stages of the methodology, it seems that this study is 
a guidance that can be used when evaluating competition policy. For this reason, this study 
cannot be considered as a methodology of competition policy; it can be considered as a ‘best 
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practices’ study that is to be taken into account when evaluating a given CA or competition 
policy in a given country.   In addition, the proposed methodology has not been tested and the 
authors see their project as a contribution to the debatable issue of evaluating competition 
policy and as an identification of ways for further academic research.
104
  
 
2-2-6: Concluding remarks on Part One 
Part one of this chapter has provided a review of the literature that touches upon the area of 
assessing public enforcement of competition. At the beginning of this part, the significance of 
public enforcement has been established. Then, the relationship between private and public 
enforcement of competition law has been brought to light, showing that public enforcement 
in Europe is of crucial importance because of weak private competition law enforcement. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that CAs in Europe face a challenge that is maybe not faced 
by other CAs, which the lack of private enforcement. Hence, CAs in Europe are facing a 
tough challenge where they should be aiming to fill the gap lift out from the lack of private 
enforcement. Afterwards, the issue of optimal enforcement has been examined. It has been 
argued that optimal enforcement issues have to be dealt with after assessing the competition 
regime, and that there are no single formula for optimal enforcement , where it has to be 
decided on a case by case biases (i.e. each regime/CA has its own optimal enforcement 
package). With respect to optimal enforcement, it has been concluded that it is a situation 
similar to perfect competition, where it is very difficult (if not impossible) to attain.  
Therefore, this thesis, at this stage, calls CAs to pursue better enforcement rather than optimal 
enforcement. At the end of this part, literature that can be considered as assessment literature 
has been examined. The pros and cons of this literature have been pointed out, and how it 
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may contribute to the next part of this chapter when constructing criteria for the assessment 
of public enforcement of competition law. The next part of this chapter aims to introduce 
criteria for the assessment of public enforcement of competition law.  
 
2-3: Part Two: Proposed criteria  
In order to establish criteria for assessing public enforcement of competition law, one has to 
set out some plausible assumptions and highlight the strengths and the weaknesses in the 
existing measures used. The assumptions presented below are based on what have been 
gleaned from the reviewed literature earlier in Part One.  
 
2-3-1: Assumptions 
- In Europe, public enforcement is superior to private enforcement. Thus, the task of 
enforcing competition law relies heavily on CAs and one should not expect too much 
from private enforcement in raising deterrence levels.  
- It is assumed that the CA cannot catch and punish every single infringement because 
of limited capabilities and resources and therefore it has to prioritise its activities. 
- It is assumed that full deterrence does not exist in any jurisdiction; hence, the CA has 
to deal with breaches of competition law. 
 
2-3-2: Constructing the proposed criteria  
If one wonders why, until now, there are no agreed standard for assessing CAs’ performance. 
An answer to this may be sought by looking at the used or suggested standards for assessing 
CAs’ performance. From table 1 below, it can be seen that used or suggested standards have 
many shortcomings, and most probably that is why there are no agreed standard for assessing 
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CAs’ performance. The measures discussed in table 1 will be discussed in further detail 
below when constructing the criteria that this chapter will offer.    
Measure Aim of the measure Drawbacks 
Success rate on appeal 
- Full review of the CA’s 
decisions. 
- It assesses substantive and 
procedural issues.  
- Merely success rate alone does 
not tell us whether the CA is 
doing well or not. 
- The appeal court will not say 
anything about other activities of 
the CA, i.e. not comprehensive 
review. 
Number of cases - Activeness of the CA. 
- High or low number of cases 
does not say anything about the 
quality of such decisions. The 
CA may have been active, but 
has it been productive.   
Duration of investigations 
- How fast the CA is in ending its 
investigation. 
- Might be used as a sign of how 
efficient the CA is. 
- What is fast or slow? 
- How we can judge the quality of 
decisions making. 
Rankings 
- Good overviews of what CAs are 
doing.  
- It does not say anything of how 
the CA can improve its 
performance or where the 
problems are lie. 
- Manly depends on responses, 
merely not responding would 
lower the ranking.  
- No clear criteria of how CAs 
ranked. 
  Table 1: Possible measures for assessing CAs’ performance 
Hüschelrath and Leheyda observe that ‘One reason for the identified lack of research in the 
area might be the belief that a fixed methodology is simply not needed or desired – partly 
because it would constrain active thinking on the best way to approach a certain evaluation 
question. Although it is certainly true that evaluation exercises need to be flexible in order to 
be able to adapt the specifics of the project’.105 
The difference between the methods that have been suggested and the criteria that will be 
proposed in this chapter is that the proposed criteria will include all possible measures in a 
single criterion (this will be shown below). Furthermore, all of the outcomes that the 
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proposed criteria will produce will give explanations to one another. Hence, the proposed 
criteria will consist mainly of three sets of information: enforcement and non-enforcement 
activities, endowments of the CA (capabilities) and what are the surrounding circumstances 
and facts within the CA and/or the jurisdiction under examination. In addition, when 
constructing the proposed criteria literature that calls for best practices (when assessing CAs’ 
performance) will be consulted and taken into account, where such best practices are feasible 
to implement. Therefore, the proposed criteria include what the CA produced while taking 
into account the capabilities of the authority in question, bearing in mind the comparative 
aspect of the criteria. In what follows a detailed description for each set of information will 
be given, in addition, it will be shown how each set complements the other.  
Graph 1 gives an overview of the proposed criteria. As it can be seen from graph 1, more 
emphases have been given to the outputs of the CA, this is because, capabilities and 
surrounding circumstances are examined in order to understand the CA’s outputs. Hence, the 
proposed criteria offer clear and flexible criteria, where it can accommodate as many as 
possible aspects of what could affect public enforcement. 
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Graph 1: Proposed criteria 
Performance 
Outputs 
Capabilities 
Surrounding 
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2-3-2-1: Enforcement and Non Enforcement Activities (Outputs)  
This category includes the following: number of cases, success rate, duration of investigation, 
complexity of cases, non-enforcement activities. Thus, this category represents outputs of 
CAs.  
 
2-3-2-1-1: Number and nature of cases:   
Once the CA concluded a given investigation it has three options to close its investigation, it 
may issue an infringement, non-infringement or commitments decisions. From a CA’s 
standpoint, there should be two goals to be fulfilled from its investigations. First and 
foremost, ending and remedying anti-competitive behaviour that occurred or could occur in 
its jurisdiction. This can be achieved by issuing infringement and commitments decisions. 
The second goal should be clarifying the law and setting the boundaries for its application. 
This could be achieved by any of the three decisions available for the CA.  
Therefore, the number of cases concluded (regardless of the nature of the decision) can be 
seen as a measure for the CA’s enforcement activities. However, this measure tells us so little 
about the quality of the CA’s actions, particularly if one leaves aside  the second goal 
mentioned earlier, namely, the issue of clarifying the law. Merely the number of cases 
concluded will not reflect the quality of the decisions.
106
 Furthermore, at the stage of counting 
the cases and the nature of these cases it is not clear if the CA got it “right” or “wrong”, 
because CAs’ decisions are appealable and this has to be taken into account when considering 
the performance of the CA. Furthermore, the nature of the concluded cases is an important 
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aspect to be looked at when considering the number of cases. The issue of the nature of cases 
and its effect on the CA’s output is discussed below.107 
However, the number of concluded cases can be seen as a good measurement of the 
activeness of the CA but not about the quality of its performance. Therefore, if the number 
and the nature of concluded cases are taken alongside other issues (i.e. with other parts of the 
proposed criteria) it would constitute a reliable measurement for CAs. In addition, by taking 
into account the number and the nature of concluded cases, some of the claims that have been 
made about authorities’ performance can be tested. For example, it has been suggested that, 
the higher the caseload of the authority; the lower is the percentage of winning a case.
 108
 The 
validity of such claims can be tested.  
 
2-3-2-1-2: Success rate on appeal 
The appeal system can be seen as a comprehensive tool (it assesses factual findings and 
conclusions drawn from these facts) to assess the authority’s application of the law on a case-
by-case basis, which is difficult to be seen in any other evaluation/ assessment standard. 
Consequently, if one calculates the CA success rate on appeal, then an estimate of the CA 
performance can be given.
109
 However, in this respect, some limitations to this method should 
be mentioned. First, not all decisions are appealed, particularly, where the cost of appeal 
outweighs the benefits from it. Second, the CA enforcement policies play a decisive role in 
the CA’s success rate on appeal. For example, if the CA targets clear cut violations which are 
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much easier to prove than other type of cases. For instance, if a CA targets cartel cases based 
on leniency applications, it is much easier than targeting unilateral conduct cases. To 
illustrate this, take the case of excessive pricing as an example (a unilateral conduct case). In 
such a situation, the CA is required to determine what an excessive price is and what is not.
110
 
Whereas, in the case of cartel cases (where there is a leniency application), the CA will have 
a definitive proof of the conduct, hence, a possibility of such a decision to be dismissed on 
appeal is much lower than in the case of unilateral conduct cases, where the decision is 
merely based on the CA’s assessment of the conduct. Therefore, the nature of the appealed 
cases could play a very important role when calculating success rate on appeal. Indeed, the 
number of cases concluded in the period under examination may also play a role in affecting 
the success rate on appeal. Third, from a comparative perspective, cross-countries 
comparisons would not give the ideal image of each CA in comparison to its counterpart. 
This is because, as some claims,
111
 of differences in the standards applied in each jurisdiction 
and differences in the legal systems as well.  
Therefore, from the given above, it seems that in order to take into account success rate on 
appeal as a mean for assessing CAs’ performance, other issues have to be taken into account 
to draw conclusions  about the authority’s performance. Such as the nature of the cases, 
number of cases, and other issues related to the capabilities of the CA.  In addition, studying 
success rate on appeal would clarify many propositions that recent scholarship have 
attempted to answer.  For instances, questions about the relationship between the number of 
experts in the CA and success rate on appeal may be answered, and the proposition if the 
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increase/ decrease in the number of concluded cases would increase or decrease the success 
rate on appeal?  
 
2-3-2-1-3: Duration and source of investigations  
Duration of investigation may be used to evaluate how efficient and fast the CA in ending its 
investigation. Hence, this category intends to examine the length of the proceedings that CAs 
take in order to reach its final decision. That is to say, from the point in which the CA starts 
its investigation to the point in which it issues its final decision. To do so, some aspects that 
may affect the duration of investigations should be pointed out. The nature of the investigated 
case and the source of investigations may affect the length of the investigations. In regard of 
source of investigations, it has to be highlighted that the CA may open its investigation based 
upon different grounds: ex officio investigations, complaints, results of market studies 
(inquiries) and leniency applications. Therefore, when examining duration of investigations, 
the source of the investigation is, certainly, an aspect to look at. To illustrate this, consider for 
example a cartel case.  A normal cartel investigation would take longer than a cartel 
investigation where there was a leniency application.
112
 The same is true with other cases if, 
for example, in a given industry there was a market study, which identifies any competition 
concerns in a given market, this would help the CA when it starts an investigation, as the CA 
will have a clear idea about the infringement. In contrast, if the CA starts an investigation 
based on suspicions (so called “ex officio” investigation), such investigations may require 
more time from the CA, as in such a case the CA will have little information about the 
investigated conduct compared to the previous situations.  
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2-3-2-1-4: Complexity of cases 
Competition law cases (as any other areas of law) are not equal in terms of complexity. 
Complexity may arise from the nature of the case, the quantification of harm or the 
calculation of sanctions. As a result, this may affect many aspects of the CA’s outputs. It may 
affect, inter alia, duration of investigations, the number of cases concluded and success rate 
on appeal.   
 However, the matter of measuring or determining the complexity of cases is a controversial 
one.  Hence, one needs to come up with a measure that helps in distinguishing between cases. 
A possible way to determine the complexity of cases is the terminology used by CAs and 
courts, on both sides of the Atlantic, where it can be seen as an indicator for the complexity 
of the cases examined. For example, in the US, the phrases “per se” and the “rule of reason” 
are used to distinguish between conduct that is deemed illegal directly (per se), and which 
type of conduct needs further examination to establish if it has anti-competitive effects (rule 
of reason).
113
 The same can be seen in the EU, but with different language, the phrases 
“object” and “effect” conduct are used to distinguish between types of conduct. “Object” is 
used for clear-cut infringements, whilst “effect” is used for conduct that requires examining 
its effect.
114
 Therefore, for applying the criteria, such distinction between the types of 
behaviour can be used to identify which cases can be seen as “easy cases” or “difficult 
cases”, in other words, to determine the complexity of the cases. Furthermore, the source of 
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 Oliver Black, ‘Per se rules and rules of reason: what are they?’ (1997) European Competition Law Review 
154. 
114
 For a discussion about ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’/ ‘object’ and ‘effect’. See Richard Whish, Competition 
Law (6
th
 edn OUP, Oxford 2009) p. 113-135; Anneli Howard, ‘Object and effect: what's in an object?’ (2009) 8 
Competition law journal 37. For an excellent, in-depth and critical overview, see Oliver Black, Conceptual 
Foundations of Antitrust (CUP, Cambridge 2005), on per se and rule of reason see p 63- 93; on object and effect 
see p. 115-127.  
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the investigation and the nature of the cases will be taken into account when deciding the 
complexity of the cases.  
 
2-3-2-1-5: Non- enforcement activities   
In addition to enforcement activities, CAs around the world work on issues that may affect its 
enforcement activities, however commentators usually overlook these activities. The former 
commissioner, Muris, at the FTC highlighted the importance of taking into account non-
enforcement activities when examining the performance of CAs by stating: ‘...nonlitigation 
activities that have a major impact on public policy or less obviously significant cases and 
rules that do not tackle large players, but that alter doctrine in important ways, are usually 
overlooked’115 Therefore, taking into account non-enforcement activities would help in 
assessing the authority’s performance more precisely.   
A common practice that most CAs do is the issuance of guidelines for certain type of 
conduct. For example, many CAs issue guidelines on the treatment of vertical agreements, 
leniency application or fining guidelines. Furthermore, many CAs have the power to conduct 
market studies (or sector inquiry), where if the CA feels that competition in certain market or 
industry is not functioning well, it may carries out a market study to identify if there are any 
competition problems. Such studies may lead the CA to open an investigation if the study 
reveals that there are competition law concerns.
116
  Another type of non-enforcement 
activities is when the CA asks an external body to evaluate its actions in a certain area, or the 
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 Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 165, 166 
116
 For example, the European Commission conducted inquires in the energy (2005) and in the pharmaceuticals 
(2009) industries.  
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so-called impact assessment exercises, this type usually used to estimate savings or 
deterrence effects as a result of the CA’s actions.117  
To conduct such types of non-enforcement activities, certainly, the CA incurs time and cost. 
Therefore, by taking this into account such activities when applying the proposed criteria, the 
performance of the authority examined can be assessed more precisely, as one will be able to 
know where the CA has spent its time and money.   
 
2-3-2-2: Endowments (capabilities) of CAs
118
 
The issues that will be discussed in this category will be mainly used to clarify issues gleaned 
from the previous category (i.e. the outputs of the CA under examination). This will be 
particularly useful when comparing CAs to one another, as one will be able to identify what 
the CA achieved or produced (enforcement and non-enforcement activities) in light of the 
capabilities of each CA. Based on this, one will be in a position where he/she can identifies 
weaknesses and strengths of the CA from a comparative perspective and recommends how 
the CAs under examination may enhance their performance. Muris stressed on the 
importance of assessing the authority’s performance in light of its capabilities, he states ‘too 
often the effectiveness of competition policy is equated with the number of and visibility of 
cases pursued. Experience with competition policy shows that this focus ignores the need to 
evaluate an agency’s commitments in light of its institutional capabilities’119. Muris then 
pointed out that the CA may create serious problems by taking so many matters where it 
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 Such studies will be discusses below.  
118
 For consistency this information can be taken from the GCR survey where available to the jurisdiction under 
examination.  
119
 Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 165, 181.  
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lacks the human capital and financial capabilities to execute them all;
120
 this is another issue 
that can be examined when applying the criteria. In order to complement the process of 
assessing the CA’s performance, one also needs to take into account the specifics of each CA 
and the country under examination; this will be dealt with in the next section.  
Therefore, this category includes, inter alia, the following issues:  staff, budget and number 
of specialists.  
2-3-2-2-1: Staff 
The number of staff in the CA may affect all the outcomes of the CA under examination in 
terms of quality and quantity. For instance, it may well affect the duration of investigation as 
well as it may affect the quality of the authority’s decisions as it has been suggested.121 For 
example, a CA may not be able to present its case very well because of lack of staff or 
inexperienced staff, because of this; it may lose its case on appeal. Hence, answers to 
important questions can be revealed when taking into considerations outcomes and the 
number and the nature of the CA’s staff. Other issues about the staff of the CA may also 
affect its performance. For instance, answers to the following questions may provide 
explanations to aspects related to the authority performance. (i) Is the CA dealing solely with 
competition law issues? (ii) What is the number of staff devoted to competition law 
enforcement? (iii) Is it true that increase/ decrease of the number of staff affect the duration 
or the quality of the decisions?  
                                                          
120
 Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’ (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 165, 181-182 (giving the FTC in the 1970s as an example , where it case load was to high compared the 
agency’s capabilities, thereby raising doubts about the FTC’s ability to handle the cases successfully). 
121
 Mats A. Bergman, ‘QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? OR Measuring and Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement’ (2008) 156 De Economist 387. 
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2-3-2-2-2: Budget 
The budget of the authority certainly affects the authority performance. However, what is 
more important is how much the CA has to deliver its message, i.e. the amount of money 
allocated for enforcement. For example, there may be a CA that has higher budget than 
another CA, however, the former may allocate less money than the latter for enforcement. 
This may provide explanations about the performance of the CA; also, it will help, based on 
outputs of CAs, in advising CAs about the allocation of resources from a comparative 
perspective. So CAs can learn from each other on how to allocate their budgets efficiently.  
 
2-3-2-2-3: Number of specialists
122
  
Nowadays many CAs around the world are adopting and applying competition laws that 
require in depth analysis, and there is a considerable switch to the so called “effect based 
approach” and moving away for the so-called “form based approach”. Even in the case of 
clear-cut infringement, decisions makers are calling for applying an effect based approach for 
the quantification of harm and the effects of the conduct to calculate fines.
123
 With that in 
mind, CAs are required to recruit experts who can conduct and quantify the effects of 
competition law infringements, which is an expensive and difficult task.  
Therefore, when taking number of specialists together with other aspects of the criteria, one 
will be able answer the following concerns: have the increase/ decrease of experts affect the 
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 Includes lawyers, economists and the level of education for the staff.  
123
 In a recent speech by a Judge in the European General Court, he has called for applying an effect based 
approach in cartel cases when quantifying harm and fines. Available at 
http://webcast.ec.europa.eu/eutv/portal/_v_fl_300_en/player/index_player.html?id=14091&pId=14068 accessed 
10 March 2012. 
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quality, the number of cases, the duration of investigations? In other words, has the existence 
of specialists improved the CA performance compared to another CA? 
2-3-2-3: Surrounding circumstances and facts about the CA (or the jurisdiction)  
This category examines issues relating to the CA or the jurisdiction under examination, and 
mainly consists of previously conducted studies or reports. This information will be consulted 
in order to seek an explanation for unanswered questions or issues, and to seek further clarity 
on issues that have been unanswered from the previous categories (outputs and capabilities).        
2-3-2-3-1: Case studies  
A case study examines a particular decision that the CA took or a group of decisions in 
certain area.
124
 To put simply, the aim of these studies is to show where the CA gets it ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ and what would be the possible implications in the future as a result of adopting 
the decision (s) that has/have been examined in the study.
125
 Mostly, a case study explores 
only one or few areas of the authority’s enforcement activities (e.g. cartels or mergers) or 
even a selection of cases. This approach characterised to be detailed (regarding the examined 
case or selection of cases), however, not comprehensive as it does not cover the whole 
activities of the CA. Case studies usually conducted into cases where there is a big firm 
involved, where the fine was very high or in some cases where the CA departs from an 
established ruling. Therefore, case studies can be considered as an assessment of the CA 
performance in a given case (s), however, without considering the whole activities of the CA 
and without considering the CA’s capabilities. Examples of cases that have been subject to 
case studies are the Microsoft
126
 case and the GE/ Honeywell merger.
127
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 Examples about cases that attract lots of attention are.  
125
 A good example of this is, Bruce Lyons (ed), Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009). In this edited collection, the respected authors provided an 
economic analysis for a number of cases in the EU. 
126
 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 — Microsoft, 2004. 
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It should be noted, that such studies might become of importance when the CA in question 
produces a small number of cases in a given year. In such a case, if there were case studies 
about any of the cases produced, then such studies will provide an insight about the CA’s 
performance and it may answer questions about the authority’s performance in that year. 
2-3-2-3-2: Peer reviews 
Peer reviews are studies that are conducted either by the CA itself or on behalf of the 
authority by an external body. Peer reviews usually examine specific areas, inter alia, 
assessing the impact of CA’s decisions, estimating the savings from the CA’s enforcement 
actions or the impact of interventions on deterrence. The main aim of these reviews is to 
examine where the CA under investigation stands in respect of the issues of the review, and 
how the CA can improve its performance in that respect. For example, many peer reviews 
studies have been conducted on behalf of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK. The 
studies have been conducted in different areas, most recently for example, a peer review 
study assessed the impact of competition intervention on compliance and deterrence.
128
 The 
aim of these reviews was to find out where the UK’s CAs stands and how it can improve its 
performance compared to another jurisdictions.  
Hence, peer reviews may provide a good insight about the CA’s performance. For example, if 
a peer review concluded that the levels of deterrence are high in a given jurisdiction and the 
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 See, the European Commission Decision of 03/07/2001, Case No COMP/M.2220. Declaring the merger 
between General Electric/Honeywell to be incompatible with the European common market.  
128
 A study by London Economics (2011) OFT 1391 available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1391.pdf accessed 1 February 2012. Other 
peer reviews studies about the OFT includes the following: Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, ‘Ex Post Evaluation 
of Mergers’ (2001) Report for the UK Office of Fair Trading, Department of Trade and Industry and the 
Competition Commission; KPMG (2004), ‘Peer Review of Competition Policy’, Report for the UK Department 
of Trade and Industry. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file32813.pdf   accessed 20 December 
2011; KPMG (2007), ‘Peer Review of Competition Policy’, Report for the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry. available at  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file39863.pdf 
accessed 20 12 2011 
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number of cases concluded was low compared to another jurisdiction, then the peer review 
study in this case has provided an explanation for the low number of cases.  
2-3-2-3-3: Competitiveness reports 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) annually produces The Global Competiveness Report 
(TGCR) that assesses the competitiveness of most of the countries around the world. 
Although TGCR is not directly about competition policy, it has very useful information that 
may affect the levels of enforcement of competition laws in the examined countries. For 
instance, TGCR provides information, among other issues, about the effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policies, barriers to entry, market size and the intensity of local competition...etc.   
At the outset, and taking this information alone would not say anything about the 
performance about the CA’s performance. However, if this information considered with 
previously mentioned issues about the CA’s enforcement activities and the capabilities of the 
CA, it may provide some explanations to unanswered questions.  
The information provided in TGCR could be used to draw some explanations when applying 
the criteria to actual data. For example, when applying the criteria into a given country and 
finding that that there are a lot abuse of dominance cases compared to another jurisdiction. To 
seek an answer to this, one could look at the value of the following: extent of market 
dominance in the two countries, prevalence of trade barriers and intensity of local 
competition. Such information may clarify the reason of why this is happened and if it is 
really the case or not. 
Hence, information obtained from TGCR would play important role when conducting 
assessment studies. However, it cannot be relied solely on TGCR when drawing conclusions 
about the performance of any given CA. 
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2-3-3: Application of the criteria and source of information needed for the application 
of the criteria 
When considering the application of the criteria it is important to give a description of the 
data and the information needed for the application of the proposed criteria. The data and the 
information related to cases have to be collected from the CA’s decisions. For the 
information related to the levels of competition, intensity of local competition and other 
information about the country itself can be obtained from competitiveness reports, such as 
TGCR.  While, information about the CA itself, such as: number of staff, budget... etc., can 
be obtained either from the GCR survey or from the CAs’ annual report.  Case studies, peer 
reviews, any other surveys or any work that attempted to evaluate the CA performance, 
should be examined and taken into account where appropriate. Some other information can 
be found in the competition laws of the jurisdictions under examination (e.g. the available 
remedies to the CA). In addition to this information, one has to set a period of time, 
preferably more than three years,
129
 for the assessment of the CA in question.  
It should be highlighted, again, that the results of applying the criteria should not be drawn 
independently from each part of the criteria but from the criteria as a whole. More 
importantly, due to the characteristics of the criteria proposed earlier, and to make the most 
from applying it, it is better to be applied to more than one jurisdiction (CA) with similar 
economic size and similarities in the institutional design. By doing so, one will be able to 
compare outcomes of CAs in light of similar characteristics and capabilities, and will be more 
competent to identify problems that could prevent the enhancement of the examined CAs.
130
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 On average CA’s investigations take around three years to be concluded. See subsequent chapters. 
130
 In addition, the need and the value of comparative assessment studies have been highlighted by many 
scholars, see for example William E Kovacic, ‘Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of 
Competition Policy Authorities’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 503, 542 and 543 (highlighting the 
benefits and the lack of comparative studies). 
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2-3-4: Conclusion and possible implications 
This chapter has proposed criteria for the assessment public enforcement of competition law 
(excluding mergers and state aid activities). This chapter begins by highlighting the 
importance of public enforcement of competition law; and why, particularly in Europe, the 
burden on CAs is higher than in other jurisdictions, because of this, according to the current 
state of public and private enforcement, one should see public enforcement superior to private 
enforcement and give more attention. In addition, it has been explained why optimal 
enforcement issues should be decided after assessing public enforcement of competition law. 
The lack of a widely accepted method for assessing public enforcement has been pointed out, 
and reasons for the need of a method have been given. 
In this chapter, effort has been made to design criteria that are based on flexible and clear 
criteria. The application of the criteria mainly relies on three sets of information, which are 
publicly available. The sets of information are: (1) outputs of CAs (enforcement and non-
enforcement activities); (2) information about the capabilities of the CA; (3) facts and 
surrounding circumstances about the examined jurisdiction. Furthermore, the aim of these 
criteria is not to rank or classify CAs into categories; instead, its aim is to facilitate 
comparative studies where CAs may learn from each other based on recommendations 
gleaned from applying the criteria. 
It is hoped that the application of the proposed criteria will not only assess public 
enforcement of competition law, but also helps in exposing enforcement problems, and hence 
helping CAs in identifying  what has to be modified and/ or maintained. Consequently, CAs 
will be able to set enforcement priorities more precisely.   
In addition to this, applying the criteria to actual data would help in checking the applicability 
of many claims that have been suggested in the literature for the jurisdictions under 
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examination. For instance, the results of applying the criteria would give answers to the value 
of having a specialised appeal court; or issues about the caseload of the CA and the 
probability of wining cases.  In addition, it would be possible to assess certain areas of the 
CA’s enforcement activities, such as leniency or fining policies, in light of the overall 
assessment of public enforcement in the examined CA. Overall, assessing public enforcement 
is important but what is more important is what is driven and gleaned from the assessment 
process.  
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-Chapter 3- An Empirical Analysis of Public Enforcement of Competition 
Law in the EU   (May 2004- December 2012) 
3-1: Introduction  
This chapter examines public enforcement of competition law as applied by the 
European Commission (hereinafter ‘EC’ or ‘Commission’). This chapter will examine 
the application of Articles 101
1
 and 102
2
 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
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 Article 101 read “1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question.” 
2
 Article 102 read “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
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European Union (TFEU) since Regulation 1/2003 came into force, 1 May 2004, until 
31 December 2012.3 In order to study public enforcement, one need to look not only 
at enforcement activities of the EC but also what may affect public enforcement. 
Hence, this chapter examines enforcement activities, non- enforcement activities and 
the capabilities (budget and human capital) of the EC for the period under scrutiny.  In 
addition, to examining the role of the EC as an institution in enforcing competition 
law and its other activities (non- enforcement); any events that occurred or 
legislations that have been enacted and may affect competition law enforcement will 
be studied. Thus, this chapter aims to cover as many aspects as possible that may 
affect public enforcement of competition law.  
To achieve the aim of this chapter, data regarding public enforcement of competition 
law have been collected from the Commission’s decisions that have been concluded 
between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2012. This includes number of cases, sources 
of investigations, nature of investigation, length of investigations, outcomes of 
investigations and the fine imposed in each case (if any fines were imposed). In 
addition, this chapter examines if the concluded cases were appealed, and if so what 
was the outcome of appeals and the amount of fine after appeal. These issues related 
to the enforcement of competition law by the EC.  
In order to examine public enforcement of competition law, one needs to look at the 
issues that may affect the enforcement of the law. Thus, data regarding non-
enforcement activities of the EC have been collected as well. Any activity that has 
been conducted by the Commission and may use its resources has been collected. The 
source of such information is the EC’s website or its activity reports. In addition, data 
                                                          
3
Mergers and state aid are outside the scope of this thesis, as pointed out in Chapter 2. 
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regarding the capabilities of the EC (budget and number of staff and specialists) have 
been collected as well. This will be done in order to examine under which 
circumstances the Commission produced its enforcement and non-enforcement 
activities. The data have been obtained from the Global Competition Review 
publications on ‘rating enforcement’. In order to obtain further accuracy for the 
analysis; any publications, reports, or studies that examines issues related to public 
enforcement of competition law in Europe will be studied in this chapter and its 
findings will be taken into consideration.  Furthermore, any events, changes in 
legislations or structural changes will be considered.   
To the author’s knowledge, this is the most updated study that considers public 
enforcement of competition law in Europe. In addition, it is the only study that 
considers enforcement activities, non-enforcement activities and the capabilities of the 
EC in the same work. However, it has be noted, that this chapter is aimed to provide a 
platform for the comparative analysis that will be conducted later in the thesis 
between the three jurisdictions.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3-2 discusses the outcomes of the 
EC and is divided into two main subsections. Sub-section 3-2-1 presents and analyses 
the enforcement activities of the EC and the outcomes of appeals for the appealed 
cases. Sub-section 3-2-2 considers the non-enforcement activities of the EC. Section 
3-3 illustrates the capabilities of the EC. Section 3-4 discuses studies any other form 
of publications that can be considered as an assessment study or aims assess aspects 
related to public enforcement of competition law in Europe. Section 3-5 concludes.  
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3-2: Outcomes of the EC 
This section presents the enforcement and the non-enforcement activities of the EC 
between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2012. Sub-section A considers the 
enforcement activities which includes number of cases concluded, nature of the cases, 
sources of investigations, amount of fine imposed in each case, outcomes of appeals if 
cases have been appealed and the amount of fine after appeal if the fine was amended 
by the Court. Sub-section B considers the non-enforcement activities of the EC, so 
one has an idea how the Commission allocated its efforts; this includes guidelines, 
sector inquires and any other form of studies that may affect competition enforcement 
or may use the resources of the EC or the time of the EC’s staff.   
3-2-1: Enforcement activities
4
 
3-2-1-1: Number of cases 
Table 1 below shows the number of cases concluded by the EC from May 2004 to 
December 2012. The EC concluded 102 cases: 63 infringement decisions; 26 
commitment decisions and 13 non-infringement decisions.5  
From May 2004 until the end of 2004, the EC concluded eleven decisions, nine 
infringement decisions and two non- infringement decisions. In 2005, there have been 
nine cases concluded, six infringement decisions, one commitment decisions and two 
non-infringement decisions. 2006 saw the number of cases drooped to eight cases, six 
infringement decisions and two non-infringement decisions. The year 2007 saw a high 
number of cases compared to the previous years, where the EC concluded 16 cases, 
                                                          
4
 Full information about the cases discussed in this section are available in the appendix at the end of 
this chapter; where table 1 presents infringement decisions and table 2 presents commitments and non-
infringement decisions.  
5
 Cases where the Commission decided that it is not in the Community interest to open an in-depth 
investigation are included in the non-infringement decisions category.  
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eleven infringement decisions and five commitment decisions.6 In 2008, the EC 
concluded eleven decisions, nine infringement decisions and two commitment 
decisions. In 2009, the number of cases concluded was 13 cases, six infringement 
decisions, two non-infringement decisions and five commitment decisions. The 
number of cases jumped to 15 cases in 2010, there were seven infringement decisions, 
two non-infringement decisions and six commitment decisions. In 2011, the number 
of cases dropped to eleven cases, five infringements, four non-infringements and two 
commitments. In 2012, the number of cases dropped further to eight cases, the lowest 
number of cases in a year in the whole sample, there were four infringements, two 
non-infringements and two commitments.  
Year Infringement Non-infringement Commitments Total 
2004 9 2 0 11 
2005 6 1 2 9 
2006 6 0 2 8 
2007 11 0 5 16 
2008 9 0 2 11 
2009 6 2 5 13 
2010 7 2 6 15 
2011 5 4 2 11 
2012 4 2 2 8 
Table 1: Number and type of cases concluded by EC (May 2004- December 2012) 
                                                          
6
 It is worth mentioning that four of the five commitments decisions resulted from one investigation by 
the Commission. See cases:  Cases COMP/E- 2/39140 DaimlerChrysler, COMP/E-2/39141 Fiat, 
COMP/E-2/39142 Toyota, COMP/E- 2/39143 Opel. 
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As it has been stated in the previous chapters, the number of cases alone should not be 
taken as an indicating factor to determine the performance of the EC; other factors 
have to be taken into account in order to examine public enforcement of the EC. 
There may have issues that affected the number of cases, such as, the size of the cases 
concluded in each year or the available resources to the EC or other issues that will be 
examined later in the chapter. More importantly, it also important to examine if the 
EC truly won the cases concluded, i.e., what happened on appeal if these cases has 
been appealed.  
3-2-1-2: Nature of investigations 
It is also worth examining the nature of the cases concluded in the period under 
examination.  Table 2 below shows the number of cases by the decision reached in 
each year. The majority of the cases were dealt with under Article 101 TFEU, there 
were 71 out of the 102 cases where Article 101 TFEU where the subject of the 
investigation. In 57 cases, the EC found an infringement of Article 101. In twelve 
cases, the investigations were concluded by parties offering commitments and the EC 
accepted those commitments. In two cases, the EC concluded its investigations by 
declaring that there are no breaches of Article 101 TFEU or the Commission decided 
that it is not in the Community interest to open an in-depth investigation. Thus, it can 
be seen that most of the EC’s investigations under Article 101 TFEU have resulted in 
actions been taken by the EC (either by declaring infringements and fining the parties 
involved or accepting commitments that remedy the EC’s competition concerns). This 
can be interpreted that the Commission concerns were right and spotted anti-
competitive practices in most of its Article 101 TFEU investigations. 
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Article 102 TFEU was subject to 27 investigations. In six cases, the EC found that 
Article 102 TFEU has been violated. Around half Article 102 TFEU investigations 
(14 cases) have been concluded as commitment decisions. Seven investigations have 
been concluded as non-infringement decision, where the EC has not found any breach 
of Article 102 TFEU or the Commission decided that it is not in the Community 
interest to open an in-depth investigation.  
The remaining four cases where investigated under Article 101 & 102 TFEU at the 
same time. All of these cases were declared as non-infringement decisions or the 
Commission decided that it is not in the Community interest to open an in-depth 
investigation.  
It can be observed from the application of Article 102 TFEU that the EC that it is 
more difficult to find an infringement of article 102 TFEU compared to Article 101 
TFEU; and that the EC in Article 102 TFEU investigations relied more on 
commitments decisions.7 In addition, the EC has issued more non-infringement 
decisions in Article 102 TFEU investigations than Article 101 TFEU despite that the 
number of 101 investigations was much higher than Article 102 TFEU 
investigations.8 
 
Infringement 
Article 101 
101 
commitments 
Infringement 
Article 102 
102 
commitments 
No 
infringement 
Article 101 
No infringement 
Article 101 & 
102 
No 
infringement 
Article 102 
2004 8 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2005 5 1 1 1 0 0 1 
2006 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 
2007 10 4 1 1 0 0 0 
2008 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 
2009 5 1 1 4 0 2 0 
2010 7 2 0 4 0 0 2 
                                                          
7
 This may be because of the sectors which the Commission found competition concerns  
8
 This may also been because of the sources of investigations in each type of cases. For example, 
complaints vs. Own initiative or leniency. This will be examined below 
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2011 4 0 1 2 1 2 1 
2012 4 2 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 57 12 6 14 2 4 7 
Table 2: number of cases by the decision reached 
 
3-2-1-3: Sources of investigations 
After considering the number of cases and the type of cases concluded by the EC 
between May 2004 and December 2012, it is worth examining the source of the EC’s 
investigation, i.e., the basis that made the Commission to open an investigation in the 
first place. The EC started its investigations on different grounds; for example, 
leniency applications, complaints, the Commission’s own initiative, sector inquires, 
the European Competition Network (ECN) and notifications under the old regime 
were used as sources of investigations. Table 3 below shows on what grounds the EC 
open its investigations. It is important to study the sources of the EC’s investigations 
in order to give a precise advice to the Commission, and to understand if the source of 
the investigation has an impact on the outcome of the cases, in terms of quality, time 
or whether the EC preferred a certain tool over the other. Table 4 below shows the 
source of investigation by the decision reached. 
The EC mainly relied on leniency application, complaints and the EC’s own initiative 
as the sources for its investigations. Leniency applications, the most used tool, have 
been used 37 times as the main source for investigations. Complaints and the EC’s 
own initiative were the second used tools, nine times and 13 times respectively.  Other 
sources were rarely used; 9such as ECN (once), sector inquiry (once) and notified 
agreement to the Commission under the old notification regime (three cases). 
                                                          
9
 In one case the source of the investigation was unknown. (see footnote 8) 
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What is more important to identify, is if there is any relationship between the nature 
of the investigation and the source of the investigation. For the infringement decisions 
under Article 101, the source of the investigations for the majority of the infringement 
decisions was leniency applications (37 cases). The Commission own initiative was 
the source of eleven cases, and in five cases, the EC started its investigations based on 
complaints. Sector inquires, the ECN and notified agreement to the EC where the 
source of investigations in one case each.  
Under Article 101, there were 14 commitments and non-infringements decisions. 
Complaints and the EC’s own initiative were the sources that the Commission relied 
upon mostly. The source of the investigation for the two non-infringement decisions 
were complaints. For commitments decisions, the Commission own initiative was the 
source of the investigation in three cases; in seven cases, the source was complaints 
and; in two cases, the Commission started its investigation because the agreements 
were notified to the Commission under the old notification regime.10   
For the infringement cases dealt with under Article 102, where there was six cases. 
The source of the investigation in four cases was complaints and in two cases, the 
source of the investigation was the EC’s own initiative.  
 In eleven cases, under Article 102, the Commission accepted commitments from the 
investigated parties; the source of the investigation was either complaints (six cases) 
or the Commission’s own initiative (five cases).11 All of the cases where the 
                                                          
10
 In three cases, the source of the investigation was unknown (see footnote 8). 
11
 In three cases, the source of the investigation was unknown (see footnote 8). 
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Commission declared that Article 102 has not been violated (six cases); the source of 
the investigations was complaints.12  
There have been four cases where Article 101 and 102 have been investigated but no 
infringements have been found, the source of the investigation in these cases was 
unknown.13  
Source of investigation Count 
Unknown 11 
Complaint 28 
ECN 1 
Leniency 37 
Notified agreement to the Commission 3 
Own initiative 21 
Sector Inquiry 1 
Table 3: sources of investigations for the concluded cases by the EC  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
Source of 
investigation 
Type 
Article 
101 
101 
commitments 
Article 
102 
102 
commitments 
No infringement 
101 
No infringement 
101 & 102 
No infringement 
102 
Not known 1 3 0 3 0 4 1 
Complaint 5 7 4 6 2 0 6 
ECN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Leniency 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notified 
agreement to 
the 
Commission 
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Own 
initiative 
11 3 2 5 0 0 0 
Sector 
Inquiry 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4: Source of investigations and the decision reached 
 
                                                          
12
 In one case, the source of the investigation was unknown (see footnote 8). 
13
 In three cases, the source of the investigation was unknown (see footnote 8). 
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3-2-2: Analysis and observations  
To draw some observations from the above mentioned. All of the cases where the 
Commission’s own initiative was the source of the investigation, there was an action 
taken by the Commission. This was done by either declaring an infringement or fining 
the parties involved or accepting commitments from the investigated parties to 
remedy the Commission’s competition concern. This may interpreted that the 
Commission will not open a formal investigation unless it is highly satisfied that there 
are anti-competitive practices. Another interpretation for this precise rate is that the 
only information that is available publicly is about formally opened investigations and 
that the Commission may have closed own initiative investigations because there 
were no infringements, but this has not been made public. However, this is not 
possible with other sources of investigations, as the Commission in these cases has to 
respond, or it decide to open an investigation it has to state the actual date when it has 
knew about the alleged infringement.14 
The source of investigations under Article 102 TFEU cases was mostly complaints 
(18 cases) and then the Commissions own initiative (seven cases). It seems that the 
Commission relies on information from outsiders to open Article 102 TFEU 
investigations and this may has led to high percentage of non-infringement decisions 
compared to the overall number of Article 102 TFEU investigations. This may 
because complaints are usually made from actual or potential competitors, which they 
may not provide precise information or providing untrue allegations toward their 
                                                          
14
 Gippini-Fournier stated “The date when proceedings are opened is usually indicated in a decision, 
but it is not as such a reliable indicator, as it is largely in the Commission's discretion and may come 
after months or years of preliminary investigation” Eric Gippini-Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of 
European Competition Law: First Experiences with Regulation 1/2003’ Community Report to the 
FIDE Congress 2008 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139776,    See P. 13. 
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competitors. This can be seen very clearly from the sample, where the source of all 
non-infringement decisions was complaints.  
In addition, the nature of Article 102 TFEU investigations is not straightforward 
compared to cartel cases, for example; as to determine what constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position or not is not an easy task because it depends on many factors, not 
only the practice itself.15 In addition, the matter that in most cases it is one firm that is 
being investigated, not as in the case of cartels; where a cartelist(s) may confess 
information to the CA.  In the whole sample there were 47 cartel cases, 37 of these 
cases where opened as a result of leniency applications, which shows the main 
difference between Article 102 TFEU and cartel (Article 101 TFEU) cases and how 
this tool helped the EC in finding infringements.  
The Commission under both Article 101 and 102 has used commitments decisions. 
But as a percentage to the overall number of cases under each provision, it can be 
seen that more than half of Article 102 investigations ended up as commitment 
decisions (14 out of 27) compared to a small number of commitments decisions under 
article 101 (13 out of 70). This also brings back the discussion about the nature of the 
investigations under each provision, mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
 
3-2-2-1: Fines
16
 and duration of investigations  
The previous sub-section considered the number of cases, the nature and the sources 
of investigations for the cases concluded by the EC from May 2004 to December 
                                                          
15
 Other issues have to be considered under Article102 TFEU cases; such as: Market shares, market 
definition, other competitors in the market, effects on innovation and free riding problems....and so on.  
16
 It should be noted that the fine in some cases were reduced substantially on appeal. The matter of 
appeals and success rate on appeal will be discussed in the next section.   
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2012. This sub-section considers the duration of investigation and the fines imposed 
in these cases, and it will link this to the findings in the previous sub-section. In other 
words, after providing the duration of investigations and the fine imposed in each 
case, it will be attempted, for example, if there is any relationship between the 
duration of the investigation and the type and the source of the investigation; also it 
will be attempted to see if the fine imposed affect the duration of investigation. These 
issues and other issues will be analysed below.  
 
3-2-2-1-1: Fines imposed  
The fine imposed by the EC ranges from not imposing any financial penalties to 
around €1.4 billion. Before discussing the penalties imposed in each case, the overall 
fine in each year will be provided. Table 5 below shows the amount of fine imposed 
in each year from May 2004 until December 2012. As it can be seen that fines 
imposed are increasing from the year 2004 until 2007. From May 2004 to December 
2004, total amount of fine imposed by the EC was around €370 million. In 2005, the 
amount of fine increased to over €668 million. In 2006, the total amount of fine 
increased to around 1.8 billion. 2007 saw the highest amount of fines imposed in a 
single year where the overall amount of fine was around €3.4 billion. In 2008, the 
amount of fine dropped to around €2.27 billion. In 2009, the overall amount of fine 
increased to €2.6 billion. In 2010, the fines increased to around €2.85 billion. In 2011 
the overall amount of fine decreased dramatically, compared to the previous years, to 
around €700 million. In 2012, the fine increased to around €1.6 billion.  
If one looks if the amount of fine has any relationship with the number of cases 
concluded for the years under examination. For example, the year 2007 saw the 
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highest number of cases and the highest amount of fine imposed in a single year. 
However, in 2012, the Commission concluded four cases, the lowest number of cases 
in a year,  but the amount of fine imposed in this year is not the lowest in the 
sample. Hence, it cannot be said that the number of cases could play a role in the 
amount of fine imposed. In addition, fines are determined based on many aspects; 
such as, the size of the market, duration and seriousness of the infringement and 
indeed the size of the firms involved.17  
Year Fine in each year (€) Number of cases concluded 
2004 372,911,100 9 
2005 668,597,000 6 
2006 1,857,167,500 6 
2007 3,475,190,500 11 
2008 2,271,177,400 9 
2009 2,600,134,400 6 
2010 2,852,138,533 7 
2011 741,607,194 5 
2012 1,653,176,000 4 
Table 5: the overall amount of fine imposed in each year by the EC  
(May 2004 - December 2012)  
 
 
3-2-2-1-2: Duration of investigations 
After discussing the number of cases, the nature of the cases and the fine imposed in 
these cases. It is now important to talk about the time it took the commission to 
produce these cases, i.e. the duration of investigations.  It is also important to assess 
what could affect the duration of investigations concluded by the EC. It is worth 
examining if the there are certain issues that may affect the duration of investigations; 
for instance, does the nature of the case investigated affects the length of the 
                                                          
17
 See, the European Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to 
Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006. 
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investigation? Does the source of the investigation affect the length of the 
investigation? Do the capabilities of the EC affect the duration of the investigation 
(this will examined in the next section “capabilities of the EC”)? Does the number of 
cases concluded in a given year affect the overall duration of that year?  
In this section, the average duration for infringement decisions will be examined 
separately from non-infringements and commitments decisions. The main reason 
behind this is that in non-infringement decision the EC is not involved with issues of 
assessment of harm and calculating the fine. Also, in commitments decisions the 
Commission does not conduct a full investigation, it only conducts a preliminary 
assessment of the alleged infringements, if the parties offer commitments that remedy 
the Commission’s concerns,18 then the EC will accept these commitments and closes 
the investigation.  
To start with, the average duration for infringement decisions concluded by the EC 
between May 2004 and December 2012. Table 6 below presents the average duration 
of investigations in each year; the average duration for all infringements decisions in 
the whole sample is 51.9 months. From May 2004 to December 2004, the average 
duration was 28.7 months where the EC concluded nine cases. In 2005, it has 
increased to 59.3 months with six cases concluded. In 2006, the average duration was 
56.9 months with six concluded. In 2007, the average duration decreased to 55.1 
months where the Commission concluded ten cases. In 2008, the average duration 
stayed at 55.1 with nine cases concluded. In 2009, the EC concluded 6 infringement 
decisions and the average duration was 51 months.  In 2010, the average duration 
                                                          
18
 See Article 9 from Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 1/1. 
80 
 
increased dramatically to 71.6 months where the EC concluded seven cases. In 2011, 
the average duration was 41 months with five cases concluded. In 2012, the average 
duration was 49 months with three cases concluded. As it can be seen that in most of 
the years the average duration was above the average duration for the whole sample. 
What can also be observed from graph 1 is that the average duration in each year 
(starting from 2005) is decreasing, with exception of 2010.19  
Year Average duration( in months) 
2004 28.7 
2005 59.3 
2006 56.9 
2007 55.1 
2008 55.1 
2009 51 
2010 71.6 
2011 41 
2012 49 
Average duration for all cases 51.9 
Table 6: Average duration for infringements cases decisions concluded by the 
EC (May 2004- December 2012) 
 
                                                          
19
 There were two cases where it took the Commission around 96 months to conclude its investigations. 
This was in DRAMs and Pre-stressing steel.  
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Graph 1: Average duration for infringement decisions concluded by the EC  
(May 2004 - December 2012 in months) 
 
Below are some observations from linking duration of investigations with other issues 
discussed previously.   
 
3-2-2-1-3: Ordinary cartel procedures vs. Settlement cartel procedures 
It is important as well to examine if there are particular type of cases that may lower 
or raise the average duration of investigations. To start with a recent procedure that 
has been introduced to lower the length of investigations, settlements in cartel cases.20 
This procedure has been used four times until the end of 2012.21 In ordinary cartel 
procedures, the average duration for the 43 cases is around 51 months. For settlements 
procedures (4 cases) the average duration is around 56 months. However, it has to be 
noted that in the first settlement cartel case it took the Commission 96 months to 
                                                          
20
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 
773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases Official Journal L 171 , 
01/07/2008 P. 3 - 5 
21
 The Commission reached settlements in the following cases: DRAMs, CRT glass bulbs, 
Refrigeration compressors and Water management products.  
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conclude its investigation, which can be considered as an outlier.22 The average 
duration without this outlier is around 41 months, which is 10 months lower than the 
ordinary procedure. Hence, it can be said that in most settlement cartel cases the 
Commission concluded its investigations quicker than ordinary procedures.  
 
3-2-2-1-4: Cartels, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance cases: 
any differences in treatment? 
In the whole sample, there are 47 cartel cases and the average duration for these cases 
is 47.8 months.23 There are ten cases that can be classified as anti-competitive 
agreements cases (under Article 101); the average duration for these cases is 52.8 
months. Six infringement cases were dealt with under Article 102; the average 
duration for these cases is 51.1 months. These figures may indicate two possible 
explanations. First, and most probably, that the Commission is devoting more staff 
and resources to its cartel enforcement cases and that the Commission has experts in 
this particular area. Hence, cartel cases require less time than other type of cases 
despite the high number of cartel cases. Second, the Commission is finding anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of dominance cases more complicated than cartel 
cases. This requires the Commission more time to conclude these cases.  
                                                          
22
 DRAMs.  
23
 According to Templ Lang one of the reasons for the high number of cartel cases is “The result of 
Reg. 1/2003 was to allow the Commission to decide its enforcement priorities, for the first time. It was 
understandable that it chose to give priority to price-fixing and market-sharing, which are relatively 
easily proved as a result of leniency and immunity applications.” See, John Temple Lang, ‘Three 
Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of The European Commission in Competition Cases Under 
Regulation 1/2003’ available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996510 , p. 229.  
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3-2-2-1-5: Amount of fine imposed vs. Duration of investigations 
It is also important to look at if the fine imposed affects the duration of investigations. 
The cases where the fine imposed was 20 million or less (14 cases), the average 
duration is around 47.1 months. The cases where the fine imposed was over 20 
million and less the 100 million (15 cases), the average duration is around 52.3 
months. The cases where the fine was over 100 million and less than 500 million (23 
cases), the average duration is around 53 months. The cases where the fine was over 
500 million (11 cases), the average duration was 46.6 months. What can be seen from 
these figures is that only when the fines are very high (over 500 million) and very low 
(less than 20 million) in the sample, the average duration of investigations is less than 
the overall average duration for the whole sample (51.9 months). This may be 
interpreted as that the Commission is allocating a lot of its resources where it seems 
that the fine might be very high because such cases may bring publicity to the EC’s 
actions. In addition most of these cases are cartel cases based on leniency therefore 
such cases are more successful on appeal, i.e. most likely to be won by the EC if 
appealed.  
 
3-2-2-1-6: Duration of investigations vs. Sources of investigations 
One may also want to consider what may affect the duration of investigation or which 
type of cases or specifics in each case that may the length of the investigations. Table 
7 below show the sources of investigations and what the mean for each set of cases 
was. What can be observed form table 7 that the Commission when it has received 
information about the existence of infringement (complaint or leniency application) it 
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took the Commission more time than in the case where it opened the investigation on 
its own initiative. This may have two explanations. First, in cases where the 
Commission receives information about an alleged infringement the Commission is 
obliged to state when it has received a complaint or leniency application in its official 
decision, whereas in the case of own initiative investigation the Commission may not 
open a formal investigation unless it has enough evidence that supports its 
investigation, therefore, this may be an explanation of why investigations which 
started from the Commission’s own initiative takes less time. The second explanation 
could be that the information supplied to the Commission by leniency applications 
and from complaints does not have decisive evidence about the alleged infringement 
and the Commission needs to  investigate the conduct further which ultimately 
requires more time from the Commission than in cases where the source of the 
investigation is the EC’s own initiative. So the leniency application or the complaint 
may only be used to indicate to the alleged infringement but not to provide evidence.  
It also can be seen from table 7 that when the source of the investigation was a sector 
inquiry or from the ECN, the Commission concluded its investigations in a shorter 
period than the other sources. Thus, it seems that in these cases, the Commission was 
well informed about the infringement and hence the length of the investigation was 
shorter.   
Complaint ECN Leniency 
Notified to the 
Commission 
Own initiative Sector Inquiry 
Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count 
54 9 33 1 51.4 37 67 1 46.3 13 38 1 
Table 7: Average duration for infringements decisions by the source of 
investigation (in months) 
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3-2-2-2: Non- infringements and commitments  
For the non-infringements and commitments decisions, it can be seen clearly from 
graph 2 and table 8 below that on average these cases have been concluded much 
quicker than infringement decisions. The overall average duration of investigations 
for non-infringement and commitments decisions for the whole sample is around 30.7 
months (for infringements it is 51.9).  
From May 2004 to December 2004, the Commission concluded two non-infringement 
decisions and the average duration was 84 months. In 2005, the average duration was 
12.5 months where the EC concluded three cases (one non-infringement and two 
commitments). In 2006, there were two commitments decisions and the average 
duration was 39.5 months. In 2007, five commitments decisions were concluded and 
the average duration was 16.8 months. In 2008, the average duration was 23 months 
where the EC concluded two commitment decisions. In 2009, the average duration 
was 31.1 months; the commission concluded seven cases (five commitments and two 
non-infringements). In 2010, the average duration was 23.4 months; this year saw the 
highest number of non-infringement and commitments decisions concluded, eight 
cases (six commitments and two non-infringements). In 2011, there were five cases 
(three non-infringements and two commitments), the overall average duration in 2011 
was 23.4 months. In 2012, the average duration of investigations was 23 months, the 
EC four cases (two commitments and two non-infringements). 
86 
 
 
Graph 2: Average duration of investigations for non-infringement and 
commitments decisions concluded by the EC (May 2004 - December 2012 in 
months) 
 
Year Average duration (In months) 
2004 84 
2005 12.5 
2006 39.5 
2007 16.8 
2008 23 
2009 31.1 
2010 23.4 
2011 23.4 
2012 23 
Average duration for all cases 30.7 
Table 8: Average duration for commitments and non-infringements decision  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
3-2-3: Success rate on appeal 
24
 
The EC’s decisions are appealable to the European Courts. The EC’s decision can be 
appealed to the European General Court (GC)
25
, which it can review the 
                                                          
24
 The last date which the author searched for appealed cases is 30 January 2013.  
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Commission’s decision both on points of law and facts. The final stage of appeal of 
the EC decision is to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which it can 
review the GC’s judgments only on points of law. This sub-section aims to review of 
all of the cases concluded between May 2004 and December 2012 to examine if these 
cases have been appealed and if so what happened on appeal. Success rate on appeal 
has been used by some scholars in order to determine the quality of Competition 
Authorities decision making. This chapter will take this into account, however not as 
a determinative factor.26 
As it has been mentioned earlier, the Commission concluded 102 decisions; there 
were 63 infringements decisions. From the 63 decisions, there were four cartel cases27 
settled with the Commission, which cannot be appealed, and nine cases not appealed. 
There were around 50 decisions appealed to the Community Courts. Some of the 
recent decisions are still pending on appeal (20 cases). For the rest of the appealed 
cases (30 cases) none of these cases was lost by the Commission entirely and there 
were no huge defeats to the commission even in the cases where the fine has been 
reduced.  
This chapter will classify appealed decisions into four main categories; (i) Upheld: 
Upheld the Commission decision on both liability and fine. (ii) Largely upheld: 
upheld the Commission’s with respect to liability but reduces the fine imposed. (iii) 
Partly upheld: annuals the Commission’s with respect to some parties on liability and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
25
 Some of the cases were reviewed by the Court of First Instance (CFI), the predecessor of the GC. 
26
 This issue has been discussed in chapter 2.  
27
 DRAMs, CRT glass bulbs, Refrigeration compressors and Water management products. There was a 
hybrid cartel case, where some parties settle with the commission but others did not. This was in the , 
Animal Feed Phosphates case where all of the parties settled with the Commission except one party in 
which ordinary procedures was used with regard to this party and subsequently appealed the decision 
(still pending on appeal) 
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fines, and upheld the decisions on liability or fine for others. (iv) Dismissed: annulling 
the Commission decision entirely. 
From the 63 infringement decisions there were 50 cases appealed. 20 of which are 
still pending,28  nine cases were not appealed, 29and 4 cartel settlement cases. Hence, 
there are 30 cases in which have been appealed and judgments are available. 12 cases 
out of the 30 cases, the Community courts upheld entirely the Commission’s findings 
with regard to liability and fine (upheld).30 In eleven cases out of the 30 cases, the 
Community courts upheld the Commission’s with regard to liability but reduces the 
fine imposed (largely upheld).31 In seven cases, the Community courts annulled the 
Commission decision with respect to some parties and upheld the Commission’s 
findings with respect to other parties, which may results in reductions in the overall 
fine (partly upheld).32 There were no cases where the GC annulled the Commission’s 
decision entirely. Table 11 below shows the number and percentage of all of 
infringement decisions concluded by the Commission between May 2004 and 
December 2012. Table 12 below presents all the cases that have been appealed, 
together with the outcome and the fine.  
 
                                                          
28
 Bitumen Spain; CISAC; Car Glass; Aluminum Fluoride; Candle Waxes; Bananas; Intel; Heat 
Stabilisers; Power Transformers; Calcium Carbide; Marine Hoses; Bathroom fittings & fixtures; Pre-
stressing steel; Animal Feed Phosphates; Airfreight; LCD; Consumer detergents; Telekomunikacja 
Polska; Mountings for windows and window-doors; and Freight Forwarding. 
29
 Brasseries Kronenbourg; Souris-Topps; Belgian Architects’; GDF; professional videotape producers; 
Nitrile Butadiene; Ordre National des Pharmaciens en France; Exotic fruit; and TV and computer 
monitor tubes. 
30
 Clearstream; Raw tobacco  Spain; PO/Needles; Prokent/Tomra; MasterCard; Morgan Stanley/Visa 
International ; Chloroprene Rubber; Wanadoo España; Flat Glass; PO/Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners; 
and CB. 
31
 Plumbing tubes; SEP and others; AstraZeneca; MCAA; Industrial bags; PO/Thread; Bitumen (NL); 
Methacrylates; Elevators and Escalators; International removal services; and E.ON/GDF. 
32
 Choline Chloride; Fittings; Hydrogen Peroxide; BR/ESBR; Dutch beer market; Gas Insulated 
Switchgear; and Sodium Chlorate. 
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Upheld 
Largely 
upheld 
Partial 
Upheld 
Settlements 
Not 
appealed 
Pending 
12 cases 
(19%) 
11 cases 
(17.4%) 
7 cases 
(11.1%) 
4 cases 
(6.3%) 
9 cases 
(14.3%) 
20 cases 
(31.7%) 
Table 11: Number and percentage of infringement decisions, whether appealed 
or not. 
 
In what follows a brief description of a selection of some of the appealed cases will be 
given, followed by some observations gleaned from the discussion. The appealed 
cases will be discussed in three categories according to the fine that has been imposed 
by the Commission. First, cases where the fine imposed was over 500 million. 
Second, cases where the fine imposed was less than 500 and over 100 million. Third, 
cases where the fine imposed was less than 100 million. Table 12 below presents all 
infringement decisions and shows whether it has been appealed and the outcome and 
the amount of fine after appeal. 
 
3-2-3-1: Cases where the fine imposed was over €500 million  
The biggest reduction in fines was in the E.ON/GDF case, dealt with under Article 
101 TFEU, where the GC reduced the fine imposed by over 42% (from €1,106 billion 
to €640 million).33 This is the highest reduction in fine as an amount of reduction or as 
a percentage of reduction. According to the GC, the fine has been reduced on both 
parties involved because there was an error in determining the duration of the 
                                                          
33
Case T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas AG & E.ON AG v. Commission [2012]; Case T-370/09  GDF Suez v 
Commission [2012]. 
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infringement in France and hence the GC reduced the fine imposed.34 The GC 
judgment was not appealed to the CJEU.  
The Elevators and Escalators case represents the second highest fine imposed for the 
appealed cases were the Commission imposed around €992 million. In this case, the 
Commission found four infringements (cartel) where the durations of each one is 
different and the Commission fined each undertaking for each infringement 
separately. There were four appeals, three appeals were dismissed35 by the GC and 
one appeal resulted in reduction of fines.36 The overall amount of fine after appeal 
became around €832 million.37   
In the Gas insulated switchgear case the Commission imposed around €750 million. 
Four parties appealed to the GC. The GC annulled the EC decision for Toshiba and 
Mitsubishi Electric;38 reduced the fine for Fuji;39 and dismissed Hitachi and others 
appeal and upheld the Commission’s findings entirely.40 The appeals resulted in 
reducing the overall fine to around €539 million.41  
In 2006, the Commission imposed €519 million in the BR/ESBR case. The GC partly 
upheld the Commission decision.  The GC annulled the Commission decision in 
relation to two undertakings;42 reduced the fine imposed to one undertaking;43 and 
                                                          
34
 Case T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas AG & E.ON AG v. Commission [2012]; Case T-370/09  GDF Suez v 
Commission [2012]. 
35
 Case T-138/07 Schindler Holding and Others v Commission [2011]; Joined Cases T-141/07, T-
142/07, T-145/07 and T-146/07 General Technic-Otis and Others v Commission [2011]; and Case T-
151/07 Kone and Others v Commission [2011]. 
36
 Joined Cases T-144/07, T-147/07, T-148/07, T-149/07, T-150/07 and T-154/07 ThyssenKrupp Liften 
Ascenseurs and Others v Commission [2011]. 
37
 ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs and Kone appealed the ECJ, still pending.  
38
 Case T-133/07 Mitsubishi Electric v Commission [2011]; Case T-113/07 Toshiba v Commission 
[2011] 
39
 Case T-132/07 Fuji Electric v Commission [2011]. 
40
 Case T-112/07 Hitachi and Others v Commission [2011]. 
41
 The GC judgment has been appealed to CJEU, but still not decided.  
42
Case T-45/07 Unipetrol v Commission [2011]; Case T-44/07 Kaučuk v Commission [2011]; Case T-
53/07 Trade-Stomil v Commission [2011]. 
43
 Case T-59/07 Polimeri Europa v Commission [2011]. 
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upheld the Commission decision entirely to two undertaking.44 After appeal, the 
overall fine was reduced to around €315 million. 
 
3-2-3-2: Cases where the fine imposed between €100 and €500 million 
In the Pluming tubes case, seven undertakings appealed the EC’s decision, most of the 
appellants requests were dismissed by the CFI (now GC).45 There was a small 
reduction of fines for two appellants by the CFI.46 The overall amount of fine imposed 
before appeal was €222 million, after appeal the overall fine is around €221 million.47  
In Methacrylates, the EC imposed around €344 million on five cartelists. Four 
undertakings appealed the EC decision; the GC dismissed two appeals48 and reduced 
the fine imposed in the other two.49 The reductions brought the overall fine after 
appeal to around €238 million.50  
 
3-2-3-3: Cases where the fine imposed was less than €100 million 
The PO/Needles case was appealed to the CFI (Now GC) by the two parties fined. 
The CFI reduced the fine imposed for both appellants.51 The overall fine after appeal 
became €47 million, where it was €60 million before appeal.  The CFI judgment was 
appealed to the CJEU, where it upheld the CFI. 52 
                                                          
44
Case T-42/07 Dow Chemical and Others v Commission [2011]; and Case T-38/07Shell Petroleum 
and Others v Commission [2011]. 
45
 KME Germany (dismissed); Outokumpu and Luvata (dismissed); Boliden (dismissed); Wieland-
Werke (dismissed); KME Germany AG (dismissed). Chalkor appealed to the ECJ (dismissed). 
46
 Chalkor (Fine reduced 9,160,000 to 8,246,700); IMI (reduced from 44,980,000 to 38.556). 
47
 Two undertakings appealed the CFI judgment to the ECJ, but their appeals were dismissed.  
48
 Lucite International and ICI.  
49
 Quinn Barlo and Aremka.  
50
 Some parties appealed to the ECJ, but still not decided.  
51
 Case T-36/05 Coats Holdings and Coats v Commission [2007]; Case T-30/05 Prym and Prym 
Consumer v Commission [2007]. 
52
 Case C-534/07 P William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG v Commission 
of the European Communities [2009]. 
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In AstraZeneca, a fine of €60 million was imposed on AstraZeneca for abusing its 
dominant position by the Commission. AstraZeneca appealed to the GC, where it has 
reduced the fine to around €40 million.53 The judgment was appealed to the CJEU 
where it has dismissed AstraZeneca’s appeal and confirmed the GC’s judgment  54 
In Clearstream, the Commission found Clearstream infringing Article 102 TFEU but 
it did not impose any fines on it. Clearstream appealed to EC’s decision to the CFI. 
The CFI dismissed Clearstream request and upheld the Commission findings.55  
In Prokent/Tomra, the Commission found an infringement of Article 102 TFEU and 
imposed €24 million as a fine.  Tomra appealed the decision to the GC; the GC 
dismissed Tomra appeal entirely and upheld the Commission.56 The GC judgment was 
appealed to the CJEU where it upheld the CFI and dismissed the appeal from Tomra.57  
In 2007 the Commission in Morgan Stanley/Visa International, found an infringement 
of Article 101 TFEU and fined Visa around €10 million for excluding Morgan 
Stanley from membership of Visa Europe.58 Visa Europe and Visa international 
appealed to the GC for an annulment or a reduction in fines. The GC dismissed Visa’s 
request and upheld the Commission findings on fine and liability.59 The GC judgment 
was not appealed to the CJEU.  
In Sodium Chlorate, the Commission imposed around €79 million on five cartelists. 
Four appealed to the GC. The GC dismissed the request of three appellants.60 The GC 
                                                          
53
 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2010]. 
54
 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2012]. 
55
 Case T-301/04 Clearstream v Commission [2009]. 
56
 Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems and Others v Commission [2010]. 
57
 C-549/10 P Tomra Systems ASA, Tomra Europe AS, Tomra Systems GmbH, Tomra Systems BV, 
Tomra Leergutsysteme GmbH, Tomra Systems AB, Tomra Butikksystemer AS v European 
Commission [2012] 
58
 Morgan Stanley/Visa International, para. 354. 
59
 Case T-461/07 Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission [2011]. 
60
 Case T-349/08 Uralita, SA v Commission [2011]; Case T-343/08 Arkema France v Commission 
[2011]; Case T-299/08 Elf Aquitaine v Commission [2011]. 
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annulled the Commission decision with respect to one appellant.61 However, the 
overall amount of fine was not affected as the party who was successful on appeal 
was fined jointly with another party; after appeal, the other party will pay the whole 
fine. The GC judgment was appealed to the CJEU by one party; however, the CJEU 
upheld the GC.62  
 
3-2-3-4: Commitments and non-infringement decisions 
Some of the Commitments and the non-infringements decisions were appealed to the 
Community Courts. From the 39 decisions, eight decisions were appealed; three 
commitment decisions63 and five non-infringement decisions.64 Four cases are still 
pending; three cases have been dismissed and upheld the Commission decision. Only 
in one case, the request of the appellant was successful and overturned the 
Commission decisions.65  
 
3-2-3-5: Observations 
What can be noted that for all the cases concluded between May 2004 and December 
2012 that the Courts did not dismiss the Commission’s findings entirely. In other 
words, it can be said that the Commission’s investigations (for the appealed cases) 
were all the times right and tackled anti-competitive practices.  
                                                          
61
 Case T-348/08 Aragonesas Industrias y Energía, SAU v Commission [2011]. 
62
 C-404/11 P Elf Aquitaine SA v European Commission [2012]. 
63
 Repsol CPP, Rambus, Iliad / France Telecom, Vivendi, Iliad / France Telecom. 
64
 EFIM, Vivendi, Omnis / Microsoft, Si.mobil / Mobitel, CEEES/AOP – REPSOL. 
65
 In Rambus, the Court allowed the intervention of a third party which was refused by the 
Commission.  
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It can also be noted that most of the cases that were not appealed, the fines imposed in 
the majority of these cases were comparatively low to the other cases in the sample. In 
six cases, the fine did not exceed €10 million. 
In addition, all of the Article 102 TFEU cases were appealed. There were six cases 
appealed, two of which are still pending. In the other four cases, the Court upheld the 
Commission’s findings on liability and reduced the fine in only one case. This can be 
understood, as the Commission is not investigating Article 102 TFEU cases unless 
that there a high possibility of anti-competitive behaviour and the Commission is 
presenting its cases and evidence in a convening manner that help it to win cases on 
appeal.  
Cartel settlements procedures: is the 10% reduction worth it? 
In cartel cases there are procedures that can be followed by the Commission to end its 
investigation. First, the Commission can follow ordinary procedures in its 
investigations and in such cases the Commission will not reduce the fine imposed on 
cartelist unless there is/are reasons to do so.66 Importantly, cartel cases under ordinary 
procedures can be appealed to the Community courts. Second, the Commission may 
end its investigation by reaching a settlement with the parties investigated and the 
Commission will reduce 10% of the fine that it intends to impose. Settlements 
procedures are unlikely to be appealed to the Community Courts. Therefore, 
settlement procedures should end investigations earlier than ordinary procedures (this 
is the aim of the commission when it introduced the settlement procedure in cartel 
                                                          
66
 There are certain circumstances where the Commission may reduces or increase the fines according 
its fining guidelines. The following may play a role in awarding reductions:  Leniency, mitigating 
circumstances, inability to pay and co-operation with the Commission’s investigation. See the 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 
1/2003 Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006. Para 18 to 38.   
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cases) and also it saves the Commission’s time and resources.67 Because settlement 
procedures are unlikely to be appealed and may end earlier than ordinary procedures; 
hence, the Commission will have more resources to be directed to other activities.  
In the majority of the appealed decisions, the court has reduced the overall fine by 
over 10%. In cartel settlement cases, the Commission gives 10% reduction of the fine 
that it would impose it in an ordinary procedures. If one calculates the overall fines 
pre and post appeal, it appears that in total the fines have reduced by around 19% after 
appeal.68 This means, overall, that the Commission is actually wining the cases in an 
easier and cheaper way. As the Commission when settling cases with cartelists, the 
Commission is avoiding the cost of litigation. Which can be understood as the 
Commission is taking a shortcut with its procedures and predicting what probably 
could happen on appeal and, ending better off at the end if one looks at the whole 
cases appealed between May 2004 and December 2012. In addition, one has to take 
into account the duration of the investigations as if it is truly that those investigations 
under settlements procedures ended up as are shorter.  This has been shown earlier 
that most of cartel settlements procedures were shorter by 10 months.69 In addition, 
the Commission will avoid the time spent on appeal. Thus, it can be said that, so far, 
settlements procedures seems to bring benefits to the Commission in terms of time 
savings.70  
                                                          
67
 See, Cartel case settlement, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/cartels_settlements/settlements_en.html 
68
 The overall amount of fine before appeal is around € 7.367 billion and post appeal is around €5.962 
billion, the percentage of the overall reduction in fine is 19.07. 
69
 See section 3-2-2-1 on duration of investigations. 
70
 The settlement procedure in cartel cases has been supported by Motta. He stated “If firms settled and 
agreed to pay a certain fine and not to appeal the decision, this would allow the Commission not only 
to save time and resources in the period until the decision, but also from court appeals. The 
Commission's manpower can then be redirected to the investigation, prosecution and uncovering of 
new cartels”. See, Massimo Motta, ‘On cartel deterrence and fines in the European Union’ (2008) 
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Case 
Fine 
imposed (€) 
Appeal to GC 
Appeal 
to ECJ 
Final fine after 
appeal 
Outcome 
Choline Chloride 66,430,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced 
and increased
71
 
Upheld 
CFI 
57,974,000 
Largely  
Upheld 
Plumbing tubes 222,291,100 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
72
 
Upheld
73
 221,377,700 
Largely 
upheld 
Clearstream 0 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld 
Not 
appealed 
0 Upheld 
Raw tobacco  
Spain 
20,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
 74
 
Upheld 
GC 
13,593,800 
Largely 
upheld 
PO/Needles 60,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
 75
 
Upheld 
CFI 
47,000,000 
Largely 
upheld 
SEP and others 49,500,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced 
Upheld 44,550,000 
Largely 
upheld 
AstraZeneca 60,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced 
Upheld  
GC 
40,250,000 
Largely 
upheld 
MCAA 169,600,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced 
Upheld 
GC 
162,197,000 
Largely 
upheld 
Industrial bags 290,000,000 
Liability: largely 
Fine: reduced
76
 
Pending 275,320,000 
Partial 
Upheld 
Raw tobacco 
Italy 
56,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld
77
 
Pending 56,000,000 Upheld 
PO/Thread 43,497,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
78
 
Not 
appealed 
43,374,000 
Largely 
upheld 
Prokent/Tomra 24,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld 
Upheld 
GC 
24,000,000 Upheld 
Fittings 314,760,000 
Liability: Partly 
Fine: reduced
 79
 
Upheld 
GC
80
 
312,308,000 
Partial 
Upheld 
                                                                                                                                                                      
29(4) European Competition Law Review 209, 212. 
71
 There were three appeals:  dismissed for Akzo; fine increased after appeal on BASF (from 
€34,970,000 to €35,024,000) ;  fine reduced for UCB  (from €10,380,000 to €1,870,000).  Akzo appeal 
to CJEU dismissed 
72
 There were seven appeals: KME Germany, dismissed; Fine reduced for Chalkor (from €9,160,000 to 
€8,246,700); Outokumpu and Luvata, dismissed; Boliden, dismissed; fine reduced for IMI (from 
€44,980,000 to €38,556,000); Wieland-Werke; dismissed;KME Germany AG, dismissed.  
73
 Chalkor appeal to the CJEU,dismissed. 
74
 Fine reduced on Cetarsa (from €3,631,500 to €3,147,300); fine reduced on Agroexpansión 
(€2,592,000 to €2,430,000); fine reduced on Delfanta reduced from (€11880000 to €6,120,000) 
75
 Two appeals: Prym and Prym fine reduced (from €30,000,000 to €27,000,000); Coats fine reduced  
(from €30,000,000 to €20,000,000) 
76
 Nine appeals: decision annulled for Stempher BV (fine was €2,370,000 to 0 ); reduce fine for Bonar 
(from €12,240,000 to €9,180,000); reduce fine for UPM-Kymmene (from €56,550,000 to €50,700,000) 
;  appeals dismissed for six appellants.  
77
 Two appeals by Deltafina and Alliance One, dismissed. 
78
 Four appeals: appeal of three undertakings, dismissed; Fine reduced to BST (to €856,800) 
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Bitumen (NL) 266,717,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
81
 
Not 
appealed 
239,717,000 
Largely 
upheld 
Hydrogen 
Peroxide 
388,128,000 
Liability: Partly 
Fine: reduced
 82
 
Pending 330,003,000 
Partial 
Upheld 
BR/ESBR 519,000,000 
Liability: Partly 
Fine: reduced
83
 
Pending 316,150,000 
Partial 
Upheld 
Methacrylates 344,562,500 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
84
 
pending 238,025,000 
Largely 
upheld 
Dutch beer 
market 
273,783,000 
Liability: Partly 
Fine: reduced
 85
 
Upheld 
GC 
218,698,312 
Partial 
Upheld 
Morgan 
Stanley/Visa 
International 
10,200,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld 
Not 
appealed 
10,200,000 Upheld 
Chloroprene 
Rubber 
247,635,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld
86
 
Pending 
247,635,000 
 
Upheld 
Bitumen Spain 183,651,000 Pending   Pending 
Wanadoo 
España 
151,875,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld
87
 
Pending 151,875,000 Upheld 
Elevators and 
Escalators 
992,000,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: reduced
 88
 
Pending 832,110,050 
Largely 
upheld 
Gas Insulated 
Switchgear 
750,712,500 
Liability: partial 
Fine: reduced
89
 
Pending 539,687,500 
Partial 
upheld 
Flat Glass 486,900,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld 
Not 
appealed 
486,900,000 Upheld 
PO/Hard 
Haberdashery: 
Fasteners 
303,644,000 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld
90
 
Not 
appealed 
303,644,000 Upheld 
                                                                                                                                                                      
79
 Nine appeals: decision annulled for Aalberts Industries; reduced the fine on Kaimer slightly (from 
€7,970,000 to €7,150,000); reduced the fine on Tomkins by 1 million; four undertakings, dismissed 
(Viega,Legris,IMI and FRAO). 
80
 Three appeals to the ECJ, all dismissed. 
81
 Three appeals: dismissed for Total  and Kuwait; reduction in fine for Shell ( from €108,000,000 to 
€81,000,000) 
82Five appeals: annulled for Edison (from €58,125,000 to 0); four dismissed (FMC,Snia, Solvay and 
Arkema).    
83
Six appeals:  Shell and Dow, dismissed; reduced fines for ENI/Polimeri (from 272,250,000 to 
181,500,000); annuled the Commission decision for Unipetrol/Kaucuk (from 17,550,000 to 0); 
annulled the Commission decision for Trade-Stomil (from 3,800,000 to 0). 
84
 four Appeals: reduce fine for Quinn Barlo (from €9 million to €8,25 million) ; reduced fine for 
Aremka (from 219,131,250 to 113,343,750); Lucite International, dismissed; ICI, dismissed. 
85
 annulled the Commission decision to  Koninklijke Grolsch (from €31 658 000 to 0 ); reduce fine to 
Heineken (from €219,275,000 to €197,985,937); reduced fine for Bavaria (from 22,850,000 to 
20,712,375) 
86
 Three appeals, all dismissed. 
87
 Two  appeals by Kingdom of Spain and Telfoneca, dismissed 
88
 Four appeals: three appeals, dismissed; reduction in fines for ThyssenKrupp Liften Ascenseurs in the 
four cases (form 68607000 to 45738000), (from 374220000 to 249480000),  (from 13365000 to 
89100004),  (from 23477850 to 15651900).Overall reductions= 159,889,950 
89
 Four appeals: annulled the Commission for Mitsubishi Electric (from 118 575 000 to 0); reduction in 
fine for Fuji (from 3 750 000 to 2 200 000); annulled the Commission for Toshiba (from: 90,900,000 to 
0); dismiss the appeal from Hitachi and Others. 
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International 
removal services 
32,700,000 
Liability: partial 
Fine: reduced
 91
 
Pending 30,451,000 
Partial 
upheld 
CB 0 
Liability: 
Upheld 
Fine: Upheld 
Not 
appealed 
0 Upheld 
Sodium Chlorate 79,070,000 
Liability: partial 
Fine: not 
affected
 92
 
Upheld 
GC 
 
Partial 
upheld 
CISAC 0 Pending   Pending 
Car glass 
1,383,896,00
0 
pending
93
   Pending 
Aluminium 
fluoride 
4,970,000 Pending   Pending 
Candle Waxes 
676,011,400 
 
Pending   Pending 
Bananas 
60,300,000 
 
Pending 
 
  Pending 
Intel 
1,060,000,00
0 
 
Pending   Pending 
Heat Stabilisers 
173,860,400 
 
Pending   Pending 
Power 
Transformer 
67,644,000 
 
Pending   Pending 
Calcium Carbide 61,120,000 Pending   Pending 
E.ON/GDF 
1,106,000,00
0 
 
Liability: upheld 
Fine: reduced
94
 
Not 
appealed 
640,000,000 
 
Largely 
Upheld 
Marine Hoses 
131,510,000 
 
Pending   Pending 
DRAMs 
331,000,000 
 
Settlement 
Settlemen
t 
331,000,000 
 
Settlement 
Bathroom 
fittings & 
fixtures 
622,250,783 
 
Pending   Pending 
Pre-stressing 
steel 
269,870,750 
 
Pending   Pending 
Animal Feed 
Phosphates 
175,647,000 
 
Pending   Pending 
Airfreight 799,445,000 Pending   Pending 
LCD 648,925,000 Pending   Pending 
Consumer 
detergents 
315,200,000 Pending   Pending 
Telekomunikacj
a Polska 
127,554,194 Pending   Pending 
CRT glass bulbs 128,736,000 Settlement  128,736,000 Settlement 
Refrigeration 
compressors 
161,198,000 Settlement  161,198,000 Settlement 
Mountings for 85,876,000 Pending   Pending 
                                                                                                                                                                      
90
  Three appeals, dismissed and two pending. 
91
 5 appeals: annulled the Commission for Verhuizingen (from 104,000 to 0) ; reduce the fine for 
Gosselin (form 4,500,000 to 2,320,000)  ; 3 dismissed  [Putters, Ziegler, Team Relocations]. 
92
 4 appeals: 3 dismissed; 1 annulled but did not affect amount of fine. 
93
 Three appeals: pending.  
94
 Upheld the Commission but reduced the fine on both parties from €553,000,000 to €320,000,000 
each. 
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windows and 
window-doors 
Freight 
Forwarding 
169,000,000 Pending   Pending 
Table 12: cases that have been appealed and the outcome of appeals 
3-3: Non enforcement activities 
Most of the CAs around the world besides conducting enforcement activities and 
enforcing competition provisions, they conduct non-enforcement activities that have 
many objectives to achieve. Non-enforcement activities might be used to test markets 
or sector to check the competiveness of these markets. In the EU, the Commission 
conducts the so-called sector inquires in order to check if competition distorted in 
certain markets. In addition, non-enforcement may be designed in order to raise 
awareness of the consequences of breaching competition law (e.g. compliance 
programs). Furthermore, non-enforcement activities might be used to highlight the 
benefits of competitive markets and its role on consumer welfare. Another role of 
non-enforcement activities is that CAs issue guidance documents in order to clarify 
the law and how the law will be applied by the CA (e.g. fining guidelines).  
The EC has given some of its time and resources to non-enforcement activities; these 
non-enforcement activities have been on different issues, as explained in the previous 
paragraph. Some of these non-enforcement issues have led to enforcement actions, 
such as the Eon/GDF case where the Commission knew about the infringement 
because of the outcomes of the sector inquiry in the energy sector. In addition, other 
non-enforcement activities may have led to an increase in the enforcement levels of 
the EC and has helped in spotting competition law violations. For example, as it has 
been seen previously in the chapter, the Commission notice on immunity from fines 
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and reduction of fines in cartel cases95 has helped the Commission in the majority of 
cartel cases in uncovering cartels.96 Furthermore, in the area of cartels, the 
Commission’s settlements procedures helped the Commission to save time and 
resources with ending disputes earlier than ordinary procedures, and the Commission 
avoided the cost of litigation on appeal. Hence, giving the Commission the 
opportunity to priorities its work more. Table 13 (sector inquires) and 14 (documents 
and guidelines and other publications) below lists the non-enforcement activities of 
the EC between May 2004 and December 2012. 
Year Sector inquiries 
2004  
2005  3G Sector Inquiry 
2006  
2007 
 Business Insurance Sector Inquiry; 
 Retail banking Sector Inquiry;  
 Study on electricity markets supports the results of the Commission's Sector Inquiry 
(of 2005);  
 Study on Conveyancing Services Market. 
 Inquiry into competition in gas and electricity markets 
2008  Inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector 
2009  
2010  1st Report  on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements 
2011  2nd Report  on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements 
2012  3rd Report  on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements 
Table 13: Sector inquiries conducted by the EC  
(May 2004 and December 2012) 
  
Year  Documents issued    
2004  
2005  
2006 
 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel 
cases Official Journal C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17 
 2006 ECN Model Leniency Programme (September 2006) 
 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) 
(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006, p. 2-5 
2007  
2008 
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement 
procedures in cartel cases (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal L 
                                                          
95
 Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases Official Journal C 
298, 8.12.2006, p. 17. 
96
 See, section 3-2-1-3 on sources of investigations. 
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171, 1.7.2008, p. 3–5  
 Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the 
adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (Text with EEA relevance ), 
Official Journal C 167, 2.7.2008, p. 1–6 
2009 
 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 
of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings 
OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–20 
2010 
 DG Competition Stakeholder Survey 
 Competition authorities in the European Union – the continued need for 
effective institutions (16 November 2010)  
 The recommendation of the High Level Group on Milk aimed at improving 
the bargaining power of dairy farms (17 November 2010)  
2011  
2012 
 ECN Model Leniency Programme: 2012 revision  
November 2012 
 Investigative Powers Report  Decision-making Powers Report  
 The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (21 December 2012)   
 Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions (23 
May 2012)  
 Compliance matters: What companies can do better to respect EU 
competition rules 
Table 14: Documents, studies, guidelines or any other sort of documents issued 
by the EC between May 2004 and December 2012. 
 
It can be seen that the Commission has devoted some of its resources to non-
enforcement activities. However, it is difficult to determine whether the Commission 
has got the right balance between enforcement and non-enforcement activities, as the 
Commission has outcomes on both sides. A comparison with other jurisdictions may 
help in understanding what could be the right balance; this will be done in chapter 6 
below.  Furthermore, one should not ignore that some of these non-enforcement 
activities may play a role in raising deterrence, helping in understating the law, raising 
awareness of the consequences of breaching competition law and, indeed it may have 
an important role in fostering enforcement activities.  
 
3-4: Capabilities of the EC 
After considering the Commission’s outcomes in terms of enforcement and non-
enforcement activities; it worth investigating under which circumstance the EC 
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produced these activities. In other words, examining how the budget was allocated 
and the number of staff and experts in the Commission for the years under scrutiny. 
Such an examination, alongside the activities of the EC, may provide how the budget 
and the staff of the Commission may affect the EC’s outcomes and their quality. 
However, a better understanding can be achieved when comparing the whole 
activities and the capabilities of the EC to other CAs, which will be done later in the 
thesis. 
 
3-4-1: Number of staff and specialists  
The number of staff and specialists may affect, at least in theory, the quality of 
decision-making and the duration of investigations. However, one should bear in 
mind that the procedures and legislations might affect the duration of investigations; 
also, it depends on the other activities concluded by the EC. In addition, the nature of 
the investigations concluded may affect the duration and it may affect the possibility 
of winning cases on appeal. Having said that, the increase in the number of staff and 
the number of experts in the EC may play a role in reducing duration of investigations 
and may increases the possibility of winning cases on appeal (bearing in mind the 
budget of the EC).  
Table 15 below shows the overall number of staff, lawyers and economists in the EC 
from 2004 to 2009. It can be observed from table 15 that the number of staff and 
specialists (lawyers and economists) is increasing over the years. The increase in the 
number of staff is very rapid where it can be seen that the number of staff more than 
doubled between 2004 and 2009. It can also be seen the jump in the number of 
economists at the Commission, where in 2004 the number of economists was 54 and 
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in 2009 the number has risen up to 265. This may indicate that the EC is more willing 
to employ economic analysis in its work. In addition, the number of specialists may 
be as a response to the increase employment of the effects based approach in the 
Commission’s work.  
Year Number of staff Lawyers Economists PhDs in Economics  
2004 272 116 54 
 
2005 382 156 92 13 
2006 593 243 207 21 
2007 633 248 221 17 
2008 700 319 245 19 
2009 757 340 265 20 
Table 15: Number of staff and specialists at the EC (2004-2009) 
 
3-4-2: Budget of the EC 
The enforcement of the law and recruiting experts is not a cheap process, therefore, 
CAs need to priorities its work in order to focus on most harmful violations. It can be 
noted from table 16 below that up to 2006 the budget of the EC was increasing from 
year to year; also, the budget allocated to enforcement was increasing. In these years, 
the amount of the budget allocated to enforcement was always over 30% of the 
overall budget. However, in 2007 the overall budget decreased dramatically which 
also affected the amount of budget allocated to enforcement where the Commission 
allocated only 12.1% from its overall budget to enforcement. In 2008, the overall 
budget of the EC has increased; despite this, the Commission reduced further the 
budget allocated to enforcement to 12%. In 2009 the overall budget of the 
Commission increase by more € 10 million from 2008, however the Commission 
allocated 14.2% to enforcement.    
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By looking at the number of staff and the budget in each year, it is not surprising that 
the percentage allocated to enforcement changed substantially pre 2006 and post 2006 
because the number of staff and specialists has increased dramatically over the years 
and the budget of the Commission decreased after the year 2006. Thus, the 
Commission was allocating less of its budget to enforcement.   
Year Overall budget (€ million) Budget on enforcement (€ million)  
percentage (%) 
2004 79 25.8    (32.6 %) 
2005 90 27     (30 %) 
2006 97 31.2    (32.1 %) 
2007 71.7 8.7    (12.1 %) 
2008 78.2 9.4     (12 %) 
2009 89.4 12.7    (14.2 %) 
Table 16: The overall budget and the budget on enforcement by the EC 
 (2004-2009) 
 
From graph 3 below it can be seen that whether the budget is increasing or decreasing 
the budget allocated to enforcement is decreasing (as percentage) and the amount 
spent on salaries and other issues in the Commission are taking most of the overall 
budget. Hence, the increase in the number of staff and the number of specialists at the 
Commission may be was on the expense of enforcement activities. Also it can be seen 
from graph 3 the gap between the black line (overall enforcement) and the gray line 
represents the amount of the budget spent on salaries and other issues other than 
budget on enforcement. Where the area below the grey line represents the amount 
spent on enforcement.97   
                                                          
97
 This amount may include not only antitrust enforcement (Article 101 and 102) but other enforcement 
issues such state aid and merger control.  
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Graph 3: budget of the EC and the amount allocated to enforcement 
 
3-4-3: Analysis and observations 
Duration of investigations vs. Capabilities of the EC 
It is worth examining if the capabilities of the EC have an effect on the duration of 
investigations. As it has been explained earlier, over the years there has been an 
increase in the number of staff and specialists within the EC. Thus, it will be 
examined if the increase/ decrease in the number of staff and budget affected the 
duration of investigation. This will be done by calculating the average duration for 
each year examined and compare it with the budget and the number of staff in each 
year.  As it can be seen from table 17 below, that the average duration of 
investigations does not correspond with the increase/ decrease with the budget and it 
does not correspond with the increase number of staff and the number of specialists. 
However, this does not seem to be a correct measure of the effects of the increase or 
the decrease of the capabilities of the Commission. Since, the average duration of 
investigations for infringements  is around 51 months and the years scrutinised in this 
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thesis is the year of conclusion of decisions; therefore, it is difficult to find out if the 
capabilities of the EC affects the duration of investigation or even the number of 
cases. Even if the year of initiation was employed it is difficult to know the impact of 
the capabilities on investigations from an outsider because the investigation usually 
over 36 months and it would difficult to assess whether the capabilities of EC affect 
duration of investigations, because the capabilities change from year to another.  
Year Number of staff Lawyers Economists PhDs in ECO 
Overall budget 
(€ million) 
Average 
duration 
(months) 
2004 272 116 54 
 
79 28.7 
2005 382 156 92 13 90 59.3 
2006 593 243 207 21 97 56.9 
2007 633 248 221 17 71.7 55.1 
2008 700 319 245 19 78.2 55.1 
2009 757 340 265 20 89.4 51 
 Table 17: Average duration of investigation and the Capabilities of the EC 
 
3-5: Surrounding circumstances and facts about the EC or the EU 
This section aims to provide information that could further help in understanding how 
competition law had been applied in the period under examination (May 2004- 
December 2012). Thus, this section presents and discusses studies that attempted to 
evaluate or assess (directly, indirectly or studies that could be considered as 
assessment studies) enforcement of competition law in Europe. This section also 
sheds light on some issues or events that may affect or may affected public 
enforcement of competition law.  
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies that examine the Commission’s 
performance directly, or the EC as an institution, or studies that examine the 
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application of antitrust rules directly. There have been studies that examine the 
Commission success rate on appeal; studies that examine a particular policy or the 
application of certain legislation and how the Commission enforced these rules, or the 
assessment of guidelines that regulates the application of antitrust rules. However, 
none of the studies presented below has dealt with public enforcement of competition 
law for the period under examination in this chapter.  
There was a statistical study was conducted by Carree et al. that analysed the 
Commission decisions between 1957 and 2004.98 The authors provide information 
about the number of cases, number of parties, type of decision, investigations 
duration, fine imposed and other related issues. The study linked the statistics to 
changes in legislation and other events that occurred for the period of the study. 
Therefore, this study can be considered (as stated by the authors) as a historical study 
that provides information about cases concluded by the Commission between 1957 
and 2004.99 Also, this study did not provide policy recommendations or any sort of 
suggestions for policy makers.100   
There have been some studies that attempted to assess certain regulation, guidelines, 
notices or policies that the Commission uses when applying competition law.101  For 
instance, there are some studies that examine the application of the fining or leniency 
related legislations and how this changed the way in which the Commission is dealing 
with cases, using data extracted from the Commission’s decisions.  These types of 
                                                          
98
 Martin Carree, Andrea Gunster and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, ‘European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: 
an analysis of Commission decisions’ ACLE Working Paper 2008-06. 
99
 Martin Carree, Andrea Gunster and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, ‘European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: 
an analysis of Commission decisions’ ACLE Working Paper 2008-06. P.4. 
100
 Martin Carree, Andrea Gunster and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, ‘European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: 
an analysis of Commission decisions’ ACLE Working Paper 2008-06. P.4.  
101
 The pros and cons of these studies have been examined, earlier, in chapter 2.  
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studies usually conclude with observations of whether these legislations have brought 
improvements or if it has achieved its goals.   
For example, Stephan102 examines the 1996 European leniency notice103 empirically.104 
He examines horizontal cartel cases in Europe which have been opened as a result of 
the 1996 leniency notice. Stephan finds that the leniency notice was of limited success 
because it did not help in uncovering active cartels but failed cartels. This mainly 
because around three quarters of the examined cartels were subject to prior or 
simultaneous investigations in the US; and most of the cartels were in the chemicals 
industry (67%) where many of the cartels were connected to one another.105  
Brenner,106 however, has a positive view on the 1996 leniency notice. Brenner 
examined a sample of 61 cartel cases investigated and prosecuted by the European 
Commission between 1990 and 2003. He compares cartels that were detected after 
leniency adoption with cartels detected before the leniency notice came into force. He 
found that under the 1996 leniency notice investigation and prosecution becomes 
faster by about 1.5 years. Furthermore, he finds evidence indicating that the program 
provides incentives to reveal information on criminal activities in the sense that 
agencies are better informed about the cartel conduct than they would be absent the 
program.  
                                                          
102
 Andreas Stephan ‘An Empirical Assessment of the 1996 Leniency Notice’ CCP Working Paper No. 
05-10 
103
 European Commission, 1996. Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in 
cartel cases. Official Journal of the European Commission C 207. 
104
 In 2006, the European Commission’s 1996 Leniency notice was replaced with  the Commission 
notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, Official Journal C 298, 8.12.2006, 
p. 17. 
105
 Andreas Stephan ‘An Empirical Assessment of the 1996 Leniency Notice’ CCP Working Paper No. 
05-10, p 15. 
106
 Steffen Brenner, ‘An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program’ (2009) 27 
International Journal of Industrial Organization  639. 
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The concerns with these studies are self evident as it can be seen from the examples 
given above; where two studies assess the same piece of legislation but ended up with 
very different views from the authors.  This is mainly because of the intention and the 
purpose of each study, and what each author is aiming to achieve. However, from a 
purely assessment perspective, this might be confusing, because such studies do not 
give an overall assessment of the application of competition law by the CA. This as 
well can be a dilemma for policy makers when they want to reform a certain policy. If 
an overall assessment of the law was applied to the CA, then a judgment on what to 
reform or keep would be easier.   
Similar studies have conducted in other areas as well. Geradin and Henry107 consider 
the fining policy of the European Commission.  The authors reviewed all the 
Commission decisions and CFI judgments dealing with fines, which have been 
adopted since the publication of the 1998 fining Guidelines.108109 The main findings of 
this work are: (1) most of the infringement  are treated as severe infringement, 
including cartels and non-cartel cases; (2) the Commission seems to be looking at the 
effects of the conduct and it did not rely on legal standards when setting the amount of 
fine;( 3) the CFI never increased the fine imposed by the Commission and its has been 
reluctant principles behind the Commission’s fining decision, it only reviewed 
whether the fining guidelines were correctly applied or not.110  
                                                          
107
 Geradin, D. and D. Henry, ‘The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical 
Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts Judgments’ (2005) 1(2) 
European Competition Journal  401. 
108
 European Commission, 1998. Guidelines on the method of setting fines. Official Journal of the 
European Commission C 9. 
109
In 2006, the European Commission replaced the 1998 Fining guidelines with the Commission’s 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 
1/2003. 
Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006.  
110
 Geradin, D. and D. Henry, ‘The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical 
Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts Judgments’ (2005) 1(2) 
European Competition Journal 401. Working paper version p. 58.  
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Another form of assessing the EC performance is a standard that has been used in the 
literature, namely, success rate on appeal.  Basically, such studies count the number of 
appealed decisions and the outcomes of the cases for a given period of time. 
Afterwards, a calculation of the overall success rate on appeal will be conducted, and 
on the basis of this, the study decides whether the CA under examination has a good 
success rate on appeal or not. Harding and Gibbs,111 employed this standard for cartel 
cases concluded by the EC between 1995 and 2004. The authors calculate the number 
of appellants for the cases that have been appealed and then categorise the outcome 
into three categories:112 (1) successful: this means that the appellants have the 
Commission’s decision annulled in favour of them. (2) Partly successful: the fine has 
been reduced to the appellants by the Court. (3) Unsuccessful: the Court upheld the 
Commission’s decisions entirely. In the authors sample there were 16 cartels in which 
there were 217 companies participated in these cartels.  Out of the 217 companies, 
153 appealed to the CFI and 47 appealed to the ECJ. The authors then considered that 
there are 200 companies appealed (the total appeals to the CFI and the ECJ). 
According the categorisation employed by the authors, there were:113 12 successful 
appeals (i.e. the Commission decision was annulled with regard to 12 companies); 
122 partly successful (i.e. the fines have been reduced to 122 companies); and 66 
unsuccessful appeals (i.e. the Courts dismissed the appeals of 66 companies and 
confirming the Commission decision).  
                                                          
111
 Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 
1995-2004’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 349. 
112
 Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 
1995-2004’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 349, 365. 
113
 Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, ‘Why go to court in Europe? An analysis of cartel appeals 
1995-2004’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 349, 365. 
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This type of study is an important tool to be considered when examining the 
performance of CAs; however, success on appeal is only a partial assessment of the 
CA performance as one need to look at other issues that may affect its performance 
and indeed its success rate on appeal. 114 This is mainly because115 that not all decisions 
are appealed and, indeed, it does not consider other activities and the capabilities of 
the CA in question.     
This chapter conducted a similar test but for all cases that have been appealed from 
May 2004 to December 2012. It has been found that the Commission never lost a case 
entirely on appeal and that there were no huge defeats in terms of reductions in 
fines.116  
Other studies have been conducted by externals bodies but cannot be considered as 
direct assessment studies of the EC. In 2005, the OECD produced a study about 
competition law and policy in the EU.117 One of the main messages of the study is to 
provide some information about Regulation 1/2003 and its possible implications and, 
the role of Member States competition authorities and courts after regulation 1/2003.   
This study presents issues related to the history and the policy goals of competition 
policy in the EU. One of the issues that have been highlighted in the study (and 
related to the subject matter of this chapter) is the lack of individual sanctions against 
cartelists which may undermine the effectiveness of cartel enforcements. This study 
notes that if it is not feasible to implement sanctions against individuals under 
                                                          
114
 This issue is discussed in greater detail in the Chapter 2.  
115
 as it has been shown in earlier in this chapter and the previous chapter. 
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 See sub- section 3-2-3 “success rate on appeal”. 
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 Michae Wise, ‘Competition Law and Policy in the European Union (2005)’ (2007) 9 (1) OECD 
Journal of Competition Law and Policy 7. 
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community law, then the Commission could support individual sanctions under 
national laws of Member States.118  
Some commentators have contributed to the discussion of public enforcement of 
competition law by examining regulation 1/2003. In 2008, a community report was 
prepared to the FIDE Congress 2008 about the first experiences with Regulation 
1/2003.119 The report examined the new procedures brought by regulation 1/2003 and 
its effects on the Commission’s caseload, i.e. it did not examine the Commission 
performance. The report also offered views on issues related to investigation powers, 
co-operation between Member States CAs and the role of national courts.  
The report presents some comparisons on the caseload of the Commission pre and 
post regulation 1/2003. The report notes that regulation 1/2003 substantially reduced 
the Commission workload, in terms of cases.120 The report also notes that the nature of 
cases is very different compared to pre regulation 1/2003.121 The report observed that 
there has been an instant positive impact of regulation 1/2003 (in the area of 
cartels)122123 which allows the Commission to focus on serious infringements of 
competition law.124 125 
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In addition, the report makes comparisons about the duration of investigations pre and 
post regulation 1/2003, where the author found that duration of investigations pre the 
enforcement of 1/2003 was shorter compared to post 1/2003 came into force. 
However, the author suggested that the time of undertaking such calculation is too 
early (the last case which the author’s looked at was in 2007).126 Nonetheless, as it has 
been found earlier in this chapter that average duration for infringement decisions was 
51.9 months and for commitments and non-infringements was 30.7 months therefore, 
it can be said that most of the cases included were opened under reg17 and not 
Regulation 1/2003. 
Therefore, it can be said that the report has positive views about the impact of 
regulation 1/2003 and predicted that the fruits of Regulation 1/2003 are still to come 
(at the time when the report was produced).  
 A more recent study by John Temple Lang about Regulation 1/2003 where he has 
very critical views about the regulation and provided reasons why some procedures 
regarding the decision making have to be reformed.127  However, Temple Lang’s main 
points were only made with respect to procedures that govern decision making within 
the European Commission. Temple Lang highlighted two main criticisms of the 
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current procedures under Regulation 1/2003. First, the decisions of Commission are 
taken by Commissioners which none of them has any special knowledge of 
competition law or competition economics; importantly, none of the Commissioners 
where involved in the earlier stages of building the decision.128 Second, the drafting of 
the decision, decisions are drafted by the same officials who wrote the statement of 
objections, which makes it difficult to exclude the possibility that decisions lack 
objectivity, impartiality and possibility of biased assessment of evidence.129 
Furthermore, Temple Lang pointed to other issues within the current procedures; such 
as, the high levels of fines imposed by the Commission130 and, that there is a real 
possibility that the procedures may be found contrary to the European Convention on 
Human Rights by European Court of Human Rights.131  
Hence, he proposed three possible ways to reform the current system. 132 First, the 
reform that would not require amendments to European treaties, is to give the General 
Court the powers to adopt prohibition decisions and to impose fines in competition 
cases, instead of the Commission; second, setting up a decision making body within 
the Commission; third,  setting up a European competition authority. Temple Lang is 
in favour of the first possibility for reform as amendments to the treaty is not 
required.133 He also insisted to the urgency of adopting one of the possibilities to 
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reform suggested, as the Commission should not risk its achievements where its 
procedures may be contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights.   
There has been some indirect assessment for the EC by studies carried out by KPMG 
when it has assessed competition policy in the UK. A ranking has been given to the 
EC but without explaining why the ranking has been given; because the EU was not 
the main concern of these studies. These studies were conducted by KPMG in 2004134 
and 2007.135  
As it has been mentioned on the chapter about public enforcement the UK. The peer 
reviews conducted by KPMG were mainly to review competition policy in the UK. 
The peer reviews were based on surveys distributed to competition experts 
(competition authorities officials, lawyers, economists and from business)   across the 
world, mainly from Europe. In the 2004 and the 2007 reviews, Europe was ranked 
fourth for its non-merger regime behind the US, Germany and the UK. However, 
because these peer reviews are mainly about the UK no explanations of why the EU 
has got this ranking been given. 
 
3-6: Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of public enforcement of competition 
law as applied by the EC and it has analysed the cases that has been appealed to the 
Community Courts. It has also highlighted the non-enforcement activities and the 
capabilities of the EC between May 2004 and December 2012. This was followed 
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with a discussion of studies that examined issues related to public enforcement of 
competition law in Europe.  
During the empirical analysis of the cases concluded by the EC many obeservitions, 
which were gleaned from the discussion, were highlighted and possible interpretations 
and implications were offered in the discussion. The following are the main 
observations gleaned from the empirical analysis: 
 It appears that the Commission is giving more attention to Article 101 cases, 
in particular cartel cases; the reason behind this is the role that leniency 
applications played in uncovering illegal cartels.  
  The majority of Article 102 TFEU cases were concluded as commitments 
decisions, there were only six infringement decisions.  
 The EC success rate on appeal is very high, where the Commission did not 
lose any appealed case entirely on appeal; in addition, the reductions in fines 
on appeal does not seem to be significant.  
 With regard to the sources of investigations of the Commission, it appeared 
that whenever the Commission opened an investigation on its own initiative, 
an infringement or commitment decision will be issued and the Commission 
will conclude its investigation quicker than other sources of investigations. 
None of the non-infringement decisions were opened based on the 
Commission’s own initiative.  
  Regarding the capabilities of the EC: the Commission number of staff and 
specialists is increasing over the years even though the budget was 
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decreasing; as a result the amount allocated on enforcement has decreased.  
  Also from the analysis, it seems that the non-enforcement activities of the EC 
contributed indirectly to increase the enforcement activities of the EC. For 
example, a sector inquiry has led to an infringement decision. Also, the 
guidelines on leniency and fines seem to have affected the number of cases 
and the amount of fines imposed in its cases, respectively.  
 Leniency applications proved to be an effective tool to uncover cartels but do 
not necessarily speed up the duration of investigations. Own initiative cases 
were concluded much quicker than cases where leniency application was the 
source of investigation.  
 The high number of cartel cases may be back to the international nature of 
cartel cases, where the EC has to take the leading role if the infringement has 
a European or international dimension. This may explain why there is very 
high number of cartel cases compared to other form of cases. Other possible 
explanation, that the Commission is focusing on cartel cases more than other 
types of cases.  
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Appendix  
Case Year 
Duration of 
investigation 
(in months) 
Type Fine 
Source of 
investigation 
Average 
duration of 
investigations 
(yearly) 
Choline Chloride 2004 19 101 66,430,000 Leniency 
28.7 
Brasseries 
Kronenbourg 
2004 8 101 2,500,000 Own initiative 
Souris-Topps 2004 34 101 1,590,000 complaint 
Plumbing tubes 2004 45 101 222,291,100 Leniency 
Clearstream 2004 40 102 0 Own initiative 
Raw tobacco  
Spain 
2004 36 101 20,000,000 Leniency 
PO/Needles 2004 35 101 60,000,000 Own initiative 
Belgian 
Architects’ 
2004 20 101 100,000 Own initiative 
GDF 2004 22 101 0 Not known 
SEP and others 2005 73 101 49,500,000 complaint 
59.3 
AstraZeneca 2005 73 102 60,000,000 Complaint 
MCAA 2005 73 101 216,910,000 Leniency 
Industrial bags 2005 48 101 290,000,000 Leniency 
Raw tobacco 
Italy 
2005 46 101 56,000,000 Own initiative 
PO/Thread 2005 46 101 43,497,000 Own initiative 
Prokent/Tomra 2006 60 102 24,000,000 complaint 
56.9 
Fittings 2006 66 101 314,760,000 Leniency 
Bitumen (NL) 2006 47 101 266,717,000 Leniency 
Hydrogen 
Peroxide 
2006 38 101 388,128,000 Leniency 
BR/ESBR 2006 44 101 519,000,000 Leniency 
Methacrylates 2006 38 101 344,562,500 Leniency 
MasterCard 2007 61 101 0 Own initiative 
55.1 
Dutch beer 
market 
2007 85 101 273,783,000 Own initiative 
Morgan 
Stanley/Visa 
International 
2007 84 101 10,200,000 complaint 
Chloroprene 
Rubber 
2007 57 101 247,635,000 Leniency 
professional 
videotape 
producers 
2007 67 101 74,790,000 Own initiative 
Bitumen Spain 2007 60 101 183,651,000 Leniency 
Wanadoo 
España 
2007 48 102 151,875,000 complaint 
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Elevators and 
Escalators 
2007 37 101 992,000,000 Leniency 
Gas Insulated 
Switchgear 
2007 34 101 750,712,500 Leniency 
Flat Glass 2007 33 101 486,900,000 ECN 
PO/Hard 
Haberdashery: 
Fasteners 
2007 70 101 303,644,000 Own initiative 
International 
removal services 
2008 54 101 32,700,000 Own initiative 
55.1 
CB 2008 67 101 0 
notified 
agreement to 
the 
Commission 
Nitrile Butadiene  2008 60 101 34,230,000 Leniency 
Sodium Chlorate 2008 63 101 79,070,000 Leniency 
CISAC 2008 91 101 0 Complaint 
Car glass 2008 45 101 1,383,896,000 Own initiative 
ALUMINIUM 
FLUORIDE 
2008 39 101 4,970,000 Leniency 
Candle Waxes 2008 42 101 676,011,400 Leniency 
Bananas 2008 38 101 60,300,000 Leniency 
Intel 2009 60 102 1,060,000,000 complaint 
51 
Heat Stabilisers 2009 81 101 173,860,400 Leniency 
Power 
Transformers 
2009 65 101 67,644,000 Leniency 
Calcium Carbide 2009 30 101 61,120,000 Leniency 
E.ON/GDF 2009 38 101 1,106,000,000 
 
Marine Hoses 2009 32 101 131,510,000 Leniency 
DRAMs 2010 96 101 331,000,000 Leniency 
71.6 
Bathroom 
fittings & 
fixtures 
2010 71 101 622,250,783 Leniency 
Pre-stressing 
steel 
2010 96 101 269,870,750 leniency 
Animal Feed 
Phosphates 
2010 80 101 175,647,000 Leniency 
Airfreight  2010 
 
101 799,445,000 Leniency 
LCD 2010 49 101 648,925,000 Leniency 
Ordre National 
des Pharmaciens 
en France 
2010 38 101 5,000,000 complaint 
Consumer 
detergents  
2011 33 101 315,200,000 Leniency 
41 Telekomunikacja 
Polska  
2011 26 102 127,554,194 Own initiative 
Exotic fruit  2011 78 101 8,919,000 Leniency 
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CRT glass bulbs  2011 34 101 128,736,000 Leniency 
Refrigeration 
compressors  
2011 34 101 161,198,000 Leniency 
Mountings for 
windows and 
window-doors  
2012 56 101 85,876,000 Leniency 
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Freight 
Forwarding  
2012 
 
101 169,000,000 Leniency 
Water 
management 
products  
2012 42 101 13,661,000 Leniency 
TV and 
computer 
monitor tubes 
2012 
 
101 1,470,515,000 Leniency 
Table 1: all infringement decisions concluded by the EC  
(May 2004 - December 2012) 
 
 
Case 
Year of 
conclusion 
type 
Duration of 
investigation 
(months) 
Source of 
investigation 
Scandlines Sverige 2004 
 No infringement 
of  Article 102 
84 Complaint  
Case COMP/37.974 2004 
No infringement 
of  Article 102  
Complaint 
COMP/C-2/37.214 German 
Bundesliga 
2005 101 commitments 16 
Notified 
agreement 
Airport users/AIA 2005 
No infringement 
of  Article 102  
Complaint 
Coca-Cola 2005 102 commitments 9 Complaint 
FA Premier League 2006 101 commitments 57 Own initiative 
Repsol CPP 2006 101 commitments 22 
Notified 
agreement 
Distrigaz 2007 102 commitments 44  
DaimlerChrysler 2007 101 commitments 10 Complaint 
Toyota 2007 101 commitments 10 Complaint 
Fiat 2007 101 commitments 10 Complaint 
Opel 2007 101 commitments 10 Complaint 
German Electricity 
Wholesale Market 
2008 102 commitments 23  
Rambus 2009 102 commitments 29 Complaint 
GDF 2009 102 commitments 43  
EFIM 2009 101 &102  39  
RWE Gas Foreclosure 2009 102 commitments 34 
Own initiative 
 
Ship classification 2009 101 commitments 22 Own initiative 
Microsoft  2009 102 commitments 24 Own initiative 
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Agence mondiale  2009 
No infringement 
of  Article 101 & 
102 
27  
Long-term contracts  2010 102 commitments 32 Own initiative 
Swedish Interconnectors 2010 102 commitments 12 Complaint  
E.ON Gas 2010 102 commitments 24 Complaint 
BA/AA/IB  2010 101 commitments 15  
ENI 2010 102 commitments 41 Own initiative 
Vivendi, Iliad / France 
Telecom  
2010 
No infringement 
of  Article 102 
16 Complaint 
Visa MIF  2010 101 commitments  Own initiative 
Omnis / Microsoft  2010 
No infringement 
of  Article 102 
24 Complaint 
Si.mobil / Mobitel  2011 
No infringement 
of  Article 102 
18  
CEEES/AOP - REPSOL  2011 
No infringement 
of  Article 
101/102 
 
 
BRV / FIA, certain Formula 
One engine manufacturers, 
FIM, Dorna, Honda  
2011 
No infringement 
of  Article 
101/102 
23  
Standard and Poor's  2011 102 commitments 40 Complaint 
Italian Association of 
Lehman Brothers' Bond 
Holders  
2011 
No infringement 
of  Article 101 
19 Complaint 
IBM - Maintenance services  2011 102 commitments 17 Own initiative 
Numericable - Luxembourg  2012 
No infringement 
of  Article 102 
13 Complaint 
SIEMENS/AREVA  2012 101 commitments 23 Complaint 
Restrictions concerning ELT 
books  
2012 
No infringement 
of  Article 101 
33 Complaint 
Ebooks  2012 101 commitments   
Table 2: All non-infringements and commitments decisions concluded by the EC 
(May 2004 - December 2012) 
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-Chapter 4- Public Enforcement of Competition law in the UK  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
          
4-1: Introduction 
This chapter examines public enforcement of competition law in the UK as applied by 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). It will provide information about the cases that the 
OFT concluded, the capabilities of the OFT and reviews studies that assessed the OFT 
from May 20041 to December 2012. The aim of this chapter is to provide a platform 
for the comparative analysis that will be undertaken between the three jurisdictions 
(UK, France and the EU) after providing a review for each jurisdiction separately, 
where the criteria proposed in the previous chapter will be applied for the three 
jurisdictions in a single chapter. 
Public enforcement of competition law in the UK was undertaken by the OFT (for the 
period examined), the OFT is the main body that can enforce the competition 
provisions related to antitrust enforcement in the UK.2 Public enforcement, in the 
context of this chapter, means the application of Chapter I
3
 and II
4
 of the UK 
                                                          
1
 Since 1 May 2004, when Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, the OFT, with 
the other European competition authorities, has had the power to apply and enforce Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU where European competition authorities are required to apply European rules when 
trade between member states is affected.  
2
 Other regulatory bodies may enforce competition in the UK in their industries. 
3
 Chapter I reads “(1)Subject to section 3, agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings or concerted practices which— 
(a)may affect trade within the United Kingdom, and 
(b)have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
United Kingdom, 
are prohibited unless they are exempt in accordance with the provisions of this Part.  
(2)Subsection (1) applies, in particular, to agreements, decisions or practices which— 
(a)directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b)limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment; 
(c)share markets or sources of supply; 
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Competition Act and the application of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the OFT monitor competition 
in the UK through non- enforcement activities, which has to be studied when 
considering the application of competition law; enforcement and non-enforcement 
activities will be studied in this chapter. It is also important when studying public 
enforcement of competition law to study if the OFT’s enforcement activities 
(decisions) have been appealed or not, and if so what happened on appeal. In this 
context, it is worth highlighting that the OFT decisions could be appealed to the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), which reviews the full decision, both in fact and 
in law. In subsequent stages of appeal, the courts only review points of law, i.e., 
procedural regularity and the application of the law to the assumed facts.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
(d)apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e)make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
(3)Subsection (1) applies only if the agreement, decision or practice is, or is intended to be, 
implemented in the United Kingdom. 
(4)Any agreement or decision which is prohibited by subsection (1) is void. 
(5)A provision of this Part which is expressed to apply to, or in relation to, an agreement is to be read 
as applying equally to, or in relation to, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted 
practice (but with any necessary modifications). 
(6)Subsection (5) does not apply where the context otherwise requires. 
(7)In this section “the United Kingdom” means, in relation to an agreement which operates or is 
intended to operate only in a part of the United Kingdom, that part. 
(8)The prohibition imposed by subsection (1) is referred to in this Act as “the Chapter I prohibition”. 
4
 Chapter II read “ (1)Subject to section 19, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which 
amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the 
United Kingdom. 
(2)Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in— 
(a)directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b)limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c)applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d)making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of the contracts. 
(3)In this section—“dominant position” means a dominant position within the United Kingdom; and  
“the United Kingdom” means the United Kingdom or any part of it.  
(4)The prohibition imposed by subsection (1) is referred to in this Act as “the Chapter II prohibition”. 
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It is important to note an important change that has been brought by the Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform Bill (ERRB) which has created the Competition and Market 
Authority (CMA). The CMA is based on merger of the OFT and the CC. It has been 
created in April 2014. The possible implications of the creation of the CMA will be 
discussed below.   
At the outset, it is important to highlight the source of the data and the way in which 
the data has been gathered. As it has been explained in the previous chapter, the data 
collected has been classified into three categories: outputs, capabilities and 
surrounding facts and circumstances. Whilst, each category differs from the other, the 
way in which the data collected differs and the source of it differs as well.  The data 
related to outputs have been mostly collected from the cases or from the OFT’s own 
publications.  The capabilities of the OFT data have been collected from the Global 
Competition Review’s publications, annual reports of the OFT and the OFT’s 
website. While the last category, surrounding facts and circumstances, this data have 
been obtained from different recourses, such as: academic publications, international 
bodies’ publications, governmental reports and the OFT’s own publications.   
Hence, this chapter aims to provide empirical information about public enforcement 
of competition law in the UK as declared by the OFT. More specifically, this chapter 
will provide information about the amount and the nature of public enforcement in the 
UK. 
To quantify the amount and the nature of public enforcement in the UK, information 
regarding enforcement and non-enforcement activities have to be obtained.  The 
following variables have been collected in order to quantify public enforcement: the 
number of investigations, the nature of investigations, outcomes of investigations, the 
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length of each investigation, sources of investigations, the amount of fines imposed 
and success rate on appeal. Those variables represent enforcement. For the non-
enforcement activities, any publication that the OFT produced will be included in the 
discussion, such as; guidelines, market studies or any other form of studies. The 
inclusion of non-enforcement activities is important in order to explain how the OFT 
used its capabilities.  
In addition, in order to assess public enforcement of competition law in the UK, 
information regarding the capabilities of the OFT is necessary in order to see what the 
OFT has produced in light of its capabilities. Capabilities in this context means: the 
financial abilities and the human capital (in terms of numbers and experts) of the 
OFT. It is also important to examine what certain events occurred within the period 
under examination, as this may affect the performance of the OFT and its efficiency. 
As if there were structural or procedural changes this could affect the OFT 
performance.   
At the outset, it important to highlight that this chapter will not provide answers, 
solutions or praise what may be thought problems, weaknesses or strengths of the 
OFT; instead such issues will be highlighted in order to be dealt with in the 
“comparative chapter” later after examining the three jurisdictions. However, at the 
end of each chapter analysis about recent changes and key procedural issues that may 
affect competition enforcement will be provided, based on the empirical findings 
gleaned from reviewing the OFT for the period under examination.  
4-2: Outcomes of the OFT 
This section will provide information about the OFT enforcement and non-
enforcement activities. Enforcement activities mean cases produced by the OFT 
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according to Chapter I & II of the Competition Act and Articles 101/102 TFEU. This 
includes infringement, non-infringement and commitment cases.5 Non-enforcement 
activities mean any activity that is related to competition enforcement or may affect 
competition enforcement; in other words, any activity that costs the OFT or consumes 
its time are considered as non- enforcement activity. Examples of non- enforcement 
activities are: guidelines, studies conducted by the OFT or on its behalf, and market 
studies.   
4-2-1: Enforcement activities 
4-2-1-1: Number, nature, source and dimension of cases 
Between May 2004 to December 2012 the OFT has concluded 23 cases, where 
alleged infringements of Chapter I and/or II of the Competition Act have been 
investigated. The majority of those cases have a UK dimension, i.e. European 
Competition rules were not applicable; there were four cases which have a European 
dimension.6 From the 23 cases there were 18 cases concluded as infringements, four 
cases were declared as non- infringements and one commitment decision. There were 
eight cases dealt with under Chapter II of the Act; five were non-infringements 
decisions, one commitment decision and two infringement decisions.   The other 15 
cases were Chapter I cases, all of them were declared as infringement decisions. In 
this respect, it is worth mentioning the number of cases concluded in each year of the 
period under examination (May 2004- December 2012). In 2004, the OFT concluded 
five cases; in 2005, it concluded four cases; in 2006, five cases were concluded; there 
were no cases concluded in 2007; 2008 sees one case concluded; in 2009, two cases; 
                                                          
5
 Table 1 in the Appendix presents all cases concluded by the OFT (May 2004- December 2012) and it 
shows the type, the fine and the source of the investigation for each case. 
6
 MasterCard UK Members(Chapter I and Article 101), Flybe Limited(Chapter II and Article 102), 
loan-services (Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Barclays) (Chapter I and Article 101) and Reckitt 
Benckiser (Chapter II and Article 102). 
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in 2010 the OFT concluded two cases; in 2011 four cases were concluded; and in 
2012 no cases were concluded.  Graph 1 below shows the number of cases concluded 
in each year. Table 1 below shows the number of cases according to the conclusion 
reached by the OFT.  
 
Graph 1: Number of cases concluded by the OFT (May 2004- 
December 2012) 
 
Year 
Commitme
nt  
CH II 
Infringeme
nt  
CH I 
Infringemen
t  
CH I And 
101 
Infringement  
CH II 
Infringement  
CH II & 102 
No  
Infringeme
nt of CH II 
No 
Infringement 
of CH II & 102 
2004 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 
2005 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2009 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Table 1: number of cases by the decision reached  
 
Turning to the sources of the investigations and on what basis the OFT started its 
investigation. The sources of the investigations vary. In nine cases the OFT opened 
investigations based on complaints. Leniency applications were the source of an 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
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investigation in five occasions. In three cases, the OFT knew about infringements of 
competition law from information obtained from a previously investigated case. The 
OFT started two formal investigations based on information from media report. There 
were two cases notified to the OFT under the old notification regime. In two cases the 
source of the investigations were based on the OFT’s own initiative, i.e. the OFT’s 
investigation was the main source for opening the investigation.  Table 2 below shows 
the sources of investigations and how many times the OFT relies on each of them to 
open an investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sources of investigations for the concluded cases by the OFT  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
The sources of Chapter II cases were complaints from actual or potential competitors 
in the same market and in one case from the media.7 Hence, it appears that in Chapter 
II cases the OFT do not act on its own initiative but based on complaints 
(information) received from players in the market. There is no clear explanation of 
why the OFT did not take the initiative in enforcing Chapter II cases other than it is 
not a priority of the OFT.  
                                                          
7
 See; First Edinburgh, Harwood Park Crematorium, TM Property Services Limited, Associated 
Newspapers and Cardiff Bus cases. In Reckitt Benckiser (2011) the OFT knew about this report from a 
report by BBC Newsnight.                                                                        
Source of investigations Count 
Complaint 9 
Information from another case 3 
Leniency 5 
Media 2 
Notified 2 
Own initiative 2 
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However, in Chapter I cases there were more diversity with the sources of 
investigations. Two cases were opened as a result of complaints.8 There were five 
cases where leniency was the main source for opening investigations in the first 
place.9 There were two cases under the old notification regime, where the OFT knew 
about the cases because the parties notified their agreements to check the legality of 
them.10 In a single case, the OFT knew about a Chapter I infringement from the 
press.11 There were four investigations12 linked to each other, where the OFT after 
acting on its own initiative it discovered, from subsequent leniency applications or the 
OFT’s own investigation, that there are other infringements in somehow different but 
related markets, which resulted in four investigations.13 There were two cases where 
the OFT acted on its own initiative and subsequently some parties co-operated with 
the OFT investigation and received leniency.14  Table 3 below the nature of the 
decision and what was the source of the investigation.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Aluminium spacer bars and Bid-rigging in the construction industry.  
9
 Stock check pads and Construction Recruitment Forum. There were other cases where leniency was 
applied for but this was after the OFT opened the investigation.   
10
 Attheraces and MasterCard UK Members. 
11
 Schools Exchange of information 
12
 felt and single ply, Mastic Asphalt Roof, Felt and single ply flat-roofing and Flat roof and car park 
13
 either the product market or the geographic market 
14
 UOP Limited and felt and single ply (this is the case where the it has resulted in another three cases) 
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Table 3: sources of investigations and the nature of investigations 
 
4-2-1-2: Fines15 and duration of investigations:  
Alongside the five non-infringement cases and the commitment decision, there were 
four out the 23 cases where the OFT declared an infringement of competition rules 
but did not impose any fines on the parties. This has been done for several reasons, 
either because of the legal requirements,16 the insignificance of the infringement or 
because the infringement was not implemented.17 The highest fine imposed was in the 
Tobacco case, where the OFT imposed a £225 million fine.  The second highest fine 
was in the bid-rigging in the construction industry case where the OFT fined the 
parties involved around £129 million.   In four cases the amount of the fine imposed 
where between £10 and £50 million.18 In two cases, the fines were around £ 2 
                                                          
15
 It should be noted that the fine in some cases were reduced substantially on appeal. The matter of 
appeals and success rate on appeal will be discussed in the next section.   
16
 Cardiff buses.  
17
 MasterCard UK Members. 
18
 Construction Recruitment Forum, loan-services (Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Barclays), 
Reckitt Benckiser, and Dairy retail price.  
 
Commitmen
ts CH II 
Infringement 
of CH I 
Infringement 
of  CH I & 101 
Infringement 
CH II 
Infringement 
CH II & 102 
No Infringement 
CH II or Article 
102 
Complaint 1 2 0 1 0 5 
Information 
from another 
case 
0 3 0 0 0 0 
Leniency 0 4 1 0 0 0 
Media 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Notified 
agreement  
0 1 1 0 0 0 
Own initiative 0 2 0 0 0 0 
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million.19 In five cases, the amount of the fine did not exceed £1 million.20 Graph 2 
below shows all infringement decisions and the amount of fine imposed in each case.  
 
Graph 2: Amount of fine imposed by the OFT in each case.  
When talking about the outputs of the OFT, it is important to take into account how 
long it took the OFT to produce these outputs (i.e. cases). To put it simply, this 
chapter will consider the duration of each investigation concluded by the OFT in the 
period under examination; it will then look at the specifics of each investigation in 
order to determine what could affect the length of the investigation.21 The duration of 
the investigations concluded by the OFT ranges from 12 months to 95 months. The 
                                                          
19
 Flat roof and car park and UOP Limited.  
20
 Aluminum spacer bars, stock check pads, Felt and single ply flat-roofing, Mastic Asphalt Roof and 
felt and single ply. 
21
 This will be done in the “Comparative chapter” in order to have a better understanding of each 
jurisdiction including the UK (OFT).  
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average duration for all of the investigations conducted was around 40 months. At this 
stage it cannot be said whether the average is normal or abnormal; to determine this 
one has to look at other factors, such as budget and staff, and to compare this average 
to another CA with similar characteristics and bearing in mind the caseload.22 
From the 23 cases there were 17 infringement cases. The OFT only imposed fines in 
13 cases. In ten out of the 13 cases,23 the investigation lasts around 40 months or more 
in certain cases; in the other three cases the investigations last less than 30 months.24 It 
has to be mentioned in this respect that only in one Chapter II case the OFT has 
imposed fines.25  
For non-infringement and commitment decisions, the duration of the investigations 
ranges from 12 to 40 months. In three cases the duration of the investigation was 
between 29 and 40 months. In two cases the investigation took 19 months. The OFT 
concluded the investigation within 12 months in the last case.26 Graph 4 below shows 
the average duration of investigations for each case; it has to be noted that there were 
no cases in 2007 and 2012. 
It is surprising to see (Graph 4 below) that the longest investigations were in cases 
where there were leniency applications; because, at least in theory, the OFT do not 
need to do so much investigations compared to the case of own initiative 
                                                          
22
 This will be done later on in the thesis, where the three jurisdictions will be assessed against each 
other.  
23
 felt and single ply (43 months), Mastic Asphalt Roof(40 months), Felt and single ply flat-roofing (44 
months), Flat roof and car park (35 months) aluminum spacer bars (50 months)  Bid-rigging in the 
construction (58 months) and Construction Recruitment Forum (40 months), Tobacco (85 months),  
loan-services (Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Barclays) (34 months) and Dairy retail price (95 
months). 
24
 In UOP Limited, the investigation lasts 24 months; in stock check pads the investigation last 25 
months; and in Reckitt Benckiser length of the investigations was 29 months. 
25
 There were two cases where CH II has been found to be infringed. The OFT imposed around £10 
million in the Reckitt Benckiser case. The other case, Cardiff Buses, the OFT did not impose any fine.  
26
 It should be noted in this respect, that the alleged infringement in all of the non-infringement 
decisions and the commitment decision was abuse of dominance (i.e. Chapter II). 
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investigations. This was in the Tobacco and Dairy retail price cases, where the 
investigations lasted 85 and 95 months, respectively; this is way higher than the overall 
average for investigations (around 42 months).  
It is also surprising to see the MasterCard case has such a long duration above the 
average duration of all of the cases examined. It is surprising, firstly, because this case 
(agreement) was notified to the OFT under the old notification system, which means 
that the OFT did not investigate this case from scratch. Secondly the OFT did not 
impose any fines in this case, as the agreement was not implemented at all, which 
means that the OFT was not involved in assessing the effects of the agreement and 
was not involved in any calculation of fines. 
While, unsurprisingly the shortest investigation duration was for a non- infringement 
decision where the OFT declared that there was no infringement of Chapter II in 12 
months. 
If one argues that the duration of investigations depends on the workload at certain 
times. Then, if one looks at the start and the end date for each case; i.e. to look at 
which month the OFT opened each investigation and the month in which each case 
has been concluded. Doing so does not indicate that the workload, in term of cases, 
seems to be busy at certain times, as the starting and the conclusion month for each 
case is fairly distributed over the period examined.  
It can be noticed as well that the length of non-infringements and commitment 
decisions were always below the overall average and in most cases were concluded 
quicker than infringement cases. Graph 3 below shows the length of the investigation 
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in each case, where the black bars represent infringement decisions and the gray bars 
represent non- infringements and commitments decisions.  
 
Graph 4: Duration of investigations for all cases in months 
 
4-2-1-2: Success rate on appeal 
When considering what the OFT has produced, it is important to check the quality of 
its outcomes. A possible way to do so is to check what happened on appeal for each 
case in the period under examination; if these cases were appealed. Table 4 below 
shows all of the cases for the period under examination, it shows the outcome of each 
case, whether the decision has been appealed or not; it also shows what was the 
outcome on appeal (i.e. whether the court confirmed the OFT’s or not, or has the 
appeal court reduced the fine or if the court has taken any other action). 
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Out of the 23 cases concluded by the OFT in the period under examination, there were 
ten cases appealed to the CAT.  In two cases,27 where the OFT did not impose any 
fines, the CAT set aside the OFT’s decisions. In a non-infringement decision,28 the 
CAT replaced the OFT decision with its own, i.e. it confirmed that there was no 
infringement of competition law but on different ground than those of the OFT’s. In 
three cases the CAT uphold the OFT’s decision with respect to liability and penalty 
(fines).29  In the other occasions where the OFT imposed fines,30 in three cases the 
CAT uphold the OFT’s decisions with respect to liability but reduced the fine 
imposed in these cases.  
To elaborate more on the cases where the CAT reduced the fines imposed by the OFT 
quite substantially.  
In the Bid-rigging in the construction industry case, the total fine imposed by the OFT 
on 103 undertakings was 129,200,000. 25 undertakings out of the 103 appealed to the 
CAT, where most of the appeals were in favour of the undertakings.31 The CAT in 
                                                          
27
 Attheraces and MasterCard UK Members. (1)The Racecourse Association and Others (2) British 
Horseracing Board v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 29; (1)MasterCard UK Members Forum (2) 
MasterCard International Incorporated and MasterCard Europe Sprl (3) Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group v Office of Fair Trading [2006] CAT 14. 
28
 Harwood Park Crematorium. M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess and S.J. Burgess (trading as JJ Burgess and 
Sons) v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 25. 
29
 Flat roof and car par, Flat roof and car park and stock check pads. 
30
 UOP Limited, Bid-rigging in the construction and Construction Recruitment Forum. 
31
 AH Willis and Sons Limited v. Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 13;  (1)GMI Construction 
Holdings PLC (2)GMI Construction Group PLC v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 12; Crest 
Nicholson PLC v Office of Fair Trading & ISG Pearce Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 
10; Kier Group plc, Kier Regional Limited, Ballast Nedam N.V, Bowmer and Kirkland Limited, B&K 
Property Services Limited, Corringway Conclusions plc, Thomas Vale Holdings Limited, Thomas Vale 
Construction plc, Sicon Limited and John Sisk & Son Limited v. Office of Fair Trading [2011] .CAT 3; 
North Midland Construction PLC v  Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 14; (1) Quarmby Construction 
Company Limited (2)ST James Securities Limited v. Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 11; (1)G F 
Tomlinson Building Limited (2) G F Tomlinson Group Limited v Office of Fair Trading, (1)G&J 
Seddon Limited  (2) Seddon Group Limited v Office of Fair Trading, (1) Interclass Holdings Limited 
and (2) Interclass plc v Office of Fair Trading, (1) Sol Construction Limited (2) Barkbury Construction 
Limited v Office of Fair Trading,(1)G F Tomlinson Building Limited (2) G F Tomlinson Group Limited 
v Office of Fair Trading, Apollo Property Services Group Limited v Office of Fair Trading and  
Galliford Try Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 7; (1) Barrett Estate Services Limited (2) 
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most of the cases uphold the OFT’s findings on liability but not on penalty, only in 
two out of the 25 appeals the CAT set-aside the OFT’s decisions entirely.32 The 
CAT’s reductions on fines were substantial, where reductions amount was over 50% 
of the original fine. This brought the fine after to £ 63,752,262. It should be noted that 
the 25 appeals were dealt with in nine judgments by the CAT.   
In the Construction Recruitment Forum case, three out of seven undertakings 
appealed to the CAT with respect to the penalty imposed. The Appellants were those 
undertakings who were fined the most. The appeal was successful and the CAT 
reduced the fines imposed on the three undertakings.33 The total amount of fine after 
appeal is 8,137,263, whereas before appeal the fine was 39,270,000.  
The last case appealed was the Tobacco case, where the CAT allowed appeals to six 
Appellants and quashed the OFT’ decisions in relation to those parties.34 In addition 
the OFT returned the fine paid by TM Retail subject to a prior agreement with the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Francis Construction Limited v Office of Fair Trading, (1) GAJ Construction Limited (2) GAJ 
(Holdings) Limited v Office of Fair Trading, (1) Renew Holdings plc (2) Allenbuild Limited v Office of 
Fair Trading, (1)Robert Woodhead (Holdings) Limited (2) Robert Woodhead Limited v Office of Fair 
Trading, (1) JH Hallam (R&J) Limited (2) JH Hallam (Contracts) Limited v Office of Fair Trading and 
Hobson and Porter Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 9; (1) Durkan Holdings Limited (2) 
Durkan limited (3) Concentra Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 6.  
32
 AH Willis and Sons Limited v. Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 13 and (1)GMI Construction 
Holdings PLC (2)GMI Construction Group PLC v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 12. 
33
 Although the appeals were submitted separately by the three Appellants; however, the CAT heard the 
appeals together since several of the main grounds of appeal are common to all three Appellants, and 
from the CAT’s point of view it is convenient to deal with them in a single judgment.  
34
 (1) Imperial Tobacco Group plc (2) Imperial Tobacco Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 
41; Co-operative Group Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 41 ; Wm Morrison Supermarkets 
PLC v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 41 ; (1) Asda Stores Limited (2) Asda Group Limited (3) 
Wal-Mart Stores (UK) Limited (4) Broadstreet Great Wilson Europe Limited v Office of Fair Trading 
[2011] CAT 41; (1) Shell U.K. Limited (2) Shell U.K. Oil Products Limited (3) Shell Holdings (U.K.) 
Limited v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 41; (1) Safeway Stores Limited (2) Safeway Limited v 
Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 41. 
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OFT.35 The total amount of fine after appeal is around £ 58 million, whereas before 
appeal it was around £ 225 million.  
Thus, it can be seen that the fines was reduced substantially in the biggest cases on 
appeal. Graph 5 below shows the amount of fine before and after appeal. Table 4 
shows all cases concluded by the OFT and whether the case has been appealed and 
the appeal outcome.  
 
Graph 5: amount of fine imposed before and after appeal 
  
Case 
Outcome and type of 
investigation 
Amount of fine  
before appeal (if any) (£) 
Appeal outcome (£) 
Attheraces Infringement of CH I 0 Set aside the OFT’s decision  
First Edinburgh No infringement of CH II 0 Not appealed  
Harwood Park No infringement of CH II 0 The CAT  replaced the OFT decision 
                                                          
35
 TM Retail reached an early resolution agreement with the OFT in July 2008. According to this 
agreement the OFT gave assurances relating to the effect of any successful appeal brought by another 
party against the OFT’s Tobacco. decision. See the OFT website 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/tobacco#.UMdsxGf867I; 
And http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2008/82-08#.UMdtZ2f867I 
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Crematorium with its own 
TM Property 
Services Limited 
No infringement of CH II 0 Not appealed 
UOP Limited Infringement of CH I 
Total 1,707,00036 
  
DQS appealed, but the appeal 
proceedings were brought to an end 
following consent by the OFT to a 
reduction in the fine to £36,210. total fine 
after DQS’s appeal = 1,634,210 
MasterCard UK 
Members 
Infringement of CH I & 
Article 101 
0 Set aside the OFT’s decision 
felt and single 
ply 
Infringement of CH I 138,515 Not appealed 
Mastic Asphalt 
Roof 
Infringement of CH I 87,353 Not appealed 
Felt and single 
ply flat-roofing 
Infringement of CH I 471,029 Not appealed 
Flat roof and car 
park 
Infringement of CH I 2,419,608 Yes, the CAT uphold the OFT’s decision 
Associated 
Newspapers 
Commitments (CH II) 0 Not appealed 
stock check pads Infringement of CH I 168,318 
One party appeal out three. The CAT 
dismissed the appeal and uphold the 
OFT’s decision 
aluminum spacer 
bars 
Infringement of CH I 898,470 Yes, the CAT uphold the OFT’s decision 
Schools 
Exchange of 
information 
Infringement of CH I 
467,500 
 
Not appealed 
Cardiff Bus Infringement of CH II 0 
Not appealed. The OFT’s decision 
resulted in bringing a successful claim for 
damages  
Bid-rigging in 
the construction 
Infringement of CH I 
129,200,000 The original 
total fine on the 25 who 
appealed was 79,045,501 
Yes, the fine was reduced. 25 out of 103 
appealed. it was reduced from 
£79,045,501 to £13,597,769 
The total fine after appeal= £ 63,752,262 
Construction 
Recruitment 
Forum 
Infringement of CH I 
39,270,000 
 
Appealed by three out of seven= the total 
fine was reduced to £ 8,137,26337 
Tobacco  Infringement of CH I 225,000,000 
Six parties appealed, all won their 
appeals.38 Fine reduced to £ 58,827,126 
Flybe Limited  No infringement of CH II 0 Not appealed 
Loan Services  
Infringement of CH I and 
101 
28,590,000 Not appealed  
Reckitt 
Benckiser                        
Infringement of CH II and 
102 
10,200,000 Not appealed 
Dairy Retail 
Price 
Infringement of chapter I 49,510,000 Not appealed 
IDEXX 
Laboratories 
Limited  
No infringement of CH II 0 Not appealed 
Table 4: Cases concluded by the OFT between (May 2004- December 2012) 
 whether cases have been appealed and appeal outcome. 
 
                                                          
36
 Uop=1,232,000; Thermseal=139,000; Dqs=109,000; Dgs=227,000; Ukae=0 = 100% immunity. 
37
 Fine on parties before appeal (as imposed by the OFT) Hays= 30,359,129; Eden Brown= 1,072,069; 
CDI= 7,602,789. Fine on parties after appeal Hays= 5,880,000; Eden= 477,750;  CDI= 1,543,500 
38
 Appellants fines before appeal: Asda= £14,095,933; The Co- operative Group = £14,187,353; 
Morrisons = £8,624,201; Safeway = £10,909,366; Shell = £3,354,615; Imperial Tobacco = 
£112,332,495 
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As it can be seen from table 4, there were ten cases appealed to the CAT. It appears 
from this that the OFT won only three cases, entirely (i.e. on liability and fines). In the 
other seven cases, the OFT decisions either have been quashed entirely or the fines 
reduced substantially. This was the case with infringement and non- infringement 
decisions.  A calculation of the success rate on appeal of the OFT may give an initial 
measurement of the OFT decision making quality. If one considers the number of 
cases appealed (10 cases). then the success rate on appeal is as follows: (i) 3 out of 10 
(30%) outright win; (ii) 3 out of 10 (30%) partial win; 439 out 10 (40%) lost cases. In 
addition, if one assumes that the cases that have not been appealed as wins, then the 
OFT has 16 out 23 (69.5%) outright wins.   
It should be highlighted in this respect that the OFT, recently, adopted a revised 
guidance on setting the penalties, where it gives the OFT more flexibility when 
imposing fines. This will be discussed later in the chapter, in section 4-3. 
 
4-2-2: Non enforcement activities 
When aiming to assess public enforcement of competition law, one needs to look at 
the outputs of the CA in general in order to understand where the budget of the 
authority goes and where its effort is directed. One of the important aspects in 
enforcing law is the allocation of resources, as this may inform outsiders how the 
resources are allocated and on these basis one may suggest how the OFT’s resources 
may be better allocated.  
                                                          
39
 Considering the Tobacco case as a lost case, as all of the parties who appealed the decision won their 
appeal.  
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Non- enforcement activities are important component of any CA. Non- enforcement 
activities have many important implications that may affect the enforcement of the 
law. It may play a role in raising the possibility of compliance, voluntary, with the 
law. If, for example, the CA is investing in educating business about the consequences 
of breaching competition law, this may raise deterrence levels in the jurisdictions and 
hence businesses may comply with law because they are well aware of the 
consequences of breaching competition law. Such activities cost the CA money and 
time. 
Another example of non-enforcement activities is the issuance of documents that 
clarifies the application of the law and how the CA may apply the law, widely known 
as guidelines. These documents can be seen as complementary to legislations. It is 
important for these issues to be considered as it is done by the staff of the CA and 
hence affects the allocation of resources and efforts.  
Many CAs are given the power to investigate markets in order to see if there are 
competition concerns or not. In the UK, the OFT is given the powers to conduct 
market studies to test if markets works well for consumers. The OFT does not have 
the power to impose remedies, if it appears at the end of the market study that there 
competition problem (s) in the investigated market. However, at the end of the 
market, the OFT may refer the matter to the CC where it can impose remedies if it 
sees that there are competition concerns. Therefore, market studies are considered in 
the non-enforcement activities as the OFT cannot take and enforcement action based 
on the market study outcomes.  
It has to be noted that market studies may raise the levels of deterrence, as businesses 
may consider that are may be investigated by the OFT. Therefore, it may deter those 
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who are thinking of committing an infringement. However, an enforcement action 
(opening a formal investigation) may be better in the case where infringements are 
already in place as the OFT can take action where there are suspicions that there is an 
infringement of competition law.  
For any CA a balance between enforcement and non-enforcement activities is 
required. But balance in this context does not mean equal activities in each type. The 
CA should estimate this balance; for example, if in a given jurisdiction deterrence is 
low then the CA may want to focus on enforcement to restore competiveness in its 
jurisdiction.  
In addition, if the amount of enforcement activities is not adequate, then this may 
undermine the significance of enforcement and non-enforcement activities altogether. 
Because even if businesses are aware of the consequences of breaching competition 
law, they will have in mind that CA is not enforcing the law sufficiently and that they 
may get away with their breaches unpunished. Therefore, enforcement and non-
enforcement activities are important and complementary; however, the role of 
enforcement activities and its influence is greater.   
Thus, this section presents the non-enforcement activities of the OFT from May 2004- 
December 2012.   
Table 5 below presents market studies concluded by the OFT. The number of market 
studies across different sectors, and, not exclusively competition matters were 35 
market studies. Some of these market studies have been referred to the CC for more in 
depth scrutiny.40 Graph 6 shows the number of concluded market studies compared to 
                                                          
40
 11 market studies out of the 35 have been referred to the CC. See 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/references/#.UMfRRGf867I. 
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cases concluded, on a yearly basis. Where it can also be noted that the number of 
market studies is much higher than the number of cases concluded (23) for the same 
period.  In addition, table 5 lists markets studies concluded by the OFT from May 
2004 to December 2012. 
 
Graph 6: number of market studies concluded by the OFT  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
Year Market study 
2004 
1. Financial Services and Markets Act 
2. Public subsidies 
2005 
3. Care homes 
4. Property searches 
5. Ticket agents 
2006 
6. Commercial use of public information 
7. Payment protection insurance 
8. School uniforms 
 
2007 
9. Medicine Distribution in the UK  
10. Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
11. BAA airports 
 
2008 
12. Home buying and selling  
13. Internet shopping 
14. Homebuilding in the UK  
15. Personal current accounts  
16. Sale and rent back 
2009 
17. Local bus services  
18. Isle of Wight Ferry services 
19. Northern Rock  
20. Home buying and selling  
21. Scottish property managers 
2010 
22. advertising of prices 
23. insolvency practitioners 
24. Online targeting of advertising and prices 
25. Second-hand cars 
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2011 
26. consumer contracts 
27. equity underwriting 
28. Mobility aids 
29. Off-grid Energy 
30. Organic waste 
31. Outdoor advertising  
2012 
32. aggregates 
33. dentistry 
34. Private healthcare 
35. Private motor insurance 
Table 5: market studies concluded by the OFT between May 2004- December 
2012 
Table 6 below lists all of guidance and advocacy documents produced by the OFT, 
between May 2004 and December 2012.  
Year Documents 
2004 
1. OFT 443:The Competition Act 1998 and public bodies (August 
2004) 
2. OFT 415:Assessment of market power (December 2004) 
3. OFT 419: Vertical agreements (December 2004) 
4. OFT 420:Land agreements (December 2004) 
5. OFT 421: Services of general economic interest exclusion 
(December 2004) 
6. OFT 442: Modernisation (December 2004) 
7. OFT 408: Trade associations, professional bodies and self-regulating 
bodies (December 2004) 
8. OFT 407: Enforcement (December 2004) 
9. OFT 405: Concurrent application to regulated industries (December 
2004) 
10. OFT 404: Powers of investigation (December 2004) 
11. OFT 403: Market definition (December 2004) 
12. OFT 402: Abuse of a dominant position (December 2004) 
13. OFT 401: Agreements and concerted practices (December 2004) 
2005 
14. OFT 428: Application in the energy sector (January 2005) 
15. OFT 435: Cartels and the Competition Act 1998 (March 2005) 
16. OFT 436: Leniency in cartel cases (March 2005) 
17. OFT 426: Under investigation? (March 2005) 
18. OFT 447: Competing fairly (March 2005) 
19. OFT 430:Application to services relating to railways (October 2005) 
2006 
20. OFT 451: Involving third parties in Competition Act investigations 
(April 2006) 
21. OFT 439: Public transport ticketing schemes block exemption 
(November 2006) 
2007 22. OFT 876: Completing competition assessments in impact 
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assessments: for policy makers (February 2007) 
23. OFT 962: The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the 
OFT (November 2007) 
2008 24. OFT 803: Leniency and no-action (December 2008) 
2009 
25. OFT 1132: An assessment of discretionary penalties regimes 
(October 2009) 
2010 
26. OFT 866: Evaluation of OFT Competition Advocacy (April 2010) 
27. Competition in mixed markets: ensuring competitive neutrality (July 
2010) 
28. OFT 1164: A review of the OFT's impact estimation methods 
(January 2010) 
29. OFT 1240: Evaluation of the impact of the OFT's investigation into 
bid rigging in the construction industry (June 2010) 
2011 
30. Quick Guide to competition law compliance (June 2011) 
31. OFT 1430:Company directors and competition law (June 2011) 
32. OFT 1341: How your business can achieve compliance with 
competition law (June 2011) 
33. OFT 1270: Competition Law Compliance Survey (June 2011) 
34. OFT1339: Understanding competition law DVD (June 2011) 
35. OFT 740rev: How competition law applies to co-operation between 
farming businesses: FAQs (November 2011) 
36. OFT 1389: Public bodies and competition law (December 2011) 
37. OFT 1391: Assessing the Impact of Competition Intervention on 
Compliance and Deterrence (December 2011)  
2012 
38. OFT 1415: Street furniture advertising: Recommendations to Local 
Authorities (May 2012) 
39. Rural broadband Wayleave rates - a Short Form Opinion (August 
2012) 
40. OFT 423: OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty 
(September 2012) 
41. OFT 1263rev: A guide to the OFT's investigation procedures in 
competition cases (October 2012) 
Table 6: list of documents and studies concluded by the OFT or on behalf of the 
OFT 
 
It seems that the OFT has devoted a lot of recourses and staff for its non-enforcement 
activities. It also seems that the OFT is more active in the non-enforcement side than 
the enforcement side. The validity of these claims may be checked in the next 
chapters when comparing the OFT to other CAs.  
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4-2-3: Capabilities of the OFT 
After considering the OFT’s outcomes, it is equally important to study the OFT’s 
capabilities in order to understand under which circumstances the OFT has produced 
the aforementioned outcomes.  
4-2-3-1: Number of staff and specialists  
The number of staff and specialists may affect the outcomes of the OFT in terms of 
quality, quantity and the time it took the OFT to produce this. It may also help in 
determining what could affect the outcomes the most. Furthermore, it will help in 
identifying where the OFT should invest more or less. For example, when looking at 
the number of staff and specialists and the outcomes of the OFT, one may possibly be 
able to identify which aspect is more important than the other for the OFT when 
comparing the outcomes and the capabilities of the OFT on a yearly basis for the 
period under examination.  
The number of staff focused on competition enforcement in 2004 was 243,41 from 
those there were 84 lawyers and 67 economists; however, the percentage of staff that 
is focused on competition is 43% of the 243 staff. This means around 105 staff was 
allocated in 2004, it should be noted that the precise number of specialists who work 
on competition matters is not available for this year. 
In 2005, the number of staff focused on competition enforcement was 242,42 38% of 
which were devoted solely to competition. Hence, the number of staff allocated to 
competition enforcement has decreased to 92, from the 242 staff there is 36% (around 
                                                          
41
 This includes competition and markets staff. 
42
 This includes competition and markets staff. 
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87) lawyers and 26% (around 63) economists. It is the same with the year 2004, the 
exact number of specialists in 2005 is not available as well for this year.  
In 2006, the number of staff focused on competition enforcement increased to 301,43 
41% (around 124) of which is for competition enforcement. Of the 301 there were 
around 81 (27%) lawyers and around 84 (28%) economists. It should be noted that in 
this year there four of the competition staff with PhDs in economics, this may indicate 
that the OFT is seeking further specialists in order to improve their analysis.  
In 2007 the OFT staff who are focused on competition enforcement was 259,44 around 
98 (38%) of which are focused on competition.  The number of lawyers and 
economists are around 67 (26 %) and around 60 (23%), respectively. The number of 
PhD holders in economics has increased to five.  
In 2008 the OFT staff who are focused on competition enforcement 177,45 around 50 
(28%) of them focused on competition. As the number of staff decreased, the number 
of specialists decreased as well; there were around 32 (18%) lawyers and 37 (21%) 
economists. However, the number of economists who hold PhDs increased to nine.  
In 2009, the number of staff who working on competition enforcement increased to 
189, around 57 (30%) of them are working on competition matters. The number of 
specialists increased, around 49 (26%) are lawyers and around 34 (18%) economists. 
the number of economists who hold PhDs increased to 14.  
                                                          
43
 This includes competition and markets staff.. 
44
 This includes competition and markets staff. 
45
 This includes competition and markets staff. 
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Graph 1 below summaries the number of number of staff focused on competition, 
staff working on competition matters and number of specialists at the OFT from 2004 
untill May 2010.  
 
 
Graph 7: number of staff focused on competition, staff working on 
competition matters and number of specialists at the OFT 
 
4-2-3-2: Budget 
46
 
As with the enforcement of any kind of law, enforcement of competition law is a 
costly process. Therefore, any CA will priorities its activities according to its budget, 
studying the budget of the OFT and how this budget is an important aspect that is to 
be considered when examining its performance with respect to competition law 
enforcement.  
In 2004, the OFT’s budget was €47.7 million, however, 56.7% of the budget was 
spent on salaries of the staff. In 2005, the OFT’s budget increased to €50 million and 
the amount spent on salaries increased to 61%. The amount spent on salaries stayed 
the same in 2006, the budget increased to €51 million.  
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 The budget provided by the GCR in Euros, not Sterling Pound.  
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In 2007 the OFT’s budget fallen down to €41.2 million and the amount spent on 
salaries increased to 82%. In 2008, the budget decreased further to reach €22.6 
million and the amount spent on salaries decreased as well to 48%. In 2009, the 
budget decreased to €22 million and the amount spent on salaries increased to 53%. 
It can be seen from graph 8 below that the OFT budget has decreased over the time, it 
can be noticed as well the budget allocated to enforcement, in most years, is less than 
50% of the overall budget. It has also to be mentioned that the allocated budget to 
enforcement is not only to competition law enforcement but also to other OFT 
activities, which includes consumer protection and other activities. Therefore, one 
needs to expect that the budget allocated to competition enforcement is only a 
proportion of the budget allocated to enforcement. Graph 8 and table 7 show in detail 
how the OFT’s budget is distributed from 2004 to 2010.  
 
Graph 8: the OFT’s budget form 2004-2010 
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Form graph 8, it can be seen the overall budget (black line) is decreasing over the 
years, and the budget allocated to enforcement (grey line) is decreasing as well. The 
budget on enforcement includes all types of enforcement, including issues not related 
to competition enforcement. The gap between the lines represents the amount of 
money spent on salaries. The gap is narrowing despite the increase of staff numbers.  
 
 
Table 7: budget, staff and the number of experts of the OFT (2004-2010) 
4-2-4: Surrounding circumstances and facts about the OFT or the UK 
On the one hand, in the previous sections, information about the OFT’s outcomes and 
capabilities has been provided (i.e. the OFT as an institution). On the other hand, this 
section deals with issues that may affect the OFT’s performance (outcomes) other 
than the OFT’s capabilities. Hence, this section examines what commentators thought 
about the OFT; it will also present peer-review studies that evaluates or assesses a 
UK (OFT) Budget (€ million) 
Number of staff (% of staff focused 
on competition) 
Number of experts 
2004 
47.7 
% on salary 56.7% = 27  
On enforcement = 20.7 
243 (43%) = 105 
Lawyers= 84 
Economists=  67 
 
2005 
50  
%on salary 61%=30.5 
On enforcement= 19.5 
242 (38%)=92 
Lawyers= 36% 
Economists= 26% 
No. Of PhDs in ECO= 4 
2006 
51 
%on salary 61%= 31.3 
On enforcement=19.9 
  
742 (41%)=301 
Lawyers= 27% 
Economists= 28% 
No. Of PhDs in ECO= 4 
2007 
£40.2 
%on salary 84% =33.7 
On enforcement= 6.5 
 
677 (38%)=259 
Lawyers= 26% 
Economists= 23% 
No. Of PhDs in ECO= 5 
2008 
£22.6 
%on salary 48% =10.8 
On enforcement =11.75 
638 (28%)=177 
Lawyers= 18% 
Economists= 21% 
No. Of PhDs in ECO= 9 
2009 
£22 m 
%on salary 53% =11.6 
On enforcement= 10.4 
640 (29%)= 189 
Lawyers= 26% 
Economists= 18% 
No. Of PhDs in ECO= 14  
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particular area of the OFT and what was the outcome of these studies, peer-reviews 
include any reports commissioned on behalf of the OFT by an external body or any 
governmental reports about the OFT; the last type of studies, are studies that may 
provide information about trade or competiveness of the UK as a jurisdiction.   
KPMG has conducted two peer reviews about competition policy in general in the UK 
in 2004 and 2007. The main objective of the peer reviews is to assess the 
effectiveness of the UK competition policy regime and rank it among other countries. 
In both peer reviews, KPMG employed a similar methodology with some comparative 
insights. The methodology employed was a survey distributed to competition experts47 
in the UK and other jurisdictions supplemented with few face-to- face interviews. 48  
In 2004, KPMG’s peer review ranked the UK non- merger regime fourth after USA, 
Germany and Italy ahead of the EU.49 In the 2007 peer review, KPMG stated that the 
UK regime has improved, however the ranking stayed the same with the gap between 
the UK and Germany has narrowed.50 According to the face-to-face interviewees, the 
UK lacked significant antirust decisions which have affected the overall effectiveness 
of the UK non- merger regime and made it weaker than the US and Germany.51  
The main conclusions that can be drown from both peer reviews can be summarised 
in the following bullet points (regarding the non-merger regime). 
                                                          
47
 The number of respondents to the survey  in 2004 was 215 and in 2007 was 301. 
48
 The number of face to face interviews in 2004 was 35 and in 2007 was 25. 
49
 KPMG (2004), 'Peer Review of the UK Competition Policy Regime', a report to the Department of 
Trade and Industry p. 9. The jurisdictions included in the peer review are USA, Germany, UK, EU and 
other jurisdictions named as ‘others’. However, the overall ranking (merger and non-merger regime) 
for the UK was third after the USA and Germany.  
50
 KPMG (2007), 'Peer Review of Competition Policy', a report to the Department of Trade and 
Industry, p.5. The jurisdictions included in the peer review are USA, Germany, UK, EU and other 
jurisdictions named as ‘others’. However, the overall ranking (merger and non-merger regime) for the 
UK was third after the USA and Germany. It should be stated that the overall ranking of the UK is 
closer to the USA and almost level with Germany; therefore, the UK has improved from the KPMG 
peer review in 2004. P.7. 
51
 KPMG 2007, p.5. 
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- Many correspondents highlighted the matter of prioritisation, where many of 
them believe that the UK competition regime can be improved if there is better 
prioritisation of cases. In particular, they stated that the OFT closed many low 
impact cases (non-cartel cases) on administrative priority grounds in order to 
ensure that it is able to deliver higher impact cases more quickly, as this 
approach may reduce deterrence.52 In addition, this may allow infringements 
because of their low impact go unchecked, hence, reducing the effectiveness 
of the regime. 
- It has been noted the issue of the length of time the OFT takes to reach its 
decisions and that the OFT should aim to reduce it.53 
- It has been suggested that the OFT should increase the level of penalties 
awarded.54  
- The OFT has been encouraged to take more decisions.55  
- The OFT has a lot of powers to be used, but the OFT are not making the most 
of it.  
 
Furthermore, in the eyes of the respondents, the results of the KPMG survey show 
that the UK regime is thought to be very complex in comparison to other 
regimes.56Despite this, all of the respondents and interviewees have been asked to 
rank their home regime and the UK regime; all of the respondents have ranked the 
UK regime higher than their home regime.57  
                                                          
52
 KPMG 2007, 34 and 45.  
53
 KPMG 2007, 34. 
54
 KPMG 2007, 34. 
55
 KPMG 2007, 34. 
56
 KPMG 2007, 48. 
57
 KPMG 2007, 30. 
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The findings of the peer reviews are important to be considered. However, 
highlighting problems without providing solutions on how the OFT may resolve these 
problems is another issue. The main issue about these peer reviews is that they 
representing opinions of competition experts rather than providing solid grounds for 
these opinions and why they think that there are problems. For example, the KPMG 
reviews stated that it takes the OFT too long to reach its decisions. This may be 
proved to be a right claim. However, on what basis one may determine what is too 
long or too short; if one aims to determine this one needs to take into account many 
factors. For instance, one needs to look at the human capital (numbers and experts) 
and the budget of the OFT, and comparing this to another CA with similar 
characteristics may provide an answer.  
Another example of the recommendations of the peer reviews is that the OFT needs to 
take more decisions. This has been suggested without reviewing what the OFT has 
produced. Additionally, and importantly, without considering the levels of deterrence 
in the UK or if the European Commission is dealing with cases that may affect the 
UK and these cases have a European dimension.  
The KPMG peer reviews are examples of reviews conducted by private bodies on 
behalf of the Ministry of trade and Industry in order to assess the OFT’s performance. 
Another form of reviews is studies conducted by public bodies in the same country 
that one of its tasks is to monitor public bodies work, such as CAs. In the UK, the 
National Audit Office (NAO) evaluated the UK competition regime in 200558 and 
2010.  
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In the 2005 report,59 the NAO reviewed the OFT’s performance and concluded by 
identifying certain concerns, the following are the main proposed recommendations: 
 Recruiting senior experienced staff or giving more trainings to junior staff, and 
introducing60  
 Case management and setting deadlines for resolving cases.61  
 Transparency issues: making external parties more informed about the OFT’s 
investigations.62 
 Measuring the benefits achieved for consumers as a result of its actions.63  
 Balancing of resources allocated to hard enforcement activity and softer 
compliance mechanisms.64 
Originally the NAO 2005 report, this was prepared for the Committee of Public 
Accounts (CPA), the CPA65 questioned the OFT’s senior officials regarding the NAO 
findings. The CPA has been critical when questioning the witnesses about the NAO 
and it has adopted similar conclusions and recommendations to the NAO’s.66 The 
CPA has been very critical on the issue the OFT is not using powers given to it, in 
particular not imposing criminal sanctions against parties who do not cooperate with 
the OFT during the course of investigations, the CPA stated that it wishes to return to 
the recommendations in due course and it will ask the NAO to review the OFT’s 
performance. The Following are the main recommendations made by the CPA:67 
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 National Audit Office 2005 ‘The Office of Fair Trading: Enforcing Competition on Markets’ HC 593 
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 NAO, 2005, p. 4 
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 NAO 2005, p. 4. 
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 NAO 2005, p. 4. 
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 NAO 2005, p. 5. 
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 NAO 2005, p. 4. 
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 Committee of Public Accounts, ‘Enforcing competition in markets’ Forty–second Report of Session 
2005–06. 
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 See the oral evidence the end of the report. 
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- The OFT has been advised to start ex officio investigations rather than being 
too reliant on complaints. 
- It has been suggested that the OFT should offer training to its staff, so it can 
tackle the problem of insufficient experienced staff to deal with complicated 
cases.  
- The CPA sees that the problem of delays in investigations is small case teams 
and that the OFT does not work to any deadlines. 
In 2010, the NAO68 reviewed the whole competition regime, it has reviewed generally 
the whole activities of the OFT, CC and sectoral regulators. The issue of enforcing 
competition law by regulators has been major issue in the report, where it aims to 
identify why regulators are not using their competition law powers and the suitability 
of the UK system to use such powers.69 The report does not provide analytical 
findings regarding the OFT as an institutions or about specific issues on the 
application of competition law by the OFT; it however provide analytical information 
about the whole competition regime and advising the Government on how regulators 
can be more involved in using competition powers instead of regulatory powers, i.e. 
how to enhance coordination between organisations in the UK linked to the 
competition regime. Thus, this report does not provide information about the 
performance of organisations.70  
One of the main findings of the report is: The UK competition case law is not rich 
enough. It raises the question, if it is appropriate to incentivise regulators to use their 
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 National Audit Office,  ‘Review of the UK’s Competition Landscape’, March 2010, paragraph 3.8   
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competition powers more (regulators rely on regulatory powers more than 
competition powers)71 in order to enrich case law; given that using competition law is 
a lengthy process and that most Competition Act cases are subsequently appealed 
which creates uncertainty of outcomes.72 
There have been two reports conducted on behalf of the OFT to measure the deterrent 
effects of competition law enforcement and the impact of the OFT’s interventions on 
compliance and deterrence.   
The first report was conducted by Deloitte in November 2007,73 which was about the 
deterrent effect of the OFT enforcement activities in the areas of merger control and 
competition law. The methodology employed was based on three aspects: interviews, 
legal survey and company survey. The main aspects that the report aimed to address: 
(i) the scale of the deterrent effect of the OFT’s activities; (ii) how the impact of the 
competition regime vary according to the sector and the size; (iii) the important 
factors that may motivate compliance with competition law; and (vi) which 
competition cases or mergers have had the greatest effect on firms’ behaviour. The 
findings of the reports have been drawn separately from each method employed. 
Therefore the report for each aspect there are three views drawn from the interviews, 
the legal survey, and the company survey.  
The main findings of the Deloitte report regarding competition law decisions is that 
there is no clear evidence that the OFT’s decisions have a deterrent effect in the same 
sector in which the decision belong to. Furthermore, the majority of lawyers believe 
that decisions have more deterrent effect against anti- competitive behaviour in the 
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 NAO 2010, p. 5. 
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 OFT 962: The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the OFT’ A report by Deloitte  
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same sector of the decisions but have less deterrent effect against anticompetitive 
practices in other sectors which have not been investigated (where there were no 
cases).74 In addition, both lawyers and companies have seen the UK regime most 
effective in deterring cartels, less effective in deterring anti-competitive agreements 
and least effective in deterring abuses of dominant position.75 
The second report about deterrence and compliance was conducted by London 
Economics in December 2011.76  This report is wider than the Deloitte report in terms 
of the number of respondents and the scope of the report; it also updates and extends 
the Deloitte report.77 There were several methodologies employed, the report relies on 
surveys (to businesses and lawyers), behavioural experiment and discussions held 
with business stakeholders.78 However, the main focus of the report was on the results 
obtained from the business survey.79 One the main findings of this reports was the 
deterrence ratio as a result of the OFT enforcement actions, which seems to have a 
substantial deterrent effect. The report found that for cartel cases investigated there 
are 28 cartels deterred; for each commercial agreements investigated by the OFT there 
are 40 commercial agreements deterred; and for each abuse of dominance case 
investigated there 12 cases deterred.80 
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Furthermore, respondents rated the OFT highly in terms of deterring potential anti-
competitive behaviour.81 In addition, respondents have been asked to suggest how the 
OFT may improve its effectiveness with respect to competition law enforcement.82 On 
the one hand, respondents from business believe that the OFT may improve 
effectiveness by investigating fewer cases but more high profile cases; however, high 
profile cases have not been defined.83 On the other hand, lawyers suggested that 
undertaking more cases in general would improve the OFT’s effectiveness. 
There is an interesting observation regarding both reports, namely the extent and the 
ratio of deterrence. In the 2007 report it has been found that the OFT is most effective 
in deterring cartels and then anti- competitive agreements and abuses of dominance, 
while in the 2011 report the OFT has been found to be most effective in deterring 
anti-competitive agreements followed by cartels and abuse of dominance. This is 
surprising because the cases that have been concluded by the OFT between 2007 and 
2011 all of the cases were either cartel cases or alleged abuse of dominance cases. 
Therefore, the levels of deterrence against anti-competitive agreement may become 
weaker, at least in theory, because there were no cases at all between the two reports. 
Another explanation is that there is full deterrence against agreements. Another 
possible explanation, is the OFT’s policy in selecting cases, as the OFT is targeting 
high impact cases which anti-competitive agreements do not belong to this category; 
because anti- competitive agreements are generally smaller than cartel.  
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Information about the competitiveness of the UK 
This information will be taken from the annual Global Competitiveness Report 
produced by the World Economic Forum. It provides information about the levels of 
competition and other issues that may affect the levels of competition enforcement. 
This information may help in giving explanations to the OFT’s outcomes, form a 
comparative perspective. Information about issues related to the intensity of 
competition, the existence of market power, the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 
and the existence of trade barriers, may explain issues related to the levels of 
competition law enforcement and the levels of deterrence, when conducting 
comparative studies.  
For example, if there are low numbers of abuse of dominance cases in country X 
compared to country Y, then if one looks at the ranking of the TGCR for the below 
factors (in table 7), this maybe a contributing explanation for the level of enforcement 
against abuse of dominance cases.  
Therefore, table 8 presents the ranking of the UK for the factors (started in table 7) 
from 2008.
 84
 It seems the ranking of the UK is improving over the years. It should be 
stressed that one should not draw conclusions on the basis of the ranking itself, but is 
can be taken as an explanatory issues that one may take into account in order to 
understand issues related to the levels of competition enforcement and may indicate to 
the levels of deterrence.  
Year 
Intensity of local 
competition  
Extent of market 
dominance 
Effectiveness of 
anti-monopoly 
Prevalence of 
trade barriers 
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(Ranking) (Ranking) policy (Ranking) (Ranking) 
2008 10/134 16/134 15/134 33/134 
2009 6/133 14/133 17/133 28/133 
2010 8/139 10/139 8/139 21/139 
2011 3/142 6/142 3/142 17/142 
2012 5/144 6/144 9/144 13/144 
Table 8: Information taken from the Global Competitiveness Reports  
(2008-2012) 
 
4-3: Analysis of possible implications for recent changes and proposed changes  
The main changes so far in the OFT are investigation procedures and fining policy; 
other possible changes on the way are in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill  
(ERRB). These changes will be discussed, below, alongside current procedures and 
practices that are related to the enforcement of competition rules in the UK, such as 
the OFT’s prioritisation principles. The discussion will be about issues that may affect 
public enforcement. The discussion and the recommendations are based on the 
assumption that the OFT is not bringing enough cases and that the OFT needs to 
shorten duration of investigations, as it has been suggested by commentators and the 
reports reviewed earlier in the chapter. In the conclusion section of this chapter, it will 
be commented as if this assumption is not valid as well.  
 
4-3-1: The OFT’s prioritisation principles 
Before going into the changes that occurred recently or may occur in the future, it is 
important to understand on what grounds the OFT may open an investigation or not, 
as these principles are the deciding principles for opening an investigation. Indeed, it 
may be seen that the problems (if any) lay at the stage before opening an 
investigation, i.e. selection of cases. In October 2008, the OFT issued a document 
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entitled ‘OFT prioritisation principles’.85 This document outlines on what basis the 
OFT will decide to open an investigation into an alleged infringement. At the 
beginning, the OFT stated that it has a limited budget and it has to allocate this budget 
in a way that its actions can deliver benefits to consumers of five times of its annual 
budget.86  In light of this, the OFT highlighted that when deciding whether to open an 
investigation or not87 it will consider wide range of principles including the following: 
(i) impact, (ii) strategic significance (iii) risks and (iv) resources. The OFT elaborates 
on each of these principles and explains the importance of each one.  
For the impact principle, the OFT stated that it will pursue cases that have direct 
effect on consumer welfare; which includes better value for consumers in terms of 
price, services and choice.88 The OFT stated that the impact of its work may be seen 
indirectly benefiting consumers; if as a result of the OFT action (s) the behaviour of 
consumers, businesses and government has changed.89 In other words, by raising 
awareness among consumers and increasing deterrence. It also added cases that may 
increase efficiency and productivity will be prioritised as it will have economic 
impact.90   
The second principle is strategic significance. The OFT will assess if the work is 
strategically significance the following factors. First, if the work fit with annual plan 
of the OFT.91 Second, if the work will help in establishing or examining new legal or 
economic approaches.92 Third, if the work in question will improve the ability of the 
OFT to deliver better outcomes; and if it would help the OFT in achieving better 
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credibility of the UK competition and consumer regime.93 Lastly, the OFT will ask, if 
it is the best placed to act or there other bodies or approaches are better placed to take 
an action.94 The OFT will take into account how the work would add to the OFT’s 
portfolio.  
The other two main principles that the OFT will look at when considering whether to 
act or not: are risks and resources. This means that the OFT will assess the likelihood 
of a successful outcome of the case. At the same time, the OFT will consider its 
resources and will take into account issues, such as, enabling the OFT to meet its 
objectives.  
It should be noted that the OFT, when considering whether to act or not, it will take 
into consideration all of the prioritisation principles stated above.95 The OFT stated 
“We generally prioritise according to the impact of work on consumers and according 
to the work's strategic significance. We balance this against the risks and resources 
involved.”96 
After reviewing what the prioritisation principles are, it is now important to comment 
on these principles and how these principles may affect enforcement. At the outset, it 
seems that these principles are very general and does not tell an outsider how exactly 
the OFT will open an investigation. It can also be said that this is a common issue that 
any organised CA has to take into when considering opening an investigation.  
When looking at the number of cases concluded by the OFT (May 2004-
December2012), the OFT should have a more precise policy in order to have a richer 
case law. In other words, the OFT may need to adopt a short-term policy that 
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addresses the weaknesses within the UK regime that helps the UK regime to recover. 
A possible way of doing so is to come up with precise prioritisation principles that 
help the UK system to have clear targets in the short term (four to five years).97 this 
will help the OFT (or the future Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)) to 
increase the number of cases and may as well decrease the duration of investigations, 
as the UK CA will have precise targets to achieve. This means that the OFT (or the 
future CMA) may need to overlook some of the existing activities (mainly non-
enforcement activities as explained earlier in the chapter) in order to achieve its short-
term policy, i.e. mainly increasing the caseload and reducing investigations durations.   
In addition, some of the non-enforcement activities may be turned into enforcement 
activities, for example by opening formal investigations instead of market studies, as 
it can be seen that the number of market studies is much higher than the number of 
cases concluded for the period examined in this chapter. Although, one should note 
that market studies seem to be an easier tool for the OFT than opening formal 
investigations, as market studies’ duration were less than cases.98 At the same time, it 
should be noted that market studies may not remedy competition concerns and further 
action is needed in order to remedy competition concerns, either by refereeing issues 
to the CC or opening a formal investigation, which ultimately, this process will take 
longer than an ordinary investigation. However, none of the OFT’s decisions 
examined in this chapter was opened because the source of the investigation was 
based on information from market studies. Some market studies resulted in referring it 
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to the CC, however.99 Another possible reason for the OFT to prefer market studies 
over opening cases is the appeal process in front of the CAT, which the OFT has 
struggled to have its decisions cleared in front of it. If this is a valid claim, then the 
OFT should not worry too much about the outcome as it will result in clarifying the 
law, regardless. Furthermore, the OFT record against the CAT is not too worrying, as 
it has been shown earlier in the chapter that there is 50% to win the case if it has been 
appealed, 100 contrary to what has been suggested without empirical evidence.101   
All in all, in order to improve the UK competition regime, clear and achievable targets 
for the short term with focusing on bringing cases and reducing the length of 
investigations, which means that the OFT (or the future CMA) will need to focus 
more on enforcement activities and reduce budget and staff allocated for non-
enforcement activities. Furthermore, the OFT need to focus on all type of cases so it 
can create deterrence to small and large infringements.  
  
4-3-2: Procedures for investigating suspected competition law infringements  
In October 2012, the OFT amended its procedures for investigating competition law 
infringements.102 In the initial thoughts for adopting the new procedures were to 
improve the speed and the robustness of decision-making, and to remove the 
investigation process and the decision making so each process is carried out by 
different teams. Therefore, it can be understood that transparency is an issue that the 
changes need to address. It is also important to note that these changes have been 
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adopted by the European Commission in October 2011.103 Where some of the issues 
raised tackled in the changes were already seen at a European level. Therefore, it can 
be said that these changes are not purely innovative but are in line with changes 
already addressed at a European level. The most notable changes are: (i) publicity of 
the OFT work;104 (ii) case timetables,105 (iii) new decision making model;106 (iv) 
strengthen procedural rights during an investigation.107 
With respect the publicity of the OFT’s work, The OFT will publish case opening 
notices on its website once a formal investigation is opened. However, the OFT may 
not publish notices in certain cases where it may prejudice the investigation, such as 
cartel cases.108  Also the OFT will prepare case timetables that will cover the 
investigation stages till the point in which the OFT decide whether it will issue a 
statement of objections.109 If a statement of objections has been issued, then the OFT 
will update the case timetable.110 However, it should be noted that the OFT can update 
the timetable at any stage if the investigation require this and the OFT will publish the 
reasons behind the updates.111   
The main objective of the OFT’s new decision model is to separate between 
investigators and decision makers. Therefore, once the OFT issues a statement of 
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objections, a case decision group will be appointed.112 None of the group’s members 
may be anyone who was involved in the decision to issue the statement of 
objections.113 
With regard the fourth point, to strengthen procedural rights during an investigation. 
The OFT will give the parties the opportunity to comment in writing and orally on a 
draft penalty statement before adopting the final decision and the penalty, as the OFT 
will send a draft penalty statement to the parties involved.114 Also, the OFT will have 
more “state of play meetings”, where parties can meet the case team more frequently 
than before.115 These meetings will keep parties up-to-date with the developments of 
the case and what would be the next stage.116 In addition, the case team will share 
provisional thinking on the case.117  
It can be seen that most of these changes are more related to transparency, and these 
issue will not change the ability to increase the number of cases. It may help the OFT 
in finding the right the decision, but one may suggest that these procedures may 
increase the length of investigations as these issues require more formalities from the 
OFT. 
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4-3-3: Changes to rules relating to setting fines 
In September 2012, the OFT reformed its guidance in sitting the appropriate amount 
of a penalty.118 It can be suggested that the main aim of the changes to the fining 
policy of the OFT was to employ the approach taken by the CAT on appeal, given the 
recent substantial reduction in fines in recent cases.119 In addition, the Government 
reacted to this issue by proposing in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 
(ERRB), that the OFT and the CAT should use the same penalty guidance when 
imposing fines and reviewing the fines imposed.120 By this move, the Government 
aims to limit the number of future cases where the CAT employs different approach to 
the OFT’s when revising the fines imposed and to tackle unnecessary incentives to 
appeal. The proposed changes in the ERRB will be discussed below.  
The main changes in the OFT’s fining policy are: raising the starting point; tougher   
treatment for serious infringements; and treatment of aggravating factors and 
mitigating factors.  
For the starting point the OFT raised the starting point for determining fines from 10 
per cent to up to 30 per cent of the undertaking’s relevant turnover, i.e. the 
undertaking’s turnover in the product and geographic market affected by the 
infringement in the last business year before the end of the infringement.121 It can be 
said that  the new ‘starting point’ gives the OFT the flexibility to fine serious 
infringements;  while at the same time deterring other firms from being involved in 
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competition law breaches. In addition, this move brings the OFT’s approach in sitting 
the amount of fine in line with the EU approach.122  Regarding the other changes, the 
OFT gives itself more flexibility when dealing with very serious infringements.123 The 
OFT will use a starting point towards the upper end of the range for the most serious 
infringements of competition law.124 In addition, under the new penalties guidance, 
the OFT will be able to increase the fine if aggravating circumstances appeared in a 
given case; such as, repeated unreasonable behaviour that delays the OFT 
enforcement action and recidivism. In the case of recidivism, the OFT is now able to 
increase the fine to up to 100 per cent if the undertaking(s) commit similar 
infringements in the last 15 years and have been found guilty by the OFT, UK sector 
regulators or the European Commission, given that the previous infringements had a 
UK impact.  
The OFT’s penalties setting guidance also discussed mitigating circumstances. For 
example, the existence of a compliance program/ activity may result in a 10 per cent 
reduction in fine.  
One observation that can be seen from reforming the fining guidelines is the powerful 
indirect role of the CAT and how its judgments may contributed in reforming the 
fining policy.  
The changes in the fining policy of the OFT is a good move by the OFT as it will give 
more flexibility when setting the appropriate penalty, also it would put the OFT in a 
better position on appeal. More importantly the suggested changes in the ERRB is a 
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very important move as it will force the OFT and the CAT to use the same method 
when setting penalty and when the CAT reviews the OFT’s decisions.125  
 
4-3-4: The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill (ERRB) 
Most of the changes regarding antitrust enforcement were concerning the powers of 
investigations and what would be the consequences if the suspected undertakings 
(person) did not comply with the requirements imposed by investigators without 
reasonable excuse.126 The aspects in the ERRB that may affect enforcement and the 
duration of investigations are the following: (i) the Secretary of State may impose 
time-limits on the CMA investigations; (ii) the CMA may decide to investigate cases 
rather than sector regulators; and (iii) parliamentary review. 
 In addition, the Secretary of State may impose time-limits on investigations 
conducted by the future CMA,127 it may be suggested that the Secretary of State will 
use this tool if it sees that the CMA is taking too long with its investigations. This 
may speed up investigations. Also, the ERRB introduced that the CMA may decide to 
investigate a particular case rather than a sector regulator.128 This may increase the 
caseload of the CMA, as it has been noted that regulators have been reluctant to use 
competition powers given to them.129 Furthermore, in light of the recent changes the 
                                                          
125
 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Briefing ‘OFT adopts new policy on competition law fine’, 
September 2012 p. 2. Available at 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/OFTadopts%20new%20policy%20on
%20competition%20law%20fines.pdf 
126
 See schedule 11 of the  Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill. 
127
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, section 39. 
128
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, section  45. 
129
 As regulators have been mentioned when talking about the enforcement of competition law in the 
UK because of their ability to apply competition law in their sectors. It is worth looking at competition 
Act cases concluded by the regulators for the same period under examination (May 2004- December 
2012). Regulators have tried to apply competition law, only in one case regulators concluded with an 
infringement. See Table 2 in the Appendix. Table 5 below shows the cases concluded by regulators and 
the outcome of these cases.  
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Secretary of State will be under duty to review the operation of the of the antirust 
regime  and to prepare a report on how the regime is working to The Parliament, 
which has to be published before the end of the period of 5 years from the ERRB 
come into force.130 Reporting to The Parliament is a very good idea, as the CMA 
performance will be assessed by The Parliament and it will also give interested 
outsiders an opportunity to comment and analyse the CMA’s work. 
After providing what procedures the OFT have changed and what are the changes to 
the CMA. It can be said, that neither the OFT nor the ERRB tackled an important 
what appears to be a weakness in the UK system, namely bringing new cases and 
focusing on enforcement activities. However, the changes and the proposed changes 
may affect, theoretically, may shorten the duration of investigations. 
Therefore, it would have been helpful if the ERRB taken the issue of number of cases, 
or putting the OFT under the duty to open an investigation under certain conditions, at 
least in the short run. Or giving the Secretary of State to compel the OFT to open 
investigations under certain conditions after reviewing the CMA performance. 
 
4-4: Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed antitrust enforcement in the UK from May 2004 to 
December 2012. It has examined empirically the OFT’s outcomes, capabilities 
(human capital and budget) and analysed studies that assessed the UK enforcement 
regime. This has been followed by studying procedures and proposed changes that 
may affect antitrust enforcement in the UK.  
From the reviewed documents, it has been concluded that the OFT experiences three 
main issues that affects its performance: low number of cases, length of investigations 
                                                          
130
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, section 40 
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and the lack of high impact cases. None of the reviewed documents has defined what 
the appropriate number of cases is or what the ideal length for investigations is. This 
is mainly because of the difficulty in defining such issues. So why not assuming the 
contrary, and assume that the UK as jurisdiction is competitive and the lack of 
number cases is because of the levels of deterrence.  
A very important point that has been overlooked by commentators is to look if there 
are any alternatives to traditional public enforcement in the UK. The first point is that 
in the UK there a high level of deterrence and this is why there is low number of 
cases. The second point is the levels of private enforcement in the UK and this 
affecting the role of public enforcement. The third point is that most of competition 
law infringements that affect the UK are of international nature and hence being 
investigated by the European Commission. These points require more investigation 
and need to be examined in order to identify problems within the UK antitrust regime.  
Regarding the first point, an answer to this maybe sought by comparing the UK 
regime to another regime with similar capabilities and characteristics. This will be 
done in the subsequent chapters. Regarding the private enforcement point, according 
to the available empirical evidence,131 private enforcement in the UK is still weak and 
needs more time to be improved.132 In addition, there is no evidence that stand-alone 
                                                          
131
 On the empirical evidence see Barry J. Rodger, ‘Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A 
Study of All Cases to 2004- Part I’ (2006) European Competition Law Review 279; Barry J. Rodger 
‘Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A Study of All Cases to 2004 - Part II’, (2006) 
European Competition Law Review 241; Barry J. Rodger, ‘Competition Law Litigation in the UK 
Courts: A Study of All Cases to 2004- Part III’(2006) European Competition Law Review 341; Barry J. 
Rodger, ‘Competition law litigation in the UK courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008: Part 1’ (2009) 
2(2) Global Competition law Review 93; Barry J. Rodger, ‘Competition law litigation in the UK 
courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008: Part 2’ (2009) 2(3) Global Competition law Review, 136-147; 
Barry J. Rodger, ‘Private enforcement of competition law, the hidden story: competition litigation 
settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005’(2008) 29(2)  European Competition Law Review 96 
132
 Also highlighted in Barry Rodger, ‘UK Competition Law and Private Litigation’ in Barry Rodger 
(ed), Ten years of UK Competition Law Reform (2010 Dundee University Press, Dundee) at 74 and 77.  
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cases have been successful with exception of a small number of cases.133 Therefore, 
according to the current evidence private enforcement of competition law may not 
help public enforcement. As with the first point, the third point requires more research 
in order to identify if the European Commission has investigated cases that affect the 
UK and other jurisdictions. This will be examined in Chapter 6.    
Furthermore, the issue of the balance between enforcement and non-enforcement 
activities is an issue that needs to be considered. As if it is true that there is lack of 
decisions and that investigations take too long to be concluded. The CMA  may need 
to focus, at least in the short run, on enforcement activities more than non-
enforcement activities and may need to allocate more staff to focus on enforcement 
actions. As the lack of enforcement actions may undermine the significance of non-
enforcement activities that aim to raise awareness and deterrence, as businesses may 
have doubts on the ability to bring enforcement actions against them.  
In addition, this chapter discussed the new changes and the proposed changes that 
may take place in the future. In this respect, it has been argued that the changes are a 
good move in the right direction; however, they may not tackle all of the problems 
that have been expressed by commentators. The changes may help the CMA in 
increasing the robustness of decisions and transparency in general. However, there are 
no clear indications that it may help the CMA to bring more cases more easily. What 
is needed is a short-term plan is to focus more in bringing cases and prioritising 
enforcement activities over non-enforcement activities.  
                                                          
133
 Barry Rodger, ‘UK Competition Law and Private Litigation’ in Barry Rodger (ed), Ten years of UK 
Competition Law Reform (2010 Dundee University Press, Dundee) at 74 and 77. 
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Importantly, the UK antitrust regime needs a period of stability where major 
institutional or legislations changes shall be avoided after the CMA took office in 
April 2014.   
The next chapters of the thesis may help in providing some explanations to UK 
antitrust regimes and may provide useful insights to the UK; and what the other 
jurisdiction may learn from the UK experience.  
 
Appendix 
Case 
Year of 
conclusi
on 
Duration of 
investigatio
n (months) 
Outcome and 
type of 
investigation 
Amount of 
fine (if any) 
Source of 
investigatio
n 
Average 
duration of 
investigatio
ns (on a 
yearly 
bases)  (in 
months) 
Attheraces 2004 30 
Infringement 
of CH I 
0 
Notified 
Arrangeme
nt 
 
 
 
28.4 
First 
Edinburgh 
2004 40 
No 
infringement 
of CH II 
0 Complaint 
Harwood 
Park 
Crematorium 
2004 29 
No 
infringement 
of CH II 
0 Complaint 
TM Property 
Services 
Limited 
2004 19 
No 
infringement 
of CH II 
0 Complaint 
UOP Limited 2004 24 
Infringement 
of CH I 
1,707,000 
Own 
initiative 
MasterCard 
UK Members 
2005 66 
Infringement 
of CH I & 
Article 101 
0 
Notified 
Arrangeme
nt 
 
 
 
48.25 
 
 
 
felt and single 
ply 
2005 43 
Infringement 
of CH I 
138,515  
Mastic 
Asphalt Roof 
2005 40 
Infringement 
of CH I 
87,353  
Felt and 
single ply 
flat-roofing 
2005 44 
Infringement 
of CH I 
471,029 
 
Flat roof and 
car park 
2006 35 
Infringement 
of CH I 
2,419,608  
 
 
 
37.4 
Associated 
Newspapers 
2006 36 
Commitment
s (CH II) 
0 Complaint 
stock check 
pads 
2006 25 
Infringement 
of CH I 
168,318 Leniency 
aluminium 
spacer bars 
2006 50 
Infringement 
of CH I 
898,470 Complaint 
Own 
initiative 
(then 
the OFT 
found 
out 
about 
the 
other 
cases  
173 
 
Schools 
Exchange of 
information 
2006 41 
Infringement 
of CH I 
467,500 
From the 
media 
Cardiff Bus 2008 42 
Infringement 
of CH II 
0 Complaint 42 
Bid-rigging in 
the 
construction 
2009 58 
Infringement 
of CH I 
129,200,000 Complaint 
 
 
49 
Construction 
Recruitment 
Forum 
2009 40 
Infringement 
of CH I 
39,270,000 Leniency 
Tobacco 2010 85 
Infringement 
of CH I 
225,000,000 Leniency 
 
52 Flybe 
Limited 
2010 19 
No 
infringement 
of CH II & 
Article 102 
0 Complaint 
loan-services 
(Royal Bank 
of Scotland 
(RBS) and 
Barclays) 
2011 34 
Infringement 
of CH I & 
Article 101 
28,590,000 Leniency 
 
 
 
 
42.5 
Reckitt 
Benckiser 
2011 
29 (Early 
resolution) 
Infringement 
of CH II & 
Article 102 
10,200,000 
report by 
BBC 
Newsnight 
Dairy retail 
price 
2011 95 
Infringement 
of CH I 
49,510,000 Leniency 
IDEXX 
Laboratories 
2011 12 
No 
infringement 
of CH II 
0 Complaint 
Table 1: All cases concluded by the OFT (May 2004- December 2012) 
 
Case Year Type 
Dwr Cymru, OFWAT 2004 NO CH II 
Welding Federation, Rail Regulator 2004 NO CH II 
Npower ,Gas and Electricity  Authority 2004 NO CH II 
London Underground, ORR 2004 NO CH II 
BT Group plc, Ofcom 2004 NO CH II OR 102 
Southern Water ,OFWAT 2004 NO CH II 
Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile, Ofcom 2004 NO CH II OR 102 
BT 0845 and  0870 retail price change, Ofcom 2004 NO CH II OR 102 
BT Analyst Ofcom 2004 NO CH II 
United Utilities Electricity 2004 NO CH II 
RS Clare and Company,  ORR 2005 NO CH I/101 OR CH II/102 
Re-investigation Vodafone, Ofcom 2005 NO CH II OR 102 
Re-investigation T-mobile, Ofcom 2005 NO CH II OR 102 
BT Wholesale 2005 NO CH II OR 102 
United Utilities Water, Ofwat 2005 NO CH II OR 102 
BT digital cordless telephones, Ofcom  NO CH II 
English Welsh & Scottish Railways, ORR  YES CH II & 102 
EDF electricity meter, Gas and Electricity    NO CH II OR 102 
BBC Broadcast, Ofcom 2007 NO 101/102 
BT's charges for NTS, Ofcom 2008 NO CH II 
National Grid 2008 YES CH II & 102 
Investigation into BT's broadband residential 2010 No CH II 
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pricing, Ofcom 
DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited, ORR 2010 No CH II 
Table 2: Number of cases concluded by regulators between  
May 2004 and December 2012 
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Chapter 5: An Empirical Analysis of Public Enforcement of Competition law in France 
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
5-1: Introduction
1
 
This chapter examines, empirically, the application of competition law by the French 
Competition Authority (FCA).2 Hence, this chapter scrutinises the application of Articles 
L.420-1 and L.420-23 from the French Commercial Code and Articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), from May 2004, since the 
Regulation 1/2003 came into force,4 and up to 31 December 2012. Further, this chapter 
examines the non-enforcement activities of the FCA. This will be done in order to understand 
what exactly the outputs of the FCA during the period under examination. In addition, the 
capabilities of the FCA will be studied, i.e. the human capital and the budget of the FCA, in 
order to figure out under which circumstances the FCA produced its outputs.    
For the period under examination, there has been an important institutional change in the 
French competition regime.5 The Law on the Modernisation of the Economy (LME), of 4 
August 2008,6 created the present FCA which replaced the former Competition Council. The 
                                                          
1
 All of the translations in this chapter are unofficial, whether it has been translated by the author, the French 
Competition Authority or from the legifrance website. 
2
 This chapter examines only public enforcement of competition law. for a good discussion about private 
enforcement; see, George Cumming, Brad Spitz and Ruth Janal, Civil procedure Used for the Enforcement Of 
EC Competition Law by the English, French and German Civil Courts (Kluwer, The Netherlands 2008) 
3
 In France, Article L.420-5 punishes abusively low pricing practises; this provision also included in the 
analysis.  
4
 Council Regulation of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25. 
5
 For the way in which competition law was enforced pre the Modernisation of the French competition regime; 
see Eric David, ‘Country Analysis - France” in Gerhard Dannecker and Oswald Jansen (eds), Competition Law 
Sanctions in the European Union (Kluwer, the Hague 2004) 405- 479; see also, Dominiqe Voillemot and Amael 
Chesmeau, ‘Chapter on France’ in Julian Maitland-Walker (ed), Competition Laws of Europe (LexisNexis 2003) 
121-164; A more recent piece see, Louis Vogel, ‘Competition Law’ in George Bermann and Etienne Picard 
(eds), Introduction to French Law (Kluwer, The Netherlands 2008) 364-394.  
6
 Law no 2008-776 of 4 August 2008 of Modernisation of the Economy, and Ordinance no 2008-1161 of 
13November 2008 of Modernisation of Competition Regulation; came into force 2 March 2009.  
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LME created an independent and more powerful administrative authority.7 The major 
changes that the LME has brought other than establishing the new Authority can be 
summarised as follows.  First, it extended the powers of the FCA and reallocates them, 
previously most of the powers and the recourses shared by the Competition Council and the 
Ministry of Economy. Now, these powers and resources are centralised within the 
Competition Authority. Second, the Modernisation of Economy law has transferred merger 
competence from the Ministry of Economy to the competition authority. Third, strengthen of 
investigatory powers of competition authority officials. Formally, the Competition Council 
had to request assistance from the Ministry of Economy’s inspection services, whereas now, 
the Competition Authority has its own investigation services. Fourth, the FCA may, on its 
own initiative, issue opinions on competition related matters.8  
Alongside the institutional changes, there were some amendments to procedures that the FCA 
uses when enforcing competition law. For example, the FCA amended its notice on 
commitments decisions,9 leniency notice,10 settlements procedures, 11 fining guidelines, and to 
its compliance program.12  
In order to analyse public enforcement of competition law in France, this chapter employs an 
empirical approach to this. This chapter presents and analyses data collected from decisions 
concluded by the FCA from May 2004 to December 2012. The data collected includes the 
                                                          
7
  For example, The Council in the past has been linked with the Ministry of Economy, now the Ministry of 
Economy can only intervene in merger cases, where it may request a new examination (in-depth analysis or 
“phase II”) or to reverse certain decisions. However, in the case of requesting an in-depth analysis, the Authority 
may accept or reject the request. See Article L. 430-7-1 of the French Commercial Code. 
8
 For more on the new French Competition Authority; see Bruno Lasserre, ‘The New French Competition 
Authority: mission, priorities and strategies for the coming five years’ (2009) paper by the President of the 
Autorité de la concurrence. Available at 
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/intervention_bl_autorite_trustubusters_09.pdf>; Bruno Lasserre, 
‘Competition regulation, one year after the reform: a view of authority (Part 1)’ (2010) n ° 3-2010 Concurrences 
35-46; Bruno Lasserre, ‘The New French Competition Law Enforcement Regime’ October 2009 
COMPETITION Law International. 
9
 FCA, Notice on Competition Commitments of 2 March 2009.  
10
 FCA, Notice on the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial Penalties of 16 May 2011. 
11
 FCA, Procedural notice on antitrust settlement procedure of 10 February 2012 
12
 FCA, Framework Document on Antitrust Compliance Programmes of 10 February 2012 
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following: number of cases, sources of investigations, nature of investigations, length of 
investigations and the fine imposed where the FCA imposed any fines. In addition to this, this 
chapter studies if any of the decisions concluded, in the period under examination, have been 
appealed, and it reports the outcome of the appealed decisions.  The examination of appeals is 
important in order to calculate the success rate of the FCA on appeal, and it provides a good 
feedback of the FCA’s enforcement activities. The data regarding the enforcement activities 
of the FCA have been obtained from the decisions published by the FCA. Data regarding 
appeals have been obtained from the Paris Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation 
judgments. 
As it has been mentioned earlier this chapter examines non-enforcement activities of the 
FCA. This chapter presents and comments on the non- enforcement activities by studying 
what the FCA has produced between May 2004 and December 2012.  Non-enforcement 
activities include: opinions issued by the FCA regarding competition matters; sector 
inquiries; guidelines; advocacy activities; or any other form of studies or documents that may 
uses the FCA’s resources. The data have been obtained from the FCA’s website and 
publications.  
In addition, the FCA’s budget and human capital (capabilities) are examined in this chapter. 
Data regarding the budget, the staff, and the number of specialists have been obtained from 
the Global Competition Review publications on ‘rating enforcement’.  
After presenting and analysing the data regarding enforcement, non-enforcement and the 
capabilities of the FCA. This chapter, afterwards, provides facts and surrounding 
circumstances about the French competition regime. This includes analysing any studies or 
peer reviews that have evaluated the FCA activities, also studies that examined a specific area 
of the FCA will be considered. In addition, certain peculiarities of the French competition 
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regime will be presented, in order to provide explanations about its impact on enforcement 
and the way it may affect how the FCA deals with competition enforcement. 
To the author’s knowledge this is the most updated empirical study (if not the only) about the 
enforcement of French competition law by the FCA. However, it has to be noted, that this 
chapter it intended to provide a platform for the analysis that will be undertaken in the 
‘comparative chapter’ (Chapter 6)  where the results from the three jurisdictions will be 
studied, and to provide the appropriate advice to each CA.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2, presents and analyses the enforcement 
activities of the FCA, including appeals. Section 3 discuses the non-enforcement activities of 
the FCA. Section 4 presents the capabilities of the FCA, including the human capital and the 
budget of the FCA. Section 5 highlights certain peculiarities of the French competition 
regime and how it may affect competition enforcement. Section 6 concludes.   
 
5-2: Outcomes of the FCA 
This section discusses the enforcement activities of the FCA between 1 May 2004 and 31 
December 2012. It discusses the cases concluded by the FCA and the nature of these cases. 
The sources and duration of investigations are also discussed in this section. Then, the fines 
imposed by the FCA are presented. Analysis for the above issues will be provided. This 
section ends with analysing the cases that have been appealed.  
179 
 
5-2-1: Number of cases 
Between May 2004 and December 2012, the FCA concluded 383 cases. The FCA concluded 
138 infringement decisions, 173 non-infringement decisions,13 46 commitments decisions and 
26 ‘other’ cases.14  Table 1 below shows the number cases concluded in each year. 
From May 2004 to December 2004, the FCA concluded 64 decisions. There were 19 cases 
concluded as infringements, 36 cases declared as non-infringements and nine ‘other’ cases 
concluded. 15 In 2005, 76 cases were concluded, 27 infringement decisions, 38 non-
infringement decisions, four commitment decisions and seven other decisions. In 2006, the 
number of cases dropped to 42 cases, 13 infringement decisions, 20 non-infringement 
decisions, six commitment decisions and three other decisions. In 2007, the number of cases 
concluded increased to 50 cases. The FCA concluded 24 infringement decisions, 15 non-
infringement decisions, nine commitment decisions and two ‘other’ cases. 2008 saw the 
number of cases dropped to 34, 15 concluded as infringements, 14 non-infringement 
decisions, four commitment decisions and one ‘other’ decision. 40 cases were concluded in 
2009, 15 infringement decisions, 20 non-infringement decisions and five commitment 
decisions. In 2010 the FCA concluded 30 cases, nine infringement decisions, 13 non-
infringement decisions, seven commitment decisions and one ‘other’ case. In 2011, the 
number of cases dropped down to 19 cases; the lowest number of cases in a given year in the 
whole sample. The FCA concluded six infringement decisions, seven non-infringement 
decisions, five commitment decisions and one ‘other’ case. In 2012, the FCA concluded 28 
                                                          
13
 Non-infringement decisions include the following cases: cases where the FCA did not find an infringement; 
cases where the FCA decided that there is no need to continue with the procedure; cases where the FCA rejected 
the request for interim measures; and cases where the FCA rejected the compliant. See table 2 below for these 
cases.  
14
 Other cases includes decisions related to cases before May 2004 and mainly about cases where parties failed 
to comply with injunctions imposed or complying with commitments offered to close the proceedings; or cases 
where there was no evidence of not complying with an injunction or decision. These cases will not be discussed 
in the chapter.  
15
 The overall number of cases concluded in 2004 was 79 cases. 
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cases ten infringement decisions, ten non-infringement decisions, six commitment decisions 
and two ‘other’ cases. 
Year  Infringements Non-infringements Commitments Other Total 
2004 19 36 0 9  64 
2005 27 38 4 7 76 
2006 13 20 6 3 42 
2007 24 15 9 2 50 
2008 15 14 4 1 34 
2009 15 20 5 0 40 
2010 9 13 7 1 30 
2011 6 7 5 1 19 
2012 10 10 6 2 28 
Total 138 173 46 26 383 
Table 1: number of cases concluded by the FCA (May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
It can be observed from table 1, that the number of decreasing over the years under 
examination, particularly, from the year 2008 onwards. This where the discussions for 
adopting the Modernisation of the Economy Law was taking place and coming to an end and 
has established the new Competition Authority, the FCA took office in 2 March2009.   
Although it is too early to say that the there is a policy to reduce the caseload of the FCA, but 
this is what it seems the FCA is aiming to reach.
16
  In addition, it can be observed that the 
number of non-infringement decisions is higher than the number of infringement decisions 
and this is the case in all of the years under examination. This is possibly because of the 
uniqueness of the French competition regime where it requires the FCA (and formerly the 
French CC) to deal with any complaint and it has to publish such decisions. Also, there are a 
lot of the decisions under the non-infringements category that deals with request for interim 
measures. This is explained in Table 2 below where it shows the exact outcome of all 
                                                          
16
 Bruno Lasserre, ‘The New French Competition Authority: mission, priorities and strategies for the coming 
five years’ (2009) paper by the President of the Autorité de la concurrence, P. 22.  Available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/intervention_bl_autorite_trustubusters_09.pdf. 
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decisions, particularly for the non-infringement decisions. It can be seen from Table 2 that 
there are around 80 decisions, where the FCA rejected complaints or cases with request for 
interim measures and complaints. It has to be stressed here, again, to the peculiarity of the 
French competition regime, where the FCA has to respond to complaints in formal decisions.  
 
Year 
Accepting 
commitments 
No 
infringement 
No need 
to 
proceed 
Other 
cases 
Rejecting  
complaint 
Rejecting 
complaint 
& request 
for 
measures 
Rejecting 
the 
request 
for 
measures 
Infringements Total  
2004 0 7 16 9 8 1 4 19 64 
2005 4 11 14 7 5 6 2 27 76 
2006 6 4 8 3 2 5 1 13 42 
2007 9 4 5 2 1 5 0 24 50 
2008 4 2 2 1 2 5 3 15 34 
2009 5 2 6 0 3 3 6 15 40 
2010 7 4 2 1 1 2 4 9 30 
2011 5 0 3 1 1 1 2 6 19 
2012 6 0 4 2 5 0 1 10 28 
Total 46 34 60 26 28 28 23 138 383 
Table 2: The exact outcome for the cases for the cases concluded by the FCA  
(May 2004- December 2012), particularly for the cases that are considered as non-
infringements cases 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
 
5-2-2: Nature (type) of investigations  
This sub-section presents cases by the provision(s) in which it has been investigated. At the 
outset, it is worth highlighting the legal provisions in which the FCA investigates its cases. 
Anti-competitive agreements are investigated under Article L.420-1 of the Commercial code 
(mirrors 101 TFEU). Article L.420-2 (1) is applicable to abuse of dominance cases (mirrors 
102 TFEU). Article L.420-2 (2) is applicable to abuse of economic dependency cases.17 
                                                          
17
 There were no cases where the FCA investigated for abuse of economic dependency in the period under 
examination.  For  more about abuse of Economic dependency; see Eric David, ‘Country Analysis - France” in 
Gerhard Dannecker and Oswald Jansen (eds), Competition Law Sanctions in the European Union (Kluwer, the 
Hague 2004) 405, 414-415. 
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Article L.420-5 punishes abusively low pricing practises, in order to be applicable the 
undertaking in question do need to have a dominant position in the investigated market.18  
The FCA conducted investigations toward alleged infringement of competition law that may 
affect trade at a national level and cases that may affect trade between member states; 
therefore, the FCA applied French and European competition rules toward alleged 
infringements.  Table 3 below shows the number and the nature of investigations conducted 
by the FCA in each year.  
 
5-2-2-1: Cases dealt with under Article L.420-1 and Article 101 TFEU 
The FCA found infringements of Article L.420-1 in 69 cases. Article 101 TFEU and Article 
L.420-1 was found to be infringed in 30 cases. In three cases the FCA accepted commitments 
from parties for potential infringements of Article L.420-1 and 101 TFEU. Seven cases were 
investigated under 101 TFEU and Article L.420-1, the FCA concluded that there is no breach 
of any of the provision.  There were 37 cases investigated under Article L.420-1 concluded as 
non-infringements. Seven cases were closed by parties offering commitments under Article 
L.420-1.  
 
5-2-2-2: Cases dealt with under Article L.420-2 and 102 TFEU 
                                                          
18
 For the period under examination, Article L.420-5 has never been investigated alone; it has been investigated 
either with Article L.420-1 or L420-2 or both.  On Article L.420-5; see Eric David, ‘Country Analysis - France” 
in Gerhard Dannecker and Oswald Jansen (eds), Competition Law Sanctions in the European Union (Kluwer, 
the Hague 2004) 405, 415-416. 
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The FCA dealt with 116 cases under Articles L.420-2 and 102 TFEU. The FCA concluded 
nine infringement decisions under Article L.420-2. In eleven cases dealt with under L.420-2 
and 102 TFEU together, where declared as infringements. 55 cases where declared as non-
infringements under L.420-2 and twelve cases concluded by parties offering commitments to 
remedy the FCA’s concerns.  Under article L.420-2 and 102 there were 18 cases without the 
FCA finding infringement of any of the provisions. Also, under article L.420-2 and 102 there 
were eight cases closed by parties offering commitments.  
 
5-2-2-3: Cases dealt with under Articles L.420-1 & L.420-2 and 101 & 102 TFEU 
The FCA investigated 77 cases where it applied Articles L.420-1 & L.420-2 and in some 
cases it has applied the national provisions and Articles 101 & 102 TFEU. In seven cases, the 
FCA found an infringement of both Article L.420-1 and L.420-2. In four cases, the FCA 
accepted commitments from the investigated parties for potential infringements of Articles 
L.420-1 and L.420-2. In 30 cases investigated under Articles L.420-1 and L.420-2 no 
infringement was found. In eleven cases, the FCA found infringement of competition law that 
affected France and have affect on trade with other EU member states, under Articles L.420-1 
& L.420-2 and 101 & 102 TFEU. In six cases, the FCA accepted commitments from the 
investigated parties, under Articles L.420-1 & L.420-2 and 101 & 102 TFEU. In 20 cases 
where Articles L.420-1 & L.420-2 and 101 & 102 TFEU were the subject of these 
investigations, the FCA found no infringement of any of the aforementioned provisions. 
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5-2-2-4: Cases where Article L.420-5 was investigated 
There were no cases were investigated under L.420-5 solely, it has always been investigated 
with Articles L.420-1 or L.420-2 or both Articles together. In total there were ten cases where 
Article L.420-5 was examined. Six cases were investigated under Articles L.420-1, L.420-2 
and L.420-5. Only in one case an infringement was found. There was only one case was 
closed by accepting commitments from the investigated parties. Four cases were concluded 
as non infringements, where Articles L.420-1, L.420-2 and L.420-5 were investigated. There 
was one case where Article L.420-1 and L.420-5 were investigated, the FCA did not find an 
infringement.  Article L.420-2 and L.420-5 where the subject of three investigations, all of 
which were concluded by not finding any infringements.  
Type of cases 2004                                               2005                    2006                          2007                    2008                    2009                    2010                    2011                    2012                    
420-1 
(infringement) 
8 15 7 10 10 6 6 5 2 
420-1,  101 
(infringement) 
1 5 2 7 4 2 3 1 5 
420-1,  101 
(commitments) 
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 
420-1,  101 (no 
infringement) 
0 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 
420-1, 420-2 
(infringement) 
1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 
420-1,  420-2, 
101, 102 
(infringement) 
2 1 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 
420-1,  420-2, 
101,  102 
(commitments) 
0 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 
420-1,  420-2, 
101,  102 (no 
infringement) 
6 2 2 0 3 3 4 0 0 
420-1,  420-2, 
420-5 
(infringement) 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
420-1,  420-2, 
420-5 
(commitments) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
420-1,  420-2,  
420-5 (no 
infringement) 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
420-1,  420-2 
(commitments) 
0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
420-1,  420-2  
(no 
infringement) 
3 8 6 2 1 3 1 2 4 
420-1,  420-5 (no 
infringement) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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420-1 
(commitments) 
0 0 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 
420-1 (no 
infringement) 
11 9 2 6 2 2 1 1 3 
420-2 
(infringement) 
4 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
420-2, 102 
(infringement) 
3 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 
420-2, 102 
(commitments) 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 
420-2, 102 (no 
infringement) 
4 1 1 0 3 5 3 1 0 
420-2,  420-5 (no 
infringement) 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
420-2 
(commitments) 
0 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 
420-2 (no 
infringement) 
11 16 6 5 3 6 4 2 3 
Table 3: number of cases by the decision reached between  
(May 2004 - December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
It can be observed from the above mentioned that, most of the infringement decisions where 
anti-competitive agreements cases (99 cases out of 138 infringement decisions). Also, if the 
case has been investigated under the national and the European provisions, it is more likely 
that an action will be taken. Article 101 EFTU has been investigated in 40 cases, only in 
seven cases it has been declared as non-infringement. Abuse of dominance where 
investigated 116 times.  Over half of these cases (73 cases) where concluded by not finding 
infringements of either L.420-2 or 102 EFTU. Most of the non-infringement decisions were 
investigated, in the first place, because of complaints. A possible reason for this that many of 
these complaints is from actual or potential competitors, who cannot compete effectively or 
cannot enter the market because of their competitor (s).  
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5-2-3: Sources of investigations 
The FCA opened its investigations on different grounds. It is important to study the sources 
of investigations in order to understand if this has any affect on the outcome of the 
investigation.  The source of investigation means for the purpose of this chapter, the first 
source in which the FCA knew and investigated the alleged infringement. 
Given the peculiarity of the French system, one would expect a high number of decisions 
opened because of complaints. This can be clarified more when studying the source of the 
investigations and the outcomes of these investigations. Most of the investigations were 
opened because of complaints and referrals from ministers which can be considered as 
complaints as well. The FCA opened 212 investigations based on complaints received from 
consumer associations, competitors or consumer groups. 114 cases were referred to the FCA 
from ministries in France. 26 cases were opened on the FCA’s own initiative. Six cases were 
investigated because of leniency applications from cartelists.  It can be clearly noticed the 
low number of own initiative investigations compared to the cases that have been opened 
because of complaints or because of referrals from ministries. This can be understood as the 
FCA is doing so little on its own initiative and is limiting its discretion and the way it 
allocates its resources and priorities.  
In addition, one needs to examine the nature of the investigations alongside the sources of 
investigations in order to understand if there is any relationship between them. This is 
important to be examined in order to see if the source and the nature of the investigation have 
a relationship with the outcome of the investigation. Table 4 below shows the sources of 
investigations for the cases concluded by the FCA between May 2004 and December 2012. 
Table 5 below presents the nature (and the number) of cases and the sources of investigations 
for the cases concluded by the FCA between May 2004- December 2012. 
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Sources of investigations Count 
Complaint 212 
Leniency 6 
Minister 114 
Own initiative 26 
Table 4: Sources of investigations for all decision concluded by the FCA  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
 
5-2-3-1: Article L.420-1 case 
For the investigations under Article L.420-1 that lead to finding infringements, there were 69 
cases. Most of these cases (50) were referred to the FCA by ministers, twelve cases were 
investigated because of complaints, six cases were investigated on the FCA’s own initiative, 
and one case because of leniency. There were seven cases under Article L.420-1 concluded as 
commitment decisions. The source of the investigation for these cases was: three cases from 
complaints, three cases from minsters and one case was investigated on the FCA’s own 
initiative. The FCA declared 37 cases declared as non-infringements, the source of which 
was: 18 cases complaints and 19 cases referred form ministers.  
 
5-2-3-2: Article L.420-1 and Article 101 EFTU cases 
The FCA found in 30 cases that Article L.420-1 and Article 101 EFTU were infringed. The 
FCA knew about five cases because of complaints, five cases because of leniency 
applications, 15 cases were referred by ministers and five cases were investigated on the 
FCA’s own initiative. Three cases under Article L.420-1 and Article 101 EFTU were 
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concluded as commitment decisions. Two of these cases were started by the FCA and one 
case was opened because of a complaint.  
 
5-2-3-3: Article L.420-2 cases 
The FCA declared infringements of Article 420-2 in nine occasions. Complaints were the 
source of investigations in seven cases, referrals form a ministries were the source for the 
other two cases. In twelve cases the FCA accepted commitments offered from the 
investigated parties. The sources of these cases were: ten complaints and two referrals from 
ministries. In 56 cases the FCA issued non-infringement decisions. Unsurprisingly, in 46 
cases the source of the investigations were complaints, nine cases were referrals from 
ministries and in one case the source was the FCA’s own initiative.   
  
5-2-3-4: Article L.420-2 and 102 EFTU cases 
There were 37 cases dealt with under Articles L.420-2 and 102 EFTU. Eleven cases were 
declared as infringements, the sources of the investigations in these cases were: seven cases 
were opened as a result of complaints and four cases because of referrals from ministers. 
Eights cases were concluded by parties offering commitments to remedy the FCA’s 
competition concerns. Seven cases were opened because of complaints and one case was 
referred from a minister. 18 cases were declared as non-infringements, in 17 cases the sources 
of the investigations were complaints and one case was investigated because of a referral 
form a minister.   
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5-2-3-5: Articles L.420-1 and L.420-2 EFTU cases 
In eight cases, the FCA found infringements of Articles L.420-1 and L.420-2. The sources of 
the investigations in these cases were: four cases complaints, two cases were referred from 
ministers, and one was opened on the FCA’s own initiative. There were four cases concluded 
as commitments, the sources of all of these cases was complaints. For the non-infringement 
decisions, there were 30 cases. In 27 cases the source of the investigations were complaints, 
two cases were referred by ministries to the FCA, and one case was opened on the FCA’s 
own initiative.  
5-2-3-6: Articles L.420-1, L.420-2, 101 and 102 EFTU cases  
Eleven cases were declared as infringements of Articles L.420-1, L.420-2, 101 and 102 
EFTU.  The source of the investigation in five cases was complaints, three cases were 
referred to the FCA by ministers and, three cases were investigated on the FCA’s own 
initiative. Under Articles L.420-1, L.420-2, 101 and 102 EFTU, six cases were closed by 
parties offering commitments. Five cases were opened because of complaints and one case 
was referred to the FCA by a ministry. For the non-infringement decisions, there were 20 
cases. 17 cases were investigated because of complaints logged to the FCA; two cases were 
referred by ministries and; one case was investigated on the FCA’s own initiative.   
 
5-2-3-7: Cases involves Article L.420-5  
There were no cases were investigated under L.420-5 solely, it has always been investigated 
with Article L.420-1, L420-2 or both Articles together. In total ten cases Article L.420-5 was 
examined. Six cases were investigated under Articles L.420-1, L.420-2 and L.420-5. One 
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investigation was concluded by finding an infringement; the source of this investigation was 
a compliant. One case was closed by accepting commitments; this case was investigated 
because of a complaint. Four cases were concluded as non infringements, three cases were 
investigated because of complaints and one case was investigated on the FCA’s own 
initiative. There was one case where Article L.420-1 and L.420-5 investigated; the source of 
this case was a complaint. Article L.420-2 and L.420-5 where the subject of one 
investigation, the source was of this investigation was a complaint. 
Type of cases Complaint Leniency Minister Own initiative 
420-1  
(infringement) 
12 1 50 6 
420-1,  101 
(infringement) 
5 5 15 5 
420-1,  101 
(commitments) 
1 0 0 2 
420-1,  101  
(no infringement) 
6 0 1 0 
420-1, 420-2 
(infringement) 
4 0 2 1 
420-1,  420-2, 101, 102 
(infringement) 
5 0 3 3 
420-1,  420-2, 101,  102 
(commitments) 
5 0 1 0 
420-1,  420-2, 101,  102 
(no infringement) 
17 0 2 1 
420-1,  420-2, 420-5 
(infringement) 
1 0 0 0 
420-1,  420-2, 420-5 
(commitments) 
1 0 0 0 
420-1,  420-2,  420-5  
(no infringement) 
3 0 0 1 
420-1,  420-2 
(commitments) 
4 0 0 0 
420-1,  420-2   
(no infringement) 
27 0 2 1 
420-1,  420-5  
(no infringement) 
1 0 0 0 
420-1  
(commitments) 
3 0 3 1 
420-1  
(no infringement) 
18 0 19 0 
420-2  
(infringement) 
7 0 2 0 
420-2, 102  
(infringement) 
7 0 0 4 
420-2, 102 
(commitments) 
7 0 0 1 
420-2, 102  
(no infringement) 
17 0 1 0 
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420-2,  420-5  
(no infringement) 
3 0 0 0 
420-2  
(commitments) 
11 0 3 0 
420-2  
(no infringement) 
46 0 9 1 
Total 212 6 113 29 
Table 5: Sources of investigations by decision reached for the cases concluded by the 
FCA (May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
5-2-4: Fines 
19
 
This section presents the fine imposed for the cases concluded in each year for the years 
under examination.20 The fine imposed represents the last stage for investigations where an 
infringement of competition law is found. It represents an important aspect of the FCA’s 
enforcement aspect and one of the most important aspects from the investigated parties’ point 
of view. In addition, fine imposed is an issue that motivates the investigated parties to appeal 
the FCA’s decision. Therefore, it is important to examine the fine imposed and to try to 
identify if the fine imposed is affected by other issues, or the other way around.   
In the cases where the FCA found infringements of competition law (whether at a national 
level or European level) the fine ranges from not imposing any financial penalties to more 
than €550 million.  This section discusses the fine imposed in each year and the number of 
cases concluded.21 However, it has to be noted that many of the infringement decisions have 
been appealed which means that the fine may have been amended by the court; this will be 
                                                          
19
 This section will only discuss fines imposed on a yearly basis; i.e. individual cases will not be discussed here, 
but will be discussed with the appeals in section 2.7.  
20
 See Nathalie Jalabert-Doury, ‘Competition Authority’s Upgraded Fining Policy in France — Who Will Be 
Next?’ (2011) Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report, 100 ATRR 674, 06/10/2011by the Bureau of National 
Affairs (examining critically the Notice of 16 May 2011 the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial 
Penalties and provides figures about the fines imposed between 2000-2004 and 2005- 2010, where the upper 
limit of imposing a financial penalty increased from 5% to 10%); see also, Bruno Lasserre, ‘Antitrust: A Good 
Deal for All in Times of Globalization and Recession’ 2011 7(1) Competition Policy International 245, 257-265 
(discussing fines in Europe with reference to the FCA). 
21
 Table 1 in the appendix provides the fine imposed in each case. 
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discussed later in section 5-2-7 below. Thus, the figures presented here are not final but it is 
worth examining this to assess how successful the FCA is in reaching its decisions.  
Graph 1 below presents the fine imposed in each year, from May 2004 to December 2012. 
From May 2004 to December 2004, the overall fine imposed around €24.5 million, where in 
this period the FCA concluded 19 cases. In 2005, the FCA found infringements of 
competition law in 27 cases; the overall fine imposed in these cases was around €734.7 
million. This is the highest amount of fine imposed in a single year in the whole sample; it 
has to be mentioned in this respect that the FCA imposed over €530 million in a single case.22 
In 2006, the overall amount of fine was around €128 million with 13 cases concluded. In 
2007, the FCA concluded 24 cases and imposed an overall fine of €219 million. The second 
highest fine in a year was imposed in 2008, the FCA imposed around €648 million when it 
concluded 15 cases. It is worth mentioning that the FCA imposed over €575 million in one 
case. 23 In 2009, the fine imposed drooped to €206.6 million when it found infringements of 
competition law on 15 occasions. In 2010, the FCA imposed around €387 million and 
concluded nine cases. 2011 saw six cases concluded and the FCA imposed around €389.7 
million. In 2012 the FCA imposed around 537 million when it found infringements of 
competition law in ten cases.  
It seems that the number of cases concluded does not play a role in the overall amount of fine 
imposed. For instance, in the years 2005 and 2008 where the fines imposed were the highest, 
nearly two-third of the fine imposed in each year was in a single case, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. As a general observation, it can be seen that the years 2010, 2011, 2012 
have seen a lower number of cases concluded, compared to some of the previous years under 
                                                          
22
 FCA decision 05-D-65, this case will be discussed more in the section about appeals.  
23
 FCA decision 08-D-32, this case will be discussed more in the section about appeals. 
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examination, but the overall amount of fine imposed in these years was higher.24 One may 
interpret this, that the FCA becomes more selective in its cases and focusing on cases where 
it may harm the economy more.  However, this is not a completely valid interpretation as the 
FCA, as stated earlier, has to investigate any case brought to it.  It has to be noted, however, 
that if one considers the cases where opened on the FCA’s own initiative and because of 
leniency applications, it can be noticed clearly that highest fines were imposed in these cases. 
In this respect one should give credit to the FCA for selecting those cases, as the FCA’s 
policy (leniency) or its own initiative has tackled the most harmful cases to the economy.  
 
Graph 1: fine imposed in each year for the cases concluded by the FCA  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
  
                                                          
24
 As it has been mentioned, in 2005 and 2008 there was a single in each year where the fine imposed constitute 
around two third of the overall amount of fine for the whole year.  
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5-2-5: Duration of investigations
25
 
After discussing the number of cases, the nature of the cases and the fine imposed for the 
cases concluded by the FCA. It is now important to talk about the time it took the FCA to 
produce these cases, i.e. the duration of investigations.  It is also important to assess what 
could affect the duration of investigations concluded by the FCA. It is worth examining if the 
there are certain issues that may affect the duration of investigations; for instance, does the 
nature of the case investigated affects the length of the investigation? Do the sources of the 
investigations affect the length of the investigation? Do the capabilities of the FCA affect the 
duration of the investigation (this will examined in the next section “capabilities of the 
FCA”)? Does the number of cases concluded in a given year affects the overall duration of 
that year? 
In this section, the decisions concluded by the FCA will be classified into three groups. 
Infringement decisions, non-infringements and commitments decisions, and interim measures 
decisions, because of the different nature and the time required to conclude each type of 
decision. The main reason behind this is that in non-infringement decision the FCA is not 
involved with issues of assessment of harm and calculating the fine. Also, in commitments 
decisions the FCA does not conduct a full investigation, it only conducts a preliminary 
assessment of the alleged infringements, if the parties offer commitments that remedy the 
FCA’s concerns,26 then the FCA will accept these commitments and closes the investigation. 
Also, the case of interim (emergency) measures decisions is different from both categories, 
which requires a quick action from the FCA, whether to order the measure or not.  
                                                          
25
 It has to be reminded that there are 26 decisions which have been classified as “other decisions” which are not 
considered here. 
26
 See, French Competition Authority, Notice on Competition Commitments of 2 March 2009. 
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5-2-5-1: Infringements decisions  
As it has been mentioned earlier, the FCA declared infringements of competition law in 138 
decisions. The average duration of investigations for all cases is 49.6 months. Table 6 below 
show the average duration of investigations in each year and the number of concluded cases 
for infringement decisions only.  
From May 2004 to December 2004, the FCA concluded 19 cases and the average duration for 
investigations was 44.6 months. It has to be reminded that the number of cases and the 
average duration of investigation do not represent the all of the cases concluded in 2004, as 
there were decisions concluded before May 2004 are not examined in the thesis. In 2005, the 
average duration of investigations increased to 66.5 months where the FCA concluded 27 
infringement decisions, the highest average duration of investigation in a single year for the 
whole sample. In 2006, the FCA concluded 13 cases and the average duration of 
investigations drooped down to 56.6 months. The year 2007 saw 24 cases declared as 
infringements, the average duration of investigations was 51 months. In 2008, average 
duration was 41.4 when the FCA concluded 15 cases. In 2009, the number of cases was the 
same as 2008, but the average duration of investigations increased to 48 months. In 2010, the 
number of cases concluded dropped to nine cases and the average duration fallen to 39.3 
months. In 2011, the number of infringement decisions dropped further to six cases and the 
average duration increased from 2010 to 44 months. In 2012, the number of infringement 
cases increased to ten cases and the average duration of investigations to 55.2 months. It has 
to be noted that in 2012, a case took around 110 months to be concluded by the FCA.27 If one 
                                                          
27
 FCA decision 12-D-23. 
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considers this case as an outlier, then average duration of investigations become 49.1 months, 
just below the overall average duration of cases.  
Year Average duration of investigations 
(in months)  
Number of cases  
2004 44.6 19 
2005 66.5 27 
2006 56.6 13 
2007 51 24 
2008 41.4 15 
2009 48 15 
2010 39.3 9 
2011 44 6 
2012 55.2 10 
Average duration for all cases 49.6 138 
Table 6: Average duration of investigations (infringement decisions only)  
May 2004- December 2012 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
 
5-2-5-2: Non- infringements and commitments
28
  
The FCA declared 167 cases as non-infringements and commitments. The duration of 
investigations ranges, in certain cases, from one month to over 130. The overall average 
duration for the non-infringements and commitments decisions is 37.5 months. From May 
2004 to December 2004, the FCA concluded 31 cases, the average duration of investigations 
was 50.8 months.29 In 2005, the average duration was 56.9 months where the FCA concluded 
34 cases. In 2006, the number of concluded cases drooped down to 19 cases, as with the 
average duration for investigations drooped to 45.5 months. 2007 saw 20 cases and the 
average duration fallen to 37.6, just above the overall average duration for the whole sample. 
In 2008, the FCA concluded ten cases; the average duration for these cases was 37.5 months. 
                                                          
28
 The following decisions are examined in this category: no need to proceed, non- infringements, and rejected 
complaints decisions.  
29
 The year 2004 is not a full year, as this chapter only examined from May 2004, therefore, the overall average 
for the year 2004 might be higher or lower.  
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In 2009, the average duration decreased to 26 months when the FCA closed 15 cases. The 
average duration of investigations increased to 35.5 months in 2010, the FCA concluded 14 
cases. In 2011, the FCA concluded nine cases and the average duration fallen to 19.8 months, 
the lowest average duration of investigations in a single year for the whole sample. In 2012, 
the average duration of investigations was 28 months when the FCA concluded 15 cases. 
Table 7 below presents the number and the average duration of investigations in each year, 
from May 2004 to December 2012.  
It can be observed that the number of cases concluded in a single year affects the average 
duration of the investigations concluded in that year. For instance, the year 2005 saw the 
highest number of cases concluded in a single year and it saw the highest average duration of 
investigations. In the same vein, the year 2011 saw the lowest number of cases concluded in a 
single and the lowest average duration of investigations in a single year in the whole sample. 
However, this cannot be taken as conclusive observation as other issues have to be taken into 
account, in order to know if the number of investigations concluded affects the duration of 
investigations. Further issues will be discussed later in the chapter which may help in 
understanding this issue and other issues.  
Year 
Average duration (Non & Commit) 
(in months) 
Number of Cases 
2004 50.8 31 
2005 56.9 34 
2006 45.5 19 
2007 37.6 20 
2008 37.5 10 
2009 26 15 
2010 35.5 14 
2011 19.8 9 
2012 28 15 
Average duration for all cases 37.5 167 
Table 7: Average duration of investigation (non-infringements and commitments 
decisions only) May 2004- December 2012 
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*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
5-2-5-3: Interim measure decisions (either request accepted or rejected) 
Interim or emergency measures decisions are by their nature have to be dealt with quickly by 
the FCA. This is why these decisions are dealt with separately. The FCA dealt with 52 cases 
and the average duration was 6 months. 
From May 2004 to December 2004, the FCA dealt with five cases where parties asked for 
interim measures, the average duration for these cases was 4 months. In 2005, the FCA 
concluded eight cases; the average duration of investigations was 3.6 months. In 2006, the 
average duration was 5.6 months where the FCA dealt with six requests. In 2007, the average 
duration was 4.8 months, the FCA concluded five cases. In 2008, the FCA closed eight cases; 
the average duration for these investigations was 5.2 months. In 2009, the number of cases 
increased to ten cases and the average duration increased to 10.7 months.  In 2010, the FCA 
concluded six cases; the average duration was 9.3 months. In 2011, the number of cases 
fallen to three cases, the average duration for these cases was 5.6 months. In 2012, the 
average duration was six months where the FCA concluded only one case. Table 8 shows the 
number and the average duration of investigations for interim measures cases.  
  
Year Average duration (interim measures) 
(in months) 
Number of cases 
2004 4 5 
2005 3.6 8 
2006 5.6 6 
2007 4.8 5 
2008 5.2 8 
2009 10.7 10 
2010 9.3 6 
2011 5.6 3 
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2012 6 1 
Average duration for all cases 6 52 
Table 8:  Average duration of investigation (interim or emergency measures decisions) 
(May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
5-2-6: Analysis about the outcomes of the FCA 
This section will provide some analysis from linking the finding reached in the previous 
sections, and to identify if there are any special characteristics with certain type of cases or if 
any of the variables discussed earlier has affect on the enforcement of the law.  
 
5-2-6-1: Ordinary procedures vs. Leniency and non-contest procedure  
The FCA has certain procedures to investigate and end cases. In ordinary procedures the FCA 
investigate its cases without co-operation from the undertakings involved.30 If there is a 
leniency application, then the FCA has information about the infringement and the leniency 
applicant (s) receives immunity from fines or reductions. In the non-contest procedure, the 
FCA opens an ordinary procedure and sends the statement of objections to the undertakings 
investigated. If the undertakings did not challenge the charges in the statement of objections 
and offers commitments to their future conduct. The FCA may accept these commitments on 
its own discretion, mostly to assess if the commitments would improve the future conduct of 
the undertaking (s) involved. If the FCA accepts the commitments then it may give 
reductions form the fine that it intends to impose. Such decisions are not appealable for the 
undertakings that entered the non-contest procedure. Therefore, it can be expected that 
duration of investigation for cases under leniency and non-contest procedure to be lower than 
in ordinary investigations.  
                                                          
30
 There are mitigating which may reduce the amount of fine, but these cases are considered as ordinary cases.  
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There were 14 cases which involved the non-contest procedure; the average duration for 
these investigations (49.2 months) was just below the overall average duration for all 
infringement decisions (49.6 months). Few decisions were opened because of leniency 
applications. Six cases were opened because of leniency application; the average duration for 
these cases (46.6 months) was below overall average duration. For ordinary procedures where 
118 decisions fall in this category, the average duration was over the overall average duration 
(52.9 months). Hence, it can be seen that decisions where leniency or non- contest procedure 
used, duration of investigations was shorter than in cases concluded under ordinary 
procedures and always below the overall duration of investigations.  
 
5-2-6-2: Anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance cases: any differences in 
the treatment? 
The FCA declared 138 as infringements of competition rules. There were 99 cases dealt with 
under Article L.420-1 and 101 EFTU (anti-competitive agreements), the average duration for 
these cases was 45.5 months, around four months below the overall duration. For L.420-2 and 
102, the average duration of investigations was 60.6 months, where 20 cases were concluded 
for the period under examination. When Article 101 and 102 where investigated in the same 
case, there were 19 cases, the average duration for these was 63.2 months, around 14 months 
higher than the overall average. It seems that anticompetitive agreements investigations are 
concluded much quicker than abuse of dominance investigations. Further, in investigations 
where an anticompetitive agreement and abuse of dominance were investigated, it would take 
the FCA more time to conclude its investigation.  
Also, it can be said that investigations that involves abuse of dominance and ‘abuse of 
dominance and anti-competitive agreement in the same investigation have raised the overall 
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average duration of investigations for infringement decisions, despite the fact that these 
investigations are less than a third of the overall number of the cases concluded.  
 
5-2-6-3: Amount of fine imposed vs. Duration of investigations 
In this section, cases will be classified into three categories. Cases where the fine was 
comparatively low (less than €1 million); cases where the fine was over €1 million and less 
than €50 million and; cases where the fine imposed was over €50 million.    
In the cases where the fine imposed was less than 1 million (78 cases), the average duration 
for these cases where around 47 months, two months below the overall average duration of 
investigations. For the cases where the fine was over €1 million and less than €50 million (50 
cases), the average duration was 59 months, twelve months above the overall average 
duration of investigations. For the cases where the fine imposed was over €50 million (10 
cases), the average duration 56.6 months, around 9 months above the average duration of 
investigations. It seems that the FCA does not give more attention when the infringement is 
more harmful to the economy and treats all cases in a similar way in terms of allocating 
resources. One may assume that in cases where the fine was low is simpler and that such 
undertakings do not have resources as in the cases where the fine imposed is higher and the 
undertaking are more capable of challenging the FCA’s charges than smaller undertakings.31   
Since the FCA is not giving special attention to cases where the fine is higher, then it took the 
FCA more time to conclude its cases where the fine is higher than €1 million.   
 
                                                          
31
 This is based on the assumption that the higher the fine the bigger is the undertakings involved, because fines 
are calculated on the basis of sales and the extent of the extent of the infringement and the annual turnover of the 
undertaking. See, FCA Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial Penalties.  
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5-2-6-4: Duration of investigations vs. Sources of investigations 
Table 9 below shows average duration for the investigations concluded by the source of the 
investigation. It can be seen from Table 9 that when a leniency application is the source of the 
investigation it would take the FCA less time than other sources. This may indicate that 
leniency program employed the FCA is effective in terms of reducing the duration of the 
investigation and has helped the FCA in finding infringement is a shorter period of time. It 
also seems that when cases are referred from ministries are supplied to the FCA with good 
evidence or with more information than other cases (or given more attention). Another 
possible reason for the shorter length of investigations for cases referred from ministries, 
because many of the sector inquiries and opinions issued by the FCA are usually referred to it 
by ministries which may have some relationship with the cases investigated. Cases opened on 
the FCA’s own initiative takes around four months above the overall average, despite the 
number of cases is lower compared to complaints and cases refereed from ministers. This 
may indicate that the FCA does not give extra attention to its ‘own cases’ and that it deals 
with cases equally. Cases opened because of complaints are the cases that took longer to be 
concluded. This is may be because of the high number of complaints that the FCA receives 
(including non-infringements), or it may mean that complaints are not supplied with enough 
information about the conduct that is to be investigated and that the FCA needs to collect 
more information about the conduct.  
 
complaint leniency Minister Own initiative Overall  
Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count  
57.46 41 46.67 6 47.06 73 54.94 18 49.6 
Table 9: Average duration of investigations for infringement decisions by the source of 
investigations form May 2004 to December 2012 (in months) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
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5-2-6-5: Are own initiative cases different than other cases? 
The FCA does not have too much control over cases that it can investigate, because it has to 
deal with complaints and referrals from ministries. It is important to examine own initiative 
cases to see how the FCA done with its limited discretion.  
The FCA’s own initiative was the source of investigation in 18 cases. In twelve cases, 
Articles L.420-1 and 101 EFTU were investigated and the FCA found infringements. The 
FCA found infringements of Articles L-420-2 and 102 EFTU, in three cases. In three cases, 
the FCA found infringements of Articles L.420-1, L.420-2, 101 and 102. Form the 
application of the law in these cases, it seems that the FCA is targeting cases which have 
wide dimension, i.e. most of the cases investigated on the FCA’s own initiative have affect on 
trade between member states and therefore, Articles 101 and 102 EFTU where applicable. 
Thus, it seems that the FCA is targeting cases of a wide geographical nature. Further, if one 
assumes that the size of the fine imposed reflects on the size of the infringement and its harm 
to consumers.32 The amount of fine imposed in over half the cases was over €7 million. Also, 
the second and the third highest fines imposed in the whole sample where imposed where the 
cases were investigated of the FCA’s own initiative. The success rate for ‘own initiative’ 
cases is good compared to the whole sample,33 where the FCA only lost one case on appeal 
and there were only slight reductions in the fine imposed.34 
 
 
                                                          
32
 This is a plausible assumption as fines are imposed on the amount of sales and the annual turnover of the 
undertaking.  
33
 The matters of appeals are discussed in detail, in section 5-2. 
34
 Two of the 18 cases are still pending on appeal.  
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5-2-7: Success rate on appeal 
35
 
The FCA’s decisions, with respect to antitrust enforcement, can be appealed to the Paris 
Court of Appeal (PCA), which can review the FCA’s decision both on points of law and 
facts. The final stage of appeal of the FCA decisions is to the Court of Cassation, which it can 
review the Paris Court of Appeal’s judgments only on points of law.36 This sub-section aims 
to review all of the cases concluded between May 2004 and December 2012 to examine if 
these cases have been appealed and if so what happened on appeal. Success rate on appeal 
has been used by some scholars in order to determine the quality of Competition Authorities’ 
decision making. This chapter will take this into account, however not as a determinative 
factor.37  
As it has been mentioned earlier, the FCA concluded 383 decisions; there were 138 
infringements decisions. From the 138 decisions, there were 14 cases which cannot be 
appealed; as the parties did not contest (settlements) the charges against them and the parties 
may offer future commitments regarding their future conduct, in return the FCA award a 
reduction in the fine that it intends to impose.38 In addition to the 14 cases where parties used 
the non-contest procedure; there were 46 cases were not appealed at all.39 Therefore, there 
were 78 decisions appealed to the Courts in France. Some of the recent decisions are still 
pending on appeal (ten cases). For the rest of the appealed cases (68 cases), a small number 
                                                          
35
 The last date which the author searched for appeals is 15 April 2013.  
36
 For a good overview of the Judicial review in French competition law; see, Nicolas Petit  and Louise Rabeux, 
‘Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation – A Post- Commission vs. Tetra Laval 
Assessment’ (2008), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1290143> . 
37
 This issue has been discussed in chapter 2.  
38
 This is procedure can be used for any competition law infringement whether it is anti-competitive agreement 
or abuse of dominance. The legal basis for this procedure is Article L. 464-2 III of the French Commercial 
Code. French Competition Authority decisions: 05-D-49; 07-D-02; 07-D-21; 07-D-26; 07-D-33; 07-D-40; 08-
D-13; 08-D-20; 08-D-28; 09-D-24; 09-D-31; 11-D-07;  12-D-06;  12-D-27.  
39
French Competition Authority decisions:  04-D-21; 04-D-30; 04-D-42; 04-D-43; 04-D-49; 04-D-50; 04-D-56; 
04-D-65; 04-D-74; 04-D-75; 05-D-03; 05-D-07; 05-D-10; 05-D-14; 05-D-27; 05-D-44; 05-D-45; 05-D-47; 05-
D-55; 05-D-63; 06-D-22; 06-D-25; 06-D-30; 06-D-36; 07-D-03; 07-D-04; 07-D-06; 07-D-24; 07-D-25; 07-D-
44; ; 08-D-03; 08-D-15; 08-D-22; 08-D-23; 08-D-29; 09-D-04; 09-D-17; 09-D-39; 10-D-03; 10-D-05; 10-D-10; 
10-D-11; 10-D-15; 10-D-22; 11-D-01; 12-D-26.  
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of cases were lost by the FCA entirely. Nearly half of the cases appealed were upheld entirely 
by the Courts, and the rest of the cases were partly upheld, i.e. the fine was reduced or the 
FCA decision was annulled with respect to some parties and upheld with regard to the others.  
This section classifies appealed decisions into four main categories: (i) Upheld the decision: 
The Court upheld the FCA’s decision both on liability and fine. (ii) Largely upheld the 
decision: the court upheld the FCA’s with respect to liability but reduce the fine imposed. (iii) 
Partly upheld the decision: annual the FCA’s decisions with respect to some parties on 
liability and fines, and upheld the decisions on liability or fine for others. (iv) Annulling the 
decision: annulling the FCA’s decision entirely. (v) Upheld or largely or partly upheld/ 
pending: the PAC has ruled on this and the decision is still pending on appeal before the 
Court of Cassation.    
From the 138 infringement decisions there were 78 appealed to the Courts in France. 37 out 
the 78 cases were fully upheld by the Courts and confirmed the FCA’s findings with regard to 
liability and fine (Upheld).40 In 12 cases the Courts upheld the FCA’s findings with regard to 
legibility but reduced the fine imposed (Largely Upheld).41 In eleven out of the 78 cases, the 
French Courts annulled the FCA’s findings regarding liability and fine to some parties and 
upheld the FCA’s findings to other parties (Partly Upheld).42 There were four cases where the 
Courts annulled the FCA’s finding entirely and declaring that there is no infringement (s) of 
competition law.43 In two cases, the PCA upheld the FCA’s finding entirely but still pending 
                                                          
40
 French Competition Authority decisions: 04-D-25; 04-D-26; 04-D-32; 04-D-37 ; 04-D-39; 04-D-70; 04-D-78; 
5-D-58; 05-D-59; 05-D-64; 05-D-69; 05-D-70; 06-D-09; 06-D-37; 07-D-05; 07-D-16; 07-D-28; 07-D-29; 07-D-
41; 07-D-48; 07-D-49; 08-D-09; 08-D-25; 08-D-30; 08-D-33; 09-D-03; 09-D-05; 09-D-06; 09-D-07; 09-D-10; 
09-D-14; 09-D-34; 10-D-04   
41
 French Competition Authority decisions: 05-D-43; 05-D-65; 06-D-13; 06-D-15; 07-D-15; 07-D-50; 08-D-12; 
08-D-32; 09-D-19; 09-D-36; 10-D-13  
42
 French Competition Authority decisions: 05-D-19; 05-D-26; 05-D-32; 05-D-67; 05-D-75;  06-D-07; 07-D-01; 
07-D-08; 07-D-47; 09-D- 
43
 French Competition Authority decisions: 04-D-48; 07-D-09;  08-D-06 
206 
 
in front of the Court of Cassation (Upheld/pending).44 In two cases, the PCA largely upheld 
the FCA’s finding but it has reduced the fine slightly, this case is still pending in front of the 
Court of Cassation (Largely upheld/pending).45 There are ten cases which are pending on 
appeal.46  
Therefore, if one calculates the success rate on appeal for the FCA and assumes that 
whenever the FCA was right in finding an infringement of competition law and such a 
decision stands, i.e. being upheld on appeal, then such cases are considered as successful 
cases. Such an assumption is made because the FCA was right in spotting an infringement of 
competition law. Hence, the success rate on appeal is 53.5%. This percentage represents 
cases which have Upheld, Largely Upheld, Partly upheld and cases which are not appealable 
(Non-contest procedure). If one added the cases in which are not appealed, then the success 
rate become 86.8%.  
Upheld 
Largely 
Upheld 
Partly 
upheld 
Annulme
nt 
Non- 
contest 
procedure 
Not 
appealed 
Pending 
Upheld/ 
pending 
Largely 
Upheld 
/pending 
37 cases 
(26.8%) 
12 cases 
(8.7 %) 
11 cases 
(7.9%) 
4 cases 
(2.9%) 
14 cases 
(10.1%) 
46 cases 
(33.3%) 
10 cases 
(7.2 %) 
2 cases 
(1.4 %) 
2 cases 
(1.4 % ) 
Table 10: Number and percentage of infringement decisions, whether appealed or not 
between May 2004 to December 2012 
 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
In what follows a brief description of a selection of the appealed cases will be given, 
followed by some observations gleaned from the discussion. The appealed cases will be 
discussed in three categories according to the fine that has been imposed by the FCA. First, 
cases where the fine imposed was over €50 million. Second, cases where the fine imposed 
                                                          
44
 French Competition Authority decisions: 06-D-04; 06-D-08. 
45
 French Competition Authority decision 11-D-02. 
46
 French Competition Authority decisions: 11-D-13; 11-D-17; 11-D-19; 12-D-02; 12-D-08; 12-D-09; 12-D-10; 
12-D-23; 12-D-24; 12-D-25. 
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was less than €50 and over €1 million. Third, cases where the fine imposed was less than €1 
million.47 
 
5-2-7-1: Cases where the fine imposed was over €50 million48  
In 08-D-32, the FCA imposed over €575 million for a cartel in the steel industry. Seven of 
the convicted undertakings appealed the FCA decision to the PCA. The Court upheld the 
FCA’s findings on liability but reduced the fines substantially.49 The overall fine after appeal 
become around €73 million.50 This case represents the highest reduction in fines on appeal in 
the whole sample, where the reductions amounted to nearly 90% of the original fine imposed 
by the FCA. This decision was not appealed to the Court of Cassation.  
As a matter of fact, this is a very surprising outcome, because this case was investigated as a 
result of a leniency application from one of the cartelists. Importantly, there are some parties 
who did not contest the charges by the FCA and been rewarded reductions in fines (for those 
who did not challenge the FCA, the decision in not appealed). Therefore,  the FCA has had a 
very good evidence and information about the extent of the infringement. Despite this, the 
FCA did not deal well with the case when determining the fine, which resulted in huge 
reductions from the fine imposed by the FCA at the end of its investigations.  
In 2005, the second highest fine was imposed for anti-competitive agreements in the mobile 
telephony market.51 The FCA imposed a fine of €534 million on the main mobile operators in 
France. 52  
                                                          
47
 Table 1, in the appendix, presents all infringement decisions and shows whether it has been appealed and the 
outcome and the amount of fine after appeal. Table 2, in the appendix, presents all  non- infringement and 
commitments  decisions and shows whether it has been appealed and the outcome of the cases after appeal 
48
 All of the cases in this category were appealed (10 cases). 
49
 Paris Court of Appeal Judgment of 19 January 2010. 
50
 The PCA judgment was not appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
51
 05-D-65. 
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The appeal process in this case is a unique one. The FAC’s decision was appealed to the 
PCA, where it rejected the appeal and confirmed the FCA.53 The PCA’s judgement was 
appealed to the Court of Cassation, where the Court partially reversed the judgment and sent 
it back to the PCA.54 The PCA insisted on its previous stand and rejected and upheld the case 
as it has concluded by the FCA.55 The judgment was appealed again to the Court of 
Cassation, again it partially reserved the decision and ordered to be sent back to the PCA.56 
The PCA insisted on the rightness of its judgment (and the FCA’s conclusion).57 In the end, 
in May 2012, the Court of Cassation upheld the PCA judgment.58   
There were three cases, dealt with under Article L.420-2 and 102 (Abuse of dominance 
cases), where the fine imposed was over €50 million. In 2005,59 the FCA imposed €80 
million on France Télécom for abusing its dominant position in the wholesale market for 
broadband internet access. The PCA and the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeals 
brought by the defendant.
60
  
In 2012, the FCA concluded two abuse of dominance cases and fined the undertakings 
involved over 183
61
 million and 60
62
, respectively. Both decisions are pending on appeal in 
front of the PCA.  
In 2010, the PCA reduced the fine imposed in the 09-D-36 case, because of the dimension of 
the infringement. The FCA fined Orange Caraïbe and France Telecom around €63 million  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
52
 For an interesting analysis on this case; see Louis De Mesnard ,‘Is the French Mobile Phone Cartel Really a 
Cartel?’ (2009) 122 (2) International Journal of Production Economics 663. 
53
 PCA Judgment of 16 December 2006. 
54
 Court of Cassation Judgment of 29 June 2007. 
55
 PCA judgment of 11 March 2009. 
56
 Court of Cassation Judgment of 7 April 2010. 
57
 PCA judgment of 30 June 2011. 
58
 Court of Cassation Judgment of 30 May 2012. 
59
 FCA 05-D-59 
60
 PCA judgment of 4 July 2006; and Court of Cassation Judgment of 23 October 2007. 
61
 FCA 12-D-24.   
62
 FCA 12-D-25. 
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 for implementing anticompetitive practices on the mobile telephony, or fixed telephony 
(calls to mobiles), market in the West Indies-Guyana zone. Their conduct, on the view of the 
FCA, breached Articles L. 420-1, L. 420-2, 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU. On appeal, the PCA 
upheld most of the findings of the FCA apart from the dimension of the infringement. The 
PCA stated that Articles 101 and 102 are not applicable for the infringements in question and 
that European competition rules are not applicable in this case.63 As a result, the PCA reduced 
the fine imposed to around €35 million. The PCA judgment was appealed to the Court of 
Cassation, where it upheld the PCA.64  
 
5-2-7-2: Cases where the fine imposed was between €1 and €50 million  
There are 50 cases in this category, 36 decisions where appealed. Starting with the cases 
where the Court annulled the FCA decision or there were high reductions in fines. In 04-D-
48, under Article L.420-2 and 102, the FCA imposes €20 million fine on France Telecom and 
SFR Group Cegetel for abusing their dominant position. The PCA quashed the FCA’s 
decision entirely.65 The PCA judgment was appealed to the Court of Cassation where it 
upheld the PCA judgment in quashing the FCA’s decision.66 In another case under Article 
l.420-2 and 102, the PCA completely annulled the FCA decision.67 In this case the FCA 
imposed 10 million on GlaxoSmithKline for hindered the entry of certain generic drugs to 
hospitals.68 The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal brought to it and confirmed the PCA 
judgment.69 
                                                          
63
 PCA judgment of 23 September 2010. 
64
 Court of Cassation judgment of 31 July 2012. 
65
 PCA judgment of 27 January 2011. 
66
 Court of Cassation 17 January 2012. 
67
 PCA judgment of 8 April 2008. 
68
 FCA 07-D-09. 
69
PCA judgment of 17 March 2009. 
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In 08-D-12, the FCA opened an investigation, under L. 420-1, after receiving a leniency 
application from one of the cartelists. The FCA punished six plywood manufacturers for anti-
competitive agreement on prices by imposing over €8 million. On appeal, the PAC upheld the 
FCA’s finding with regard liability but reduced the fine imposed to around €5.5 million.70 
The PAC judgment was confirmed by the Court of Cassation.71  
In 11-D-02, the FCA found 14 companies infringing Article L.420-1, by sharing almost all 
public markets for the restoration of historic monuments in three French regions. The PCA 
reduced the fine imposed by the FCA, from around €9.8 million to around €9.2 million.72 The 
PCA judgment was appealed to the Court of Cassation, where it is still pending.  
 
5-2-7-3: Cases where the fine imposed was less than 1 million 
This is the largest category in terms of the number of cases; but as a percentage of the number 
of cases that was appealed it has the smallest percentage of appealed cases, over 50% of the 
cases were not appealed.73  
In 06-D-13, the FCA imposed €718 thousand for a breach of L.420-1 on two undertakings in 
the construction industry. On appeal the PCA reduced the fine imposed to €508 thousand.74 
The PCA judgment was not appealed.  
In 07-D-01, the FCA fined three undertakings for a breach of Article L. 420-1 around €944 
thousand. Two undertakings appealed the decision to PCA, where it ruled in their favour and 
annulled the FCA’s decision for the undertakings who appealed the decision.75 The overall 
                                                          
70
 PCA Judgment of 29 September 2009. 
71
 Court of Cassation of 15 March 2011. 
72
 PCA judgement of 11 October 2012. 
73
  46 cases out 78 cases were not appealed, whether because of settlements or because the cases where not 
appealed.  
74
 PCA judgment of 25 September 2007. 
75
 PCA judgment of 15 January 2008. 
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fine after appeal becomes €12 thousand, because an undertaking did not appeal the FCA 
decision. The PCA decision was confirmed by the Court of Cassation.76 
In 08-D-06, the FCA imposed €814 thousand on seven physicians' unions for conspiring to 
increase fees for patient visits, a breach of Article L.420-1.77 The PCA annulled the FCA’s 
decision entirely.78  The PCA judgment was confirmed by the Court of Cassation.79  
In 09-D-19, the FCA imposed around €618 thousand on 19 removal companies that had 
colluded in order to produce fake estimate, an infringement of Article L.420-1. The FCA’s 
decision was appealed80 to the PCA. The PCA upheld the FCA’s findings with respect to 
liability but reduced the fine slightly for two undertakings. The fine after appeal reduced to 
around €518 thousand.81 The PCA judgment was not appealed.  
 
5-2-7-4: Observations and analysis 
It can be noted that when the fine is high, the likelihood of appealing the FCA’s decision is 
higher. Whereas, when the fine is comparatively low the possibility of appealing a decision is 
much lower. To illustrate this, if one looks at the cases where the fine was over €50 million, 
all of the cases were appealed; whereas, when the fine was less than €1 million, around 60% 
of the cases were not appealed at all. This may have two explanations. First, in the cases 
where the fine was high, the undertakings are capable of challenging the FCA’s decision 
because they have enough resources. In addition, when the fine is high, the undertakings are 
more willing to take the risk and incur litigation costs because the fine is high already. 
Second, in cases where the fine is low, the undertakings involved may not have the resources 
                                                          
76
 Court of Cassation Judgment of 16 December 2008. 
77
 FCA 08-D-06.  
78
 PCA judgment of 18 March 2009. 
79
 Court of Cassation judgment of 7 April 2010. 
80
 Some of the other parties have settled their case with the FCA; therefore, they cannot appeal the decision.  
Other undertakings did not appeal the decision. 
81
 PCA judgment of 9 May 2010. 
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to challenge the FCA decision; or that the cost of litigation is high and it is not worth 
challenging the decision and taking the risk of incurring the litigation costs.  
Another issue that is worth highlighting is the case of settlement procedure where the FCA 
award undertakings up to 25 %82 reduction in fine for those who settle their cases with the 
FCA. In other words, the difference between the fine imposed pre and post appeals will be 
calculated. This will be compared to the reductions in fines given because of the settlement 
procedure. Graph 2 below shows the fine imposed pre and post appeal in each year.  
In the years 2011 and 2012, there are three and seven cases still on pending on appeal, 
respectively. Therefore, they are not included in the calculations. For the cases concluded 
between May 2004 and December 2004, the reductions in fines as a result of appeals 
amounted to around 82%. In 2005, the reduction in fines as a result of the appeals was around 
5%. In 2006, the reductions of fines were around 29% of the fine before appeal. In 2007, the 
Courts in France reduced the fines by 11%. The fines imposed in 2008 saw the highest 
reductions in fines which amounted to around 88%. In 2009, the reductions in fine were 
around 14%. The fines imposed by the FCA remain the same post appeal. If one calculates 
the reductions of fines as a result of appeals for the whole sample, then the reductions 
amounted around 33% of the fine before appeal.    
Hence, it seems that the settlement procedure is a successful tool available to the FCA. This 
is because, the amount of reductions awarded as result of entering into a settlement is lower 
than the average reductions because of appeals, assuming that the FCA gives highest 
reduction.83 In addition, the FCA benefits from the shorter length of investigations, as shown 
in section 5-2-5 earlier. Furthermore, if the undertaking who settle with the FCA offer 
commitments to their future conduct; the FCA will have the opportunity to monitor the 
                                                          
82
 For example, in the FCA decision 07-D-33, France Telecom did not contest the facts charged against it and 
offered commitments regarding its future conduct; the fine was reduced by 25%. 
83
 The FCA awards a 25% reduction only in the cases where the undertakings settle with the FCA and offer 
commitments to their future conduct. This issue is explained more in section 5-5.  
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conduct of the undertakings and, hence the possibility of compliance with the law is 
increased.84  
 
 
Graph 2: fine imposed per and post appeal for the decisions concluded by the FCA 
(May 2004 – December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations   
 
5-2-7-5: Non-infringements and commitments decisions (including request for 
measures)  
Out of the 219 non- infringements and the commitment decisions concluded by the FCA, 
there were 36 decisions appealed. In 26 cases, the FCA decisions were upheld by PCA and 
Court of Cassation.85 In six cases the Courts annulled the FCA decisions.86 There are four 
                                                          
84
 If the undertakings offer commitments to their future conduct, the FCA has the right to monitor the 
compliance with the commitments offered. If the undertakings fail to comply with the commitments, the FCA 
can impose penalties on them. See Article L.464-2 of the Commercial Code.  
85
 French Competition Authority decisions: 04-D-40; 04-D-45; 04-D-60; 05-D-05; 05-D-13; 05-D-20; 05-D-42; 
05-D-50; 05-D-60; 05-D-68; 05-D-72; 06-D-17; 06-D-24; 06-D-29; 07-D-18; 07-D-23; 07-D-27; 07-D-37; 08-
D-05; 08-D-08; 08-D-16; 09-D-16; 09-D-26; 10-D-14; 10-D-23; 10-D-24. 
86
 French Competition Authority decisions: 04-D-76; 04-D-79; 06-D-12; 07-D-22; 07-D-45; 07-D-46.  
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cases pending on appeal.87 The majority of the cases (182) were not appealed at all.88 Table 
11 below shows the outcome of non-infringement and commitments decisions.  
Upheld Annulment Pending Not appealed 
26 6 4 182 
Table 11: outcome of the non-infringements and commitments decisions concluded by 
the FCA (May 2004- December 2012) 
*Source: Author’s own research and calculations  
 
5-3: Non-enforcement activities  
Most of the CAs around the world besides conducting enforcement activities and enforcing 
competition provisions, they conduct non-enforcement activities that have many objectives to 
achieve. Non-enforcement activities might be used to test markets or sector to check the 
competiveness of these markets. In France the FCA conducts the so called ‘sector inquires’ in 
order to check if competition distorted in the investigated markets. In addition, the FCA, 
issues opinions, on its own initiative or based on requests from ministries or courts, on 
specific issues. Furthermore, the FCA may issue opinions on legislations as well. In addition, 
non-enforcement may be designed in order to raise awareness of the consequences of 
breaching competition law (e.g. compliance programs). Additionally, non-enforcement 
                                                          
87
 French Competition Authority decisions: 11-D-18; 12-D-11; 12-D-18; 12-D-21. 
88
 French Competition Authority decisions: 04-D-16; 04-D-17; 04-D-20; 04-D-22; 04-D-23; 04-D-27; 04-D-28; 
04-D-29; 04-D-33; 04-D-35; 04-D-36; 04-D-38; 04-D-41; 04-D-46; 04-D-51; 04-D-53; 04-D-54; 04-D-55; 04-
D-57; 04-D-58; 04-D-61; 04-D-63; 04-D-64; 04-D-66; 04-D-67; 04-D-68; 04-D-69; 04-D-71; 04-D-72; 04-D-
73;04-D-77; 05-D-04; 05-D-06; 05-D-11; 05-D-12; 05-D-15; 05-D-16; 05-D-18; 05-D-21; 05-D-22; 05-D-23; 
05-D-24; 05-D-25; 05-D-28; 05-D-29; 05-D-30; 05-D-31; 05-D-33; 05-D-34; 05-D-35; 05-D-39; 05-D-40; 05-
D-41; 05-D-46; 05-D-48; 05-D-52; 05-D-53; 05-D-54; 05-D-56; 05-D-57; 05-D-61; 05-D-62; 05-D-73; 05-D-
74; 06-D-01; 06-D-02; 06-D-05; 06-D-10; 06-D-11; 06-D-14; 06-D-16; 06-D-18; 06-D-19; 06-D-20; 06-D-21; 
06-D-23; 06-D-26; 06-D-27; 06-D-28; 06-D-31; 06-D-33; 06-D-34; 06-D-35; 06-D-39; 06-D-40; 07-D-07; 07-
D-10; 07-D-11; 07-D-12; 07-D-13; 07-D-14; 07-D-17; 07-D-20; 07-D-30; 07-D- 31; 07-D-32; 07-D-34; 07-D-
36; 07-D-38; 07-D-39; 07-D-42; 07-D-43; 08-D-01; 08-D-02; 08-D-04; 08-D-10; 08-D-11; 08-D-14; 08-D-17; 
08-D-18; 08-D-19; 08-D-21; 08-D-31; 08-D-24; 08-D-26; 08-D-27; 08-D-34; 09-D-01; 09-D-02; 09-D-08; 09-
D-09; 09-D-11; 09-D-12; 09-D-13; 09-D-15; 09-D-18; 09-D-20; 09-D-21; 09-D-22; 09-D-23; 09-D-27; 09-D-
28; 09-D-29; 09-D-30; 09-D-32; 09-D-33; 09-D-35; 09-D-37; 09-D-38; 09-D-40; 10-D-01; 10-D-02; 10-D-06; 
10-D-07; 10-D-08; 10-D-09; 10-D-12; 10-D-16; 10-D-17; 10-D-18; 10-D-19; 10-D-20; 10-D-25; 10-D-26; 10-
D-27; 10-D-29; 10-D-30; 11-D-03; 11-D-04; 11-D-05; 11-D-06; 11-D-08; 11-D-09; 11-D-11; 11-D-14; 11-D-
15; 11-D-16; 11-D-20; 12-D-01; 12-D-03; 12-D-04; 12-D-07; 12-D-13; 12-D-14; 12-D-16; 12-D-17; 12-D-19; 
12-D-20; 12-D-22; 12-D-28; 12-D-29. 
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activities might be used to highlight the benefits of competitive markets and its role on 
consumer welfare. Another role of non-enforcement activities is that CAs issue guidance 
documents in order to clarify the law and how the law will be applied by the FCA (e.g. fining 
guidelines).  Table 12 below lists the sector inquires and opinions concluded by the FCA 
between May 2004 and December 2012. Table 13 presents the studies, guidelines (procedural 
notices) or any other form of studies issued by the FCA between May 2004 and December 
2012.   
Non-enforcement activities of the FCA seems to be more focused on problems of markets 
rather than trying to help business and consumers on the application and the boundaries of 
French competition law. For example, there is nearly nothing about educating business or 
consumers about competition law. Also, there is a lack of guidance documents (guidelines) 
on legislation. Furthermore, there is a lack of work on reviewing the FCA’s own work and 
the benefits to consumers as a result of the application of competition law. Also, most of the 
opinions issued by the FCA are very specific, it would be better to have fewer opinions on 
certain matters and to issue general and more comprehensive opinions. But, this is possibly 
because most opinions are issued based on references from ministries, courts or regulators. 
Hence, many of these references are specific in their nature and ask for specific answers from 
the FCA.  Thus, the number of opinions is high and their extent is very narrow.  
Hence, it seems that there is no balance in the non-enforcement activities of the FCA. Most of 
the FCA efforts are focused on markets, rather than educating business or consumers about 
competition law and its boundaries. However, it has to stated that is possibly because that the 
FCA is the only body that can enforce competition in France and that it is required to respond 
to referrals from other bodies in France about competition matters.  
Year Sector inquires and opinions  (concluded) 
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2004 
 July 2004: opinion concerning the draft decree on the sale of broadcasting rights for sporting 
competitions  
 July 2004: opinion requested by Telecommunications Regulation Authority on France 
Télécom's standard "Département Innovant" convention. 
 October 2004: Opinion on Landline to mobile calls.  
 October 2004: opinion on the state of competition in the non-specialist large-scale retail 
sector. 
 October 2004: opinion concerned the conditions in which France Télécom exercises the two 
activities of access operator on the one hand, and installation-integration of 
telecommunications systems on the other hand.   
2005 
 February 2005: opinion on the broadband internet market requested by the 
Telecommunications Regulation Authority. 
 February 2005: opinion requested by the Telecommunications Regulation Authority on the 
development of Voice over Broadband (VoB) offers and the potential distortion of 
competition.  
 April 2005: opinion on Universal banking services and competition rules. 
 April 2005: Opinion advices the regulator to intervene to prevent the risk of insufficient 
competition on the wholesale mobile telephony market. 
 May 2005: Opinion on Markets for geographic call termination on alternative landline 
networks. 
 July 2005: opinion on the conditions for ensuring fair competition during the transitional 
period leading up to the introduction of a single numbering format for all the directory 
assistance numbers which can be dialled up from a telephone. 
 December 2005: opinion on Motorway Privatisation.  
 December 2005: opinion on Electricity purchases by intensive industrial users.  
2006 
 January 2006: opinion on the regulation of the audiovisual broadcasting market. 
 March 2006: the wholesale market for SMS calls termination on mobile networks. 
 March 2006: the fair trade business in France. 
 November 2006: opinion on Broadband Internet.  
2007 
 February 2007: Call termination on mobile networks in the French Guiana and West Indies.  
 June 2007: Quality label farm and food industry.  
 June 2007: Wholesale market for voice calls termination on mobile networks.  
 July 2007: Marketing of sporting events broadcasting rights. 
 October 2007: Opinion relative to the legislation on commercial facilities. 
 November 2007 Opinion concerning the draft decree amending decree2004-699, relative to 
the marketing of competition or sporting events audiovisual rights by professional leagues 
 
2008 
 April 2008: Premium Telephone Services.  
 May 2008: opinion on the economic organisation of fruit and vegetable processing industry.  
 June 2008: Deployment of the very high speed fibre optic network.  
 June 2008: Wholesale market for high speed and very high speed. 
 June 2008: Fixed telephony markets.  
 July 2008: Public and private cinemas. 
 July 2008: Mobile telephony / mobile virtual network operators. 
 
2009 
 February 2009: Three opinions on Payment timeframes. 
 March 2009: two opinions Payment timeframes.  
 April 2009: Payment timeframes in the book sector. 
 April 2009: opinion regarding Wholesale audiovisual broadcasting services market. 
 May 2009: Five Opinions Payment timeframes.  
 June 2009: Opinion on Fuel prices in the overseas departments.  
 July 2009: Opinion on TV content access exclusivity offers by Internet service providers.  
 July 2009: Public transportation of travellers by river shuttles on the Seine.  
 September 2009: Maritime freight and mass retail distribution in the overseas departments. 
 September 2009: Deployment of very high-speed optical fibre networks. 
 September 2009: Networks approved by supplementary health institutions. 
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 October 2009: Borrower's insurance. 
 November 2009: What regulation to end the crisis in the dairy sector? 
 November 2009: The role of train stations and competition in transportation.  
2010 
 January 2010: opinion regarding digital books. 
 February 2010: opinion relative to the digital equipping of cinemas.  
 February 2010: Opinion on Competition and regulation of airport activities (that could arise 
from the possible privatization of French airports). 
 April 2010: Opinion on High and very high speed Internet access coverage. 
 May 2010: Opinion relative to the introduction of a lawyer's countersignature for private 
documents. 
 May 2010: Opinion on the new organisation of the electricity market.  
 June 2010: Convergence between fixed-line and mobile telecoms.  
 June 2010: National “ultrafast broadband” programme 
 July 2010: Opinion on the wholesale markets for voice calls termination on mobile networks 
in mainland and overseas. 
 September 2010: Deployment of optical fibre networks in moderately dense areas (on a draft 
decision by the Telecommunications and posts Regulator. 
 September 2010: Opinion on the effects on competition rules of the exceptional legal 
provisions concerning the project of the realization of the public transport network of the 
Greater Paris. 
 December 2010: Opinion on the category management between suppliers and retailers in the 
mass retail distribution for food products sector. 
 December 2010: Sector inquiry on retail in the food sector. 
 December 2010: Sector inquiry on online advertising.  
 
2011 
 January 2011: opinion on online betting and gambling. 
 February 2011: opinion on the first inter-branch agreement concluded within the ovine sector. 
 March 2011: Opinion on Broadband and next generation access networks. 
 June 2011: Opinion on Wholesale broadband market in the Antilles (French West Indies).  
 July 2011: Social tariff for broadband Internet access. 
 July 2011: Price volatility for agricultural raw materials. 
 October 2011: Two opinions concerning new entrants accessing passenger railway stations.  
 December 2011: Mobile telephony market: arrival of Free Mobile and full MVNOs.  
 December 2011: Installation of relay masts Mobile telephony. 
2012 
 October 2012: Sector inquiry into car repair and maintenance. 
 October 2012: published two reports, one of them relating to the mechanisms for importing 
and distributing consumer goods and the other relating to strengthening the competition 
control bodies of New Caledonia. 
 September 2012: sector inquiry into e-commerce. 
 August 2012: Opinion offered to The French energy regulatory commission regarding the 
electricity Market.  
 July 2012: Opinion on the Distribution of medicinal products. 
 July 2012: opinion on the involvement of Producer Responsibility Organisations (PROs) in 
the waste management and materials recycling sector. 
 March 2012: opinion regarding the effects on competition of the exclusive sale by dental 
surgeons of dental prostheses. 
 March 2012: opinion about a draft decree relating to the establishment of an automatic 
procedure for the granting of social tariffs of gas and electricity. 
 February 2012: opinion concerning maritime services to Corsica. 
 January 2012: Opinion on the roll-out of very high speed broadband via "integrated projects”.  
 January 2012: Opinion on the food retail sector in Paris 
Table 12: Sector inquires and opinions issued by the FCA between May 2004 and 
December 2012 
*Source: Author’s own research  
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Year  Document 
2004  
2005  
2006 
 September 2006: Class action in the field of competition. (response to the European 
Commission consultation on this topic)  
2007 
 April 2007: Adoption of a procedural notice relative to the revised French leniency 
programme 
2008  April 2008: Procedural Notice on commitments decisions 
2009 
 November 2009: Opinion on the Review of EC Regulation 2790/99 and of the European 
guidelines on vertical restraints  
2010  
2011  
2012 
 February 2012: Corporate compliance programmes. 
 February 2012: the settlement procedure in antitrust cases 
 November 2012: Brochure about the French leniency programme. 
Table 13: Documents, studies, guidelines issued by the FCA between  
May 2004 and December 2012 
*Source: Author’s own research  
 
5-4: Capabilities of the FCA  
After considering the FCA’s outcomes in terms of enforcement and non-enforcement 
activities; it worth investigating under which circumstance the FCA produced these activities. 
In other words, examining how the budget was allocated and the number of staff and experts 
in the FCA for the years under scrutiny. Such an examination, alongside the activities of the 
FCA, may provide how the budget and the staff of the FCA may affect the outcomes and 
their quality. However, a better understanding can be achieved when comparing the whole 
activities’ and the capabilities’ of the FCA to other CAs, which will be done later in the 
thesis. The data for this section have obtained from the Global Competition Review 
publications on ‘Rating Enforcement’. 
 
5-4-1: Number of staff and Specialists 
The number of staff and specialists may affect, at least in theory, the quality of decision 
making and the duration of investigations. However, one should bear in mind that the 
procedures and legislations may affect the duration of investigations; also it depends on the 
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other activities concluded by the FCA. In addition, the nature of the investigations concluded 
may affect the duration and it may affect the possibility of winning cases on appeal. Having 
said that, the increase in the number of staff and the number of experts in the FCA may play a 
role in reducing duration of investigations and may increases the possibility of winning cases 
on appeal (bearing in mind the budget of the FCA).  
Table 14 below shows the overall number of staff, lawyers and economists in the FCA from 
2004 to 2011.89 It can be observed from Table 14 that the number of staff and specialists 
(lawyers and economists) is increasing over the years. The increase in the number of staff is 
very rapid where it can be seen that the number of staff in 2011 is three times more than it 
was in 2004. It can also be seen that there is an increase in the number of economists at the 
FCA, however, as a percentage it seems that the number of economists is not increasing and 
it is fairly the same. It can also be noted that number of lawyers, in any given year, is over the 
half of the overall number of the FCA staff.  It can also be noted from Table 14 that there is 
an increase in the number of senior economists (those with PhD degrees). This may indicate 
that the FCA is more willing to employ economic analysis in its work. Also the number of 
specialists may be as a response to the increase employment of the effects based approach in 
the Commission’s work.90 
Year Number of staff Lawyers Economists PhDs in Eco other 
2004 50 33 (66%) 17 (34%) 
  
2005 53 34 (64%) 19 (36%) 6 
 
2006 130 73 (56%) 26 (20%) 9 31 (24%) 
2007 129 71 (55%) 28 (22%) 9 29 (23%) 
2008 158 95 (60%) 41 ( 26% 14 22 (14%) 
                                                          
89
 At the time of writing this chapter, the GCR publications for the year 2012 is not published yet.  
90
 Although, the FCA has been criticised for not embracing an effect based approach towards abuse of 
dominance cases. see Louis Vogel and Joseph Vogel, ‘Abuse of dominance under French Law: Desirable 
Evolutions’ The European Antitrust Review (2013) 59, 61 
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2009 190 108 (57%) 53 (28%) 14 28 (15%) 
2010 187 94 (50%) 50 (27%) 13 41 (22%) 
2011 200 104 (52%) 50 (25%) 12 26 (23%) 
Table 14: number of staff and specialists at the FCA (2004- 2011) 
*Source: Global Competition Review publications on ‘Rating enforcement’91  
 
5-4-2: Budget of the FCA 
The enforcement of the law and recruiting experts is not a cheap process, therefore, CAs need 
to priorities its work in order to focus on most harmful violations. Therefore, studying the 
allocation of the FCA budget, alongside what it has produced, would help in understanding 
how the FCA could improve its priorities or what is required to do so. 
The budget of the FCA has been increasing over the years where it starts at around €8.5 to 
reach around €20 million in 2011. However, the amount of the budget allocated to 
enforcement seems to be decreasing in certain years. The highest percentage was allocated in 
2004 and 2005; by 2011 this has decreased to 24%. This means an increase in the budget 
allocated to salaries and a decrease in the budget allocated to enforcement, despite the 
increase in the overall budget. Table 15 below presents the budget of the FCA between 2004 
and 2011.  
Year 
Overall Budget 
(€ million) 
Budget on enforcement (€ million) and 
percentage of overall budget 
Budget on salary (€ million) 
2004 8.5 2.5 (30%) 6 (70%) 
                                                          
91
 Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2005)8(5) The International Journal of Competition 
Policy and Regulation 1, 21-22; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2006)9(7) The 
International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 21-24; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating 
Enforcement’ (2007)10(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 31-32; Global 
Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2008)11(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and 
Regulation 1, 50-51; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2009)12(6) The International Journal 
of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 58-60; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2010)13(6) 
The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 54-56; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating 
Enforcement’ (2011)14(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 64-67; Global 
Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2012) 15 (5) The International Journal of Competition Policy and 
Regulation 1, 60-63. 
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2005 8.6 2.6 (30%) 6 (70%) 
2006 11.4 2.5 (22%) 8.9 (78%) 
2007 12.8 3.5 (28%) 9.2 (72%) 
2008 19.4 5.4 (28%) 14 (72%) 
2009 19.4 5.4 (28%) 14 (72%) 
2010 20.4 5.3 (26%) 15 (74%) 
2011 20 4.8 (24%) 15.2 (76%) 
Table 15: the overall budget and the budget allocated to enforcement at the FCA  
(2004- 2011) 
*Source: Global Competition Review publications on ‘Rating enforcement’92  
5-5: Surrounding circumstances and facts 
Although it has been suggested in chapter 2 that this part mainly examines studies that 
attempted to evaluate or assess the performance of the CA under examination. However, for 
the period under examination (May 2004- December 2012) there were no studies conducted 
to evaluate or assess the application of competition law in France.93 A very recent study by 
the OECD, which the FCA took part in it, about evaluating the competition law enforcement 
and advocacy activities; the FCA stated that there are no studies have been conducted in 
France about the enforcement of competition law or advocacy activities by the FCA.94  
                                                          
92
 Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2005)8(5) The International Journal of Competition 
Policy and Regulation 1, 21-22; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2006)9(7) The 
International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 21-24; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating 
Enforcement’ (2007)10(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 31-32; Global 
Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2008)11(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and 
Regulation 1, 50-51; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2009)12(6) The International Journal 
of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 58-60; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2010)13(6) 
The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 54-56; Global Competition Review, ‘Rating 
Enforcement’ (2011)14(6) The International Journal of Competition Policy and Regulation 1, 64-67; Global 
Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement’ (2012) 15 (5) The International Journal of Competition Policy and 
Regulation 1, 60-63. 
93
 The latest peer review was conducted by the OECD in 2003 and published in 2005; see Michael Wise, 
‘Competition Law and Policy in France (2003)’ (2005) 7 (1) OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy 7. 
94
 OECD, ‘Evaluation of Competition Enforcement and Advocacy Activities: the Results of an OECD Survey’ 
Feb (2013) DAF/COMP/WP2 (2012)7/FINAL. Available at 
<http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP2%282012%297/FINAL
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Therefore, this section highlights and examines how certain peculiarities and changes in the 
French competition regime might affect the application of competition law. 
  There were many changes in the French competition regime, brought by the LME. The most 
notable change is the establishment of the FCA in March 2009, which replaced the former 
Competition Council. The LME gave the FCA new powers that did not exist previously. For 
example, under Article L462-4, the FCA has the powers to issue opinions, on its own 
initiative, on issues related to the competiveness of markets and how competition law 
violations can be prevented. 
 Also for the period under examination, there were changes with regard to legislations and 
procedures. For example, amendments to the settlement procedure,95 leniency, commitments96 
and compliance programs97 have taken place during the period under examination. 
The most unique feature of the French competition regime is the ‘Non- Contest’ procedure 
(settlements). This procedure can be applied in investigations where any antitrust violation is 
investigated; it can be applied to anti-competitive agreements and to unilateral conduct cases. 
In a nutshell, if the undertaking (s) investigated do not challenge the charges in the statement 
of objections, the fine imposed may be reduced by 10%. Also, if the parties investigated offer 
commitments to their future conduct, this can result in the FCA reducing the fine by a further 
5- 15%, in addition to the 10% reduction for the settlement procedure. It has to be noted that 
this procedure is to be used on the FCA’s own discretion. In addition, the non-contest 
procedure can be combined with the leniency procedure as well. For example, if a cartelist 
applied for leniency and has been awarded a reduction in fine and at the same time did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
&docLanguage=En> accessed 15 April 2013.  See also, Bruno Lasserre, ‘Antitrust: A Good Deal for All in 
Times of Globalization and Recession’ 2011 7(1) Competition Policy International 245,  250 (stating the FCA 
has not published any outcome evaluations and there is no studies conducted about the FCA externally ) 
95
 French Competition Authority, Procedural notice on antitrust settlement procedure of 10 February 2012 
96
 French Competition Authority, Notice on Competition Commitments of 2 March 2009.  
97
 French Competition Authority, Framework Document on Antitrust Compliance Programmes of 10 February 
2012. 
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contest the charges in the statement of objections, a further reduction in the fine will be given 
because of entering the non-contest procedure.98 The legal basis for this procedure is Article 
L. 462-2 III of the Commercial Code.99   
The non-contest procedure can help the FCA in speeding up the conclusion of investigations 
and reduces the litigation costs, as the undertakings who settle with the FCA cannot appeal 
the decision. In addition, the settlement procedure may encourage those who violated (ing) 
competition law to settle their cases with the FCA. Also, as it has been shown earlier in 
section 5-2-3, that the settlement procedure has been more successful than the leniency 
procedure, in terms of the number of cases concluded under each procedure.  
Another unique issue of the French competition regime is that French competition law seems 
to be more specific and catches more practices than under European competition law, in the 
area of unilateral conduct practises. Article L.420-2 is applicable not only to abuse of 
dominance but also to abuse of economic dependency; between May 2004 and December 
2012 there were no abuse of economic dependency cases. Also, there is Article L.420-5 
where it punishes excessive low pricing practises; this Article does not require a dominant 
position to be applicable and it is only applicable to the sales of goods and services to 
consumers.  Article L.420-4 provides exemptions for practices that may be punished under 
article L.420-2. This exemption is not applicable for cases under Article L.420-5. However, it 
has to be noted that the application of French competition rules toward abuse of dominance 
cases has been criticised, as the FCA seems not to employ an effects based approach and that 
it is employing form (or object)- based approach.100  
 
In the following bullet points are some other features of the French competition regime: 
                                                          
98
 This occurred in the recent detergent cartel case in 2011. See case 11-D-17. 
99
 This is explained further in the FCA Procedural notice on antitrust settlement procedure of 10 February 2012. 
100
 Louis Vogel and Joseph Vogel, ‘Abuse of dominance under French Law: Desirable Evolutions’ The 
European Antitrust Review (2013) 59, 61.  
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 The FCA is the only body in France that can apply competition law. Sector regulators 
do not have the powers to enforce competition law in their industries; however, they 
can refer competition related issues to the FCA for opinions. This could be an 
explanation for the number of cases concluded by the FCA. 
 Article L.462-3 offers that any court hearing a case of anti-competitive agreement or 
abuse of dominance has the option to refer the practices at issue to the FCA to know 
its opinion about it. 
 The FCA may be asked for opinions regarding draft legislations that may affect the 
levels of competition in market. 
 Under French competition law, individuals may face fines and jail sentences for 
breaches of competition law. This is the case for breaches of Article L.420-1 or 
Article L.420-2. Individuals may be sentenced to up to four years in jail and € 75,000 
fine.101 
Table 16 below shows the ranking of France for certain aspects regarding the Competiveness 
of France. This information is taken from the Global competitiveness report produced by the 
World Economic Forum on a yearly basis. Such information may prove to be useful in a 
comparative perspective when comparing public enforcement of competition law in France to 
other countries. For example, information regarding the extent of market dominance and 
trade barriers may give an insight on why there is more abuse of dominance cases in 
jurisdiction X than in jurisdiction Y. Thus, such information may be used to provide 
explanations to issues related to the information; however, not as a determinative factor but 
alongside the issues discussed above.  
                                                          
101
 Article L420-6 states “If any natural person fraudulently takes a personal and decisive part in the conception, 
organisation or implementation of the practices referred to in Articles L.420-1 and L.420-2, this shall be 
punished by a prison sentence of four years and a fine of 75,000 euros.” This provision has been rarely applied. 
See, Bruno Lasserre, ‘Antitrust: A Good Deal for All in Times of Globalization and Recession’ 2011 7(1) 
Competition Policy International 245, 258 and 266- 269. 
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year 
Intensity of local competition  
(Ranking) 
Extent of market 
dominance (Ranking) 
Effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy 
(Ranking) 
Prevalence of trade 
barriers (Ranking) 
2008 12/ 134 13/134 11/134 27/134 
2009 15/133 25/133 10/133 29/133 
2010 17/139 22/139 10/139 27/139 
2011 12/142 24/142 10/142 32/142 
2012 28/144 33/144 20/144 35/144 
  Table 16: Information related to the competiveness of France 
*Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competiveness Reports (2008-2012) 
 
5-6: Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of public enforcement of competition law in 
France. This chapter also discusses the decisions of the FCA that have been appealed. 
Further, institutional and procedural changes have been highlighted and linked to the results 
reached.  In addition, this chapter commented on the non-enforcement activities of the FCA 
and its capabilities. However, this chapter did not provide advice for the FCA on how it may 
improve its performance. This will be done in the ‘Comparative chapter’ where it will 
comment on the FCA from a comparative perspective; in light of this, suggestions on what 
has to be maintained or changed will be offered.  
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised in the following bullet points:  
 It has been difficult to assess how the FCA sets its priorities; the main reason for this is 
that the FCA has to respond to referrals and complaints logged to it. This has resulted in 
a high number of non-infringement decisions. The same can be reached with respect to 
non-enforcement activities, where most of the outputs were mainly opinions issued at 
the request of ministries, sector regulators and courts. This may have caused less 
attention to other non-enforcement activities that the FCA may conduct.  
 It has been shown that the procedure used by the FCA, in particular, the settlement 
procedure proved to be successful, as it has reduced the duration of investigations when 
the procedure was used.  
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 The FCA success rate on appeal is high overall, but there are some cases where the fines 
were reduced substantially on appeal or the appeal court quashed the FCA’s decisions 
entirely. This may give a perception that the appeal process is still worthwhile. This was 
particularly the case where the fine was high.  
 With regard sources of investigations, most of the investigations where opened because 
of complaints and referrals from ministries. There was a limited number of cases opened 
on the FCA’s own initiative (ex officio), this may indicate that the FCA do not have 
enough resources and time to open ex officio investigations because of the number of 
complaints and referrals it receives.  
 With regard to unilateral conduct cases, around 63% of the cases where concluded as 
non-infringement decision; over 70% of the non-infringements decisions where 
investigated because of complaints.  This may indicate that there is an abuse of the 
system or complainants do not have the knowledge to identify anti-competitive conduct. 
Hence, it would better if the French legislator changes the system where the FCA does 
not need to respond to all complaints it receives. This would give the FCA a bigger 
margin to prioritise its activities.  
 The establishment of the FCA to replace the former Competition Council seems to have 
improved the French competition regime. As the FCA seems to reduce its caseload; 
importantly, only in the years where the FCA was in charge the number of infringement 
decisions is more the number of non-infringement decisions. Also, the average duration 
of investigations has been reduced. Particularly, with non-infringement decisions where 
the average duration of investigation was reduced substantially. 
However, it is remain to be seen what the analysis in the next chapter will reveal, where the 
FCA will be compared to the other jurisdictions. A comparative analysis may help more in 
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giving the appropriate advice on how to improve the FCA performance by identifying what 
has to be maintained and what has to be changed or improved.  
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Appendix  
Case 
Year of 
conclusion  
Type
102
 
Duration 
(Months) 
Fine (€) Source 
Appeal 
outcome 
Fine after 
appeal (€) 
04-D-21 2004 1,2,101,102 25 20,000 Minister Not appealed 20,000 
04-D-25 2004 1 36 12,000 Minister Upheld 12,000 
04-D-26 2004 2 67 76,224 complaint Upheld 76,224 
04-D-30 2004 1 30 23,120 complaint Not appealed 23,120 
04-D-32 2004 2,102 70 700,000 complaint Upheld 700,000 
04-D-37 2004 2 
 
76,224 complaint Upheld 76,224 
04-D-39 2004 1 30 1,016,000 complaint Upheld 1,016,000 
04-D-42 2004 1 39 50,360 Minister Not appealed 50,360 
04-D-43 2004 1 26 166,500 Minister Not appealed 166,500 
04-D-44 2004 2 54 50,000 complaint Upheld 50,000 
04-D-48 2004 2,102 64 20,000,000 complaint annulment 0 
04-D-49 2004 1,2,101,102 69 796,800 complaint Not appealed 796,800 
04-D-50 2004 1 40 59,100 Minister Not appealed 59,100 
04-D-56 2004 1,2 56 64,200 complaint Not appealed 64,200 
04-D-65 2004 2,102 28 600,000 
Own 
initiative 
Not appealed 600,000 
04-D-70 2004 2 40 484,000 complaint Upheld 484,000 
04-D-74 2004 1,101 58 0 Minister Not appealed 0 
04-D-75 2004 1 
 
150,000 complaint Not appealed 150,000 
04-D-78 2004 1 27 260,100 Minister Upheld 260,100 
05-D-03 2005 1 43 192,224 Minister Not appealed 192,224 
05-D-07 2005 1,101 75 75,000 complaint Not appealed 75,000 
05-D-10 2005 1,101 44 45,000 complaint Not appealed 45,000 
05-D-14 2005 1 40 1,500 Minister Not appealed 1,500 
05-D-17 2005 1 66 525,000 Minister 
largely 
Upheld 
160,000 
05-D-19 2005 1 85 17,262,950 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
17,187,950 
05-D-26 2005 1 27 7,083,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
6,048,000 
05-D-27 2005 1 71 2,000 Minister Not appealed 2,000 
05-D-32 2005 1,2 54 5,002,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
3,023,000 
05-D-38 2005 1,101 36 11,550,000 Minister Upheld 11,550,000 
05-D-43 2005 1 72 1,000 complaint 
Largely 
Upheld 
1,000 
05-D-44 2005 2 115 20,000 Minister Not appealed 20,000 
05-D-45 2005 1 42 73,000 Minister Not appealed 73,000 
05-D-47 2005 1 44 68,000 Minister Not appealed 68,000 
05-D-49  2005 1,2,101,102 70 1,360,000 complaint 
Not 
appealed/S 
1,360,000 
                                                          
102
 Abbreviations used in this column. 1= L.420-1 of the Commercial code; 2= L.420-2 of the Commercial code; 
5= L.420-5 of the Commercial code; 101= Article 101 EFTU; 102= Article 102 EFTU.  
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05-D-51 2005 1 113 448,840 Minister Upheld 448,840 
05-D-55 2005 1,101 22 5,000 Minister Not appealed 5,000 
05-D-58 2005 2 94 500,000 complaint Upheld 500,000 
05-D-59 2005 2 72 80,000,000 complaint Upheld 80,000,000 
05-D-63 2005 2,102 55 1,000,000 complaint Not appealed 1,000,000 
05-D-64 2005 1 47 709,000 
Own 
initiative 
Upheld 709,000 
05-D-65 2005 1,101 51 
534,000,00
0 
Own 
initiative 
Largely 
Upheld 
534,000,00
0 
05-D-66 2005 1 91 34,300,000 complaint annulment 0 
05-D-67 2005 1 108 1,384,500 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
1,134,500 
05-D-69 2005 1 95 33,660,000 Minister Upheld 33,660,000 
05-D-70 2005 1 72 14,400,000 Minister Upheld 14,400,000 
05-D-75 2005 2 92 100,000 complaint 
Partly 
Upheld 
100,000 
06-D-03 2006 1 88 26,100,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
24,000,000 
06-D-04 2006 1,2,101,102 89 45,400,000 
Own 
initiative 
Upheld/pend
ing 
40,200,000 
06-D-06 2006 1,2,101,102 46 10,000 Minister upheld 10,000 
 06-D-07 2006 1 108 48,000,000 
Own 
initiative 
Partly 
Upheld 
43,440,000 
06-D-08 2006 1 50 600,000 Minister 
Upheld/pend
ing 
600,000 
06-D-09 2006 1,101 49 5,035,000 leniency Upheld 5,035,000 
06-D-13 2006 1 34 718,000 Minister 
Largely 
Upheld 
508,000 
06-D-15 2006 1 41 1,325,300 Minister 
Largely 
Upheld 
925,300 
06-D-22 2006 1,2,101,102 60 300,000 Minister Not appealed 300,000 
06-D-25 2006 1 35 13,630 Minister Not appealed 13,630 
06-D-30 2006 1 38 113,850 Minister Not appealed 113,850 
06-D-36 2006 1,2 72 15,000 complaint Not appealed 15,000 
06-D-37 2006 1,101 27 580,000 Minister Upheld 580,000 
07-D-01 2007 1 41 944,600 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
12,000 
07-D-02 2007 1 61 1,398,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
1,398,000 
07-D-03 2007 1,101 
 
500,000 
Own 
initiative 
Not appealed 500,000 
07-D-04 2007 1 21 50,000 Minister Not appealed 50,000 
07-D-05 2007 1 38 125,000 Minister Upheld 125,000 
07-D-06 2007 1,2 69 800,000 Minister Not appealed 800,000 
07-D-08 2007 1,2,101,102 81 25,250,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
14,750,000 
07-D-09 2007 2,102 80 10,000,000 
Own 
initiative 
annulment 0 
07-D-15  2007 1 132 47,314,200 
Own 
initiative 
Largely 
Upheld 
47,229,200 
07-D-16 2007 1 42 396,000 Minister Upheld 396,000 
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07-D-21 2007 1,101 35 16,225,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
16,225,000 
07-D-24 2007 1,101 30 120,000 Minister Not appealed 120,000 
07-D-25 2007 1,2,101,102 84 100,000 complaint Not appealed 100,000 
07-D-26 2007 1,101 68 19,530,000 complaint 
Not 
appealed/S 
19,530,000 
07-D-28 2007 1,2 68 2,850,000 complaint Upheld 2,850,000 
07-D-29 2007 1 34 1,703,000 Minister Upheld 1,703,000 
07-D-33 2007 2,102 71 45,000,000 
Own 
initiative 
Not 
appealed/S 
45,000,000 
07-D-40 2007 1 39 1,666,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
1,666,000 
07-D-41 2007 1 47 48,000 complaint Upheld 48,000 
07-D-44 2007 1,2,5 51 9,000 complaint Not appealed 9,000 
07-D-47 2007 1 59 3,350,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
1,350,000 
07-D-48 2007 1,101 50 2,020,550 leniency Upheld 2,020,550 
07-D-49 2007 1,101 25 2,650,000 Minister Upheld 2,650,000 
07-D-50 2007 1,101 28 37,065,000 Minister 
Largely 
Upheld 
36,965,000 
08-D-03 2008 1 29 2,000 Minister Not appealed 2,000 
08-D-06 2008 1 59 814,000 complaint annulment 0 
08-D-09 2008 1,2 70 50,000 complaint Upheld 50,000 
08-D-12 2008 1 48 8,184,000 leniency 
Largely 
Upheld 
5,585,200 
08-D-13 2008 1,101 25 1,620,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
1,620,000 
08-D-15 2008 1 32 52,840 Minister Not appealed 52,840 
08-D-20 2008 1 62 2,000,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
2,000,000 
08-D-22 2008 1 19 80,800 Minister Not appealed 80,800 
08-D-23 2008 1 26 40,750 complaint Not appealed 40,750 
08-D-25 2008 1,101 28 17,000,000 
Own 
initiative 
Upheld 17,000,000 
08-D-28 2008 1 35 530,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
530,000 
08-D-29 2008 1 28 133,600 Minister Not appealed 133,600 
08-D-30 2008 1,101 71 41,100,000 complaint Upheld 41,100,000 
08-D-32 2008 1,101 41 
575,454,50
0 
leniency 
Largely 
Upheld 
73,155,500 
08-D-33 2008 1 49 1,175,500 Minister Upheld 1,175,500 
09-D-03 2009 1 38 357,000 Minister Upheld 357,000 
09-D-04 2009 2,102 65 3,050,000 complaint Not appealed 3,050,000 
09-D-05 2009 1,101 38 94,400,000 Minister Upheld 94,400,000 
09-D-06 2009 1,2,101,102 78 5,500,000 complaint Upheld 5,500,000 
09-D-07 2009 1 45 78,000 complaint Upheld 78,000 
09-D-10 2009 2,102 29 300,000 complaint Upheld 300,000 
09-D-14  2009 2 45 320,000 Minister Upheld 320,000 
09-D-17 2009 1 26 5,000 complaint Not appealed 5,000 
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09-D-19  2009 1 42 618,250 Minister 
Largely 
Upheld 
518,250 
09-D-24 2009 2,102 48 27,600,000 complaint 
Not 
appealed/S 
27,600,000 
09-D-25 2009 1,101 49 4,200,000 Minister 
Partly 
Upheld 
4,060,000 
09-D-31 2009 1,2,101,102 63 6,900,000 
Own 
initiative 
Not 
appealed/S 
6,900,000 
09-D-34 2009 1 48 159,000 Minister Upheld 159,000 
09-D-36 2009 1,2,101,102 65 63,000,000 complaint 
Largely 
Upheld 
35,000,000 
09-D-39 2009 1 41 140,000 Minister Not appealed 140,000 
10-D-03 2010 1 55 92,500 complaint Not appealed 92,500 
10-D-04 2010 1,101 29 1,500,000 Minister Upheld 1,500,000 
10-D-05 2010 1 26 22,000 Minister Not appealed 22,000 
10-D-10 2010 1 36 80,000 complaint Not appealed 80,000 
10-D-11 2010 1 48 50,000 Minister Not appealed 50,000 
10-D-13 2010 1,101 27 625,000 
Own 
initiative 
Largely 
Upheld 
625,000 
10-D-15 2010 1 23 30,000 Minister Not appealed 30,000 
10-D-22 2010 1 32 22,900 Minister Not appealed 22,900 
10-D-28 2010 1,101 78 
384,900,00
0 
Own 
initiative 
largely 
Upheld/pend
ing 
384,900,00
0 
11-D-01 2011 1 14 70,000 
Own 
initiative 
Not appealed 70,000 
11-D-02 2011 1 67 9,803,590 
Own 
initiative 
Largely 
Upheld/pend
ing 
9,250,590 
11-D-07 2011 1 36 1,160,100 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
1,160,100 
11-D-13 2011 1 58 9,402,100 Minister Pending 
 
11-D-17 2011 1,101 45 
367,940,00
0 
leniency Pending 
 
11-D-19 2011 1 44 1,340,000 Minister Pending 
 
12-D-02 2012 1 15 660,700 
Own 
initiative 
Pending 
 
12-D-06 2012 1,2 32 381,400 
Own 
initiative 
Not 
appealed/S 
381,400 
12-D-08 2012 1,101 44 3,870,590 Minister Pending 
 
12-D-09 2012 1,101 47 
242,400,00
0 
leniency Pending 
 
12-D-10 2012 1,101 53 35,322,000 Minister Pending 
 
12-D-23 2012 1,101 110 900,000 Minister Pending 
 
12-D-24 2012 2,102 70 
183,127,00
0 
complaint Pending 
 
12-D-25 2012 2,102 59 60,966,000 
Own 
initiative 
Pending 
 
12-D-26 2012 1,101 78 50,000 complaint Not appealed 50,000 
12-D-27 2012 1 44 9,378,000 Minister 
Not 
appealed/S 
9,378,000 
Table 1: All infringements decisions concluded by the FCA (May 2004- December 2012) 
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Case Year of 
conclusion 
Type
103
 Duration 
(Months) 
Source Appeal 
Outcome 
      
04-D-16 2004 1,n 87 Minister not appealed 
04-D-17 2004 2,102,n 40 compliant not appealed 
04-D-20 2004 1,n 65 Minister not appealed 
04-D-22 2004 2,102,n 66 compliant not appealed 
04-D-23 2004 2,n 10 compliant not appealed 
04-D-27 2004 1,n 109 compliant not appealed 
04-D-28 2004 2,n 84 Minister not appealed 
04-D-29 2004 1,2,n 18 compliant not appealed 
04-D-33 2004 1,2,101,102,n 64 own initiative not appealed 
04-D-35 2004 1,n 14 compliant not appealed 
04-D-36 2004 2,n 10 compliant not appealed 
04-D-38 2004 1,2,101,102,n 76 compliant not appealed 
04-D-40 2004 1,2,101,102,n 3 compliant Upheld 
04-D-41 2004 2,n 57 compliant not appealed 
04-D-45 2004 2,n 4 compliant Upheld 
04-D-46 2004 2,n 5 compliant not appealed 
04-D-51 2004 1,2,101,102,n 5 compliant not appealed 
04-D-53 2004 1,2,n 62 own initiative not appealed 
04-D-54 2004 2,102,n 5 compliant not appealed 
04-D-55 2004 1,n 63 Minister not appealed 
04-D-57 2004 1,n 47 Minister not appealed 
04-D-58 2004 1,n 76 Minister not appealed 
04-D-60 2004 2,n 7 compliant Upheld 
04-D-61 2004 2,n 31 compliant not appealed 
04-D-63 2004 1,n 76 Minister not appealed 
04-D-64 2004 1,n 22 Minister not appealed 
04-D-66 2004 1,2,n 45 Minister not appealed 
04-D-67 2004 1,5,n 77 compliant not appealed 
04-D-68 2004 1,n 63 Minister not appealed 
04-D-69 2004 1,n 7 compliant not appealed 
04-D-71 2004 2,n 14 compliant not appealed 
04-D-72 2004 2,n 86 compliant not appealed 
04-D-73 2004 2,102,n 61 compliant withdrawn 
04-D-76 2004 1,2,101,102,n 79 compliant annulment 
04-D-77 2004 1,2,101,102,n 3 compliant not appealed 
04-D-79 2004 2,n 45 compliant annulment 
05-D-01 2005 2,n 4 compliant not appealed 
05-D-04 2005 1,n 96 Minister not appealed 
                                                          
103
 Abbreviations used in this column. N= Non-infringement decision; C= Commitments decisions; 1= L.420-1 
of the Commercial code; 2= L.420-2 of the Commercial code; 5= L.420-5 of the Commercial code; 101= Article 
101 EFTU; 102= Article 102 EFTU. 
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05-D-05 2005 1,2,5,n 48 compliant Upheld 
05-D-06 2005 1,2,n 4 compliant not appealed 
05-D-11 2005 1,2,101,102,n 5 compliant not appealed 
05-D-12  2005 1,2,101,102,c 5 compliant not appealed 
05-D-13 2005 2,n 81 compliant Upheld 
05-D-15 2005 2,n 36 compliant not appealed 
05-D-16 2005 2,102,c 15 own initiative not appealed 
05-D-18 2005 2,n 47 compliant not appealed 
05-D-20 2005 2,n 3 compliant Upheld 
05-D-21 2005 1,2,101,102,n 1 compliant not appealed 
05-D-22 2005 1,2,n 3 compliant not appealed 
05-D-23 2005 1,2,n 51 compliant not appealed 
05-D-24 2005 1,n 87 Minister not appealed 
05-D-25 2005 2,c 6 compliant not appealed 
05-D-28 2005 2,n 22 Minister not appealed 
05-D-29 2005 2,c 75 compliant not appealed 
05-D-30 2005 2,n 9 compliant not appealed 
05-D-31 2005 1,2,n 37 compliant not appealed 
05-D-33 2005 1,101,n 67 compliant not appealed 
05-D-34 2005 1,2,n 3 compliant not appealed 
05-D-35 2005 1,2,n 19 compliant not appealed 
05-D-39 2005 2,n 76 compliant not appealed 
05-D-40 2005 1,2,n 13 compliant not appealed 
05-D-41 2005 1,n 44 compliant not appealed 
05-D-42 2005 2,n 88 compliant Upheld 
05-D-46 2005 2,n 29 compliant not appealed 
05-D-48 2005 2,n 103 compliant not appealed 
05-D-50 2005 1,n 90 compliant Upheld 
05-D-52 2005 1,n 97 compliant not appealed 
05-D-53 2005 2,n 70 own initiative not appealed 
05-D-54 2005 2,n 83 compliant not appealed 
05-D-56 2005 1,n 55 compliant not appealed 
05-D-57 2005 1,n 55 compliant not appealed 
05-D-60 2005 1,2,n 6 compliant Upheld 
05-D-61 2005 1,n 71 Minister not appealed 
05-D-62 2005 1,n 75 Minister not appealed 
05-D-68 2005 2,n 72 compliant Upheld 
05-D-72 2005 2,102,n 65 compliant Upheld 
05-D-73 2005 2,n 72 Minister not appealed 
05-D-74 2005 2,n 78 Minister not appealed 
06-D-01 2006 2,c 21 compliant not appealed 
06-D-02  2006 2,n 27 Minister not appealed 
06-D-05 2006 1,2,n 3 compliant not appealed 
06-D-10 2006 2,n 16 compliant not appealed 
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06-D-11 2006 2,n 9 compliant not appealed 
06-D-12 2006 2,102,n 35 compliant annulment 
06-D-14 2006 1,101,n 7 compliant not appealed 
06-D-16 2006 2,n 139 compliant not appealed 
06-D-17 2006 1,2,n 116 compliant Upheld 
06-D-18 2006 1,2,101,102,n 57 compliant not appealed 
06-D-19 2006 1,2,n 6 compliant not appealed 
06-D-20 2006 2,c 5 compliant not appealed 
06-D-21 2006 1,101,n 7 compliant not appealed 
06-D-23 2006 2,5,n 40 compliant not appealed 
06-D-24 2006 1,c 9 compliant Upheld 
06-D-26  2006 1,2,101,102,n 74 compliant not appealed 
06-D-27  2006 1,2,n 5 compliant not appealed 
06-D-28 2006 1,c 32 Minister not appealed 
06-D-29  2006 1,2,c 34 compliant Upheld 
06-D-31 2006 1,n 5 compliant not appealed 
06-D-33 2006 1,n 63 Minister not appealed 
06-D-34 2006 1,2,n 47 compliant not appealed 
06-D-35 2006 2,n 61 Minister not appealed 
06-D-38 2006 2,n 75 Minister not appealed 
 06-D-39 2006 1,2,n 4 compliant not appealed 
07-D-07 2007 1,101,c 9 own initiative not appealed 
06-D-40 2006 1,2,101,102,c 6 Minister not appealed 
07-D-10 2007 1,101,n 5 compliant not appealed 
07-D-11 2007 1,n 60 Minister not appealed 
07-D-12 2007 1,n 50 compliant not appealed 
07-D-13 2007 1,2,n 1 compliant not appealed 
07-D-14 2007 2,n 32 Minister not appealed 
07-D-17 2007 1,101,c 76 own initiative not appealed 
07-D-18 2007 2,n 6 compliant Upheld 
07-D-20 2007 2,n 7 compliant not appealed 
07-D-22 2007 1,2,101,102,c 63 compliant annulment 
07-D-23 2007 2,n 79 compliant Upheld 
07-D-27 2007 1,n 28 compliant Upheld 
07-D-30 2007 2,102,c 10 compliant not appealed 
07-D- 31 2007 1,2,101,102,c 18 compliant not appealed 
07-D-32 2007 2,c 23 compliant not appealed 
07-D-34  2007 1,n 35 Minister not appealed 
07-D-36 2007 1,n 58 Minister not appealed 
07-D-37 2007 1,2,n 1 compliant Upheld 
07-D-38 2007 2,5,n 5 compliant not appealed 
07-D-39 2007 2,n 36 compliant not appealed 
07-D-42 2007 1,n 23 Minister not appealed 
07-D-43 2007 2,c 10 compliant withdrawn 
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07-D-45 2007 1,2,c 68 compliant annulment 
07-D-46 2007 1,2,c 68 compliant annulment 
08-D-01 2008 2,5,n 13 compliant not appealed 
08-D-02 2008 2,102,n 7 compliant not appealed 
08-D-04 2008 2,c 54 compliant not appealed 
08-D-05 2008 1,2,n 2 compliant Upheld 
08-D-08 2008 2,n 5 compliant Upheld 
08-D-10 2008 1,2,101,102,n 7 compliant not appealed 
08-D-11 2008 2,n 19 compliant not appealed 
08-D-14 2008 1,2,101,102,n 37 compliant withdrawn 
08-D-16 2008 1,2,101,102,n 5 compliant Upheld 
08-D-17 2008 1,n 118 compliant not appealed 
08-D-18 2008 2,102,n 2 compliant not appealed 
 08-D-19 2008 1,n 6 compliant not appealed 
08-D-21 2008 2,c 23 compliant not appealed 
08-D-24 2008 2,n 11 compliant not appealed 
08-D-26 2008 1,c 33 Minister not appealed 
08-D-27 2008 2,102,n 53 compliant not appealed 
08-D-31 2008 1,2,5,n 8 compliant not appealed 
08-D-34 2008 c 14 Minister not appealed 
09-D-01 2009 1,c 25 Minister not appealed 
09-D-02  2009 2,n 6 compliant not appealed 
09-D-08 2009 1,c 47 own initiative not appealed 
09-D-09 2009 2,n 8 compliant not appealed 
09-D-11 2009 2,102,c 10 compliant not appealed 
09-D-12 2009 2,n 6 compliant not appealed 
09-D-13 2009 1,n 29 compliant not appealed 
09-D-15 2009 2,102,n 4 compliant not appealed 
09-D-16 2009 2,102,n 13 compliant Upheld 
09-D-18 2009 1,2,101,102,n 24 compliant not appealed 
09-D-20 2009 1,n 35 compliant not appealed 
09-D-21 2009 2,n 28 compliant not appealed 
09-D-22 2009 1,2,n 13 compliant not appealed 
09-D-23 2009 1,101,n 25 Minister not appealed 
09-D-26 2009 1,2,101,102,n 40 compliant Upheld 
09-D-27 2009 1,c 21 compliant not appealed 
09-D-28 2009 1,2,n 4 compliant not appealed 
09-D-29 2009 2,n 8 compliant not appealed 
09-D-30 2009 2,n 12 compliant not appealed 
09-D-32 2009 2,c 20 compliant not appealed 
09-D-33 2009 2,102,n 36 Minister not appealed 
09-D-35 2009 1,2,n 17 compliant not appealed 
09-D-37 2009 2,102,n 8 compliant not appealed 
09-D-38 2009 1,2,101,102,n 52 Minister not appealed 
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09-D-40 2009 2,102,n 6 compliant not appealed 
10-D-01 2010 1,c 16 compliant not appealed 
10-D-02 2010 2,n 42 Minister not appealed 
10-D-06 2010 2,c 38 Minister not appealed 
10-D-07 2010 1,2,101,102,n 7 compliant not appealed 
10-D-08 2010 2,n 33 compliant not appealed 
10-D-09 2010 2,102,n 6 compliant not appealed 
10-D-12 2010 1,2,101,102,n 57 compliant not appealed 
10-D-14 2010 2,102,n 22 compliant Upheld 
10-D-16 2010 2,102,n 6 compliant not appealed 
10-D-17 2010 1,2,101,102,n 60 Minister not appealed 
10-D-18 2010 1,2,5,c 28 compliant not appealed 
10-D-19 2010 1,2,101,102,n 53 compliant not appealed 
10-D-20 2010 1,2,101,102,c 13 compliant not appealed 
10-D-23 2010 2,n 14 compliant Upheld 
10-D-24 2010 2,n 11 compliant Upheld 
10-D-25 2010 1,2,n 4 compliant not appealed 
10-D-26 2010 1,n 56 Minister not appealed 
10-D-27 2010 2,c 25 Minister not appealed 
10-D-29 2010 1,2,101,102,c 54 compliant not appealed 
10-D-30 2010 2,102,c 8 compliant not appealed 
11-D-03 2011 1,101,n 31 compliant not appealed 
11-D-04 2011 2,n 6 compliant not appealed 
11-D-05 2011 1,n 5 compliant not appealed 
11-D-06 2011 1,2,n 18 compliant not appealed 
11-D-08 2011 1,101,n 20 compliant not appealed 
11-D-09 2011 2,102,n 6 compliant not appealed 
11-D-11 2011 1,101,c 29 compliant not appealed 
11-D-14 2011 2,c 23 compliant not appealed 
11-D-15 2011 2,n 11 compliant not appealed 
11-D-16 2011 1,2,n 10 compliant not appealed 
11-D-18 2011 1,2,c 21 compliant pending 
11-D-20 2011 2,c 16 compliant Upheld 
12-D-01 2012 1,n 6 compliant not appealed 
12-D-03 2012 1,2,n 44 compliant not appealed 
12-D-04 2012 2,102,c 34 compliant not appealed 
12-D-07 2012 1,n 56 Minister not appealed 
12-D-11 2012 1,2,n 37 compliant pending 
12-D-13 2012 1,2,5,n 17 compliant not appealed 
12-D-14 2012 2,n 22 compliant not appealed 
12-D-16 2012 2,102,c 48 compliant not appealed 
12-D-17 2012 2,102,c 28 compliant not appealed 
12-D-18 2012 2,102,c 16 compliant pending 
12-D-19 2012 1,n 9 compliant not appealed 
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12-D-20 2012 1,2,5,n 26 own initiative not appealed 
12-D-21 2012 2,n 10 compliant pending 
12-D-22 2012 2,n 30 compliant not appealed 
12-D-28 2012 1,2,n 36 Minister not appealed 
12-D-29 2012 1,2,n 8 compliant not appealed 
Table 2: Non-infringements and commitments decisions concluded by the FCA  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 
 
Chapter 6 : Comparative Analysis of Public Enforment of Competition Law in the 
EU, France and the UK: Findings, Recommandations and lessons to be learnt 
6-1: Introduction  
This chapter compares and contrasts public enforcement of competition law in the EU, 
France and the UK, in light of the findings and observations gleaned from the individual 
chapters of each jurisdiction while keeping in mind the criteria and the assumptions set out 
earlier in the thesis. It is hoped that this chapter may help in exposing enforcement problems 
(if any), and to confirm the findings from the previous chapters. More importantly, this 
chapter suggests what each CA can learn from the other CAs and how it may overcome 
problems identified.  
Chapter 2 of the thesis provided criteria for assessing public enforcement of competition law. 
When the criteria were constructed it has been taken into account that it is suitable to 
comparative analysis. Also, in chapter 2 the benefits and the advantages of comparing the 
public enforcement of competition law have been highlighted. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 discussed 
and analysed the application of competition in UK, EU and France, respectively. Some 
conclusions have been drawn from these chapters; however, it has been stated that there are 
some outstanding issues that will be dealt with comparatively. This chapter will compare the 
three jurisdictions examined and will propose/advice each CA on what has to changed/ 
improved or maintained. This chapter will briefly present, comparatively, the main issues of 
the previous chapters and then it comments and analyses the outcomes.
1
     
Therefore, this chapter, at the beginning, presents and comments on comparative findings 
from the previous chapters and then it analyses and discusses the situation in each 
                                                          
1
 The previous chapters aimed to identify how CAs enforce competition law and what may affect it, in other 
words it attempted to identify patterns or issues that may affect the enforcement of the law in each jurisdiction. 
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jurisdiction, and aims to identify common issues in the three jurisdictions where these issues 
can be generalised. Thus, this chapter aims to provide suggestions on the weaknesses and the 
strengths of each CA and how it can improve its performance from a comparative perspective 
and taking into account what can be implemented in light of its capabilities and how the CA 
may change its policies in order to improve its performance.
2
 This chapter also aims to 
suggest what changes in legislation may be needed in order to implement the changes 
suggested in the chapter.
3
     
Few studies examined the application of competition law (or policies related to competition 
law enforcement) in the jurisdictions under examination in this thesis in the same work. To 
the author’s knowledge, there are three studies that dealt, explicitly, with the application of 
competition law in the jurisdictions examined in this thesis; i.e. the three jurisdictions 
examined in the same work.  
Some of the studies were specific in nature; for example, these studies examined specific 
polices or particular area, not the whole antitrust regime. Henry examined the leniency 
programs of the EU, France, Germany and the UK.
4
 He provided a comparative analysis of 
the strengths and the weaknesses of each programme. The author also highlights how each 
programme can be improved. The author praised the UK leniency programme for granting 
immunity from fine and criminal sanctions, which in his view will play a role in incentivising 
                                                          
2
 It has to be reminded about the assumptions that have been set out earlier in the thesis in particular: (1) It has 
to be reminded that the CA cannot catch and punish every single infringement because of limited capabilities 
and therefore it has to prioritise its activities. (2) It has to be reminded as well that it is assumed that full 
deterrence does not exist in any jurisdiction; hence, the CA has to deal with breaches of competition law. 
3
 An important note on the use of the language in this chapter when using comparative terms; for example, when 
stating high or low number of cases this means high or low number of cases compared to the other jurisdictions 
under examination.  
4
 David Henry, ‘Leniency programmes: an anaemic carrot for cartels in France, Germany and the UK?’ 26(1) 
European Competition Law Review 2005, 13 
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cartelists to come forward to supply information about the infringement.
5
 On the other hand, 
he criticised the French leniency programme that only grants immunity from fine but not 
form criminal sanctions as opposed to the UK programme.
6
 However, the FCA, in its most 
recent notice on leniency,
7
 states that it will consider leniency as one of the legitimate reasons 
which justifies not to pass on the case to the State Prosecutor in which individuals, belonging 
to the undertaking which has been granted leniency, would be liable to such proceedings 
absent awarding of leniency.
8
  
Rosochowicz, in a comparative PhD thesis, scrutinises how to deter cartel and abuse of 
dominant position activities in Europe, by examining the case law, available tools and 
procedure available to the CAs of the EU, France, and the UK.
9
 
10
 The author mainly focused 
on three general areas: public enforcement; private enforcement and criminal sanctions 
against individuals. Rosochowicz stated that public enforcement alone will achieve the 
required deterrence levels in light of weak private enforcement of competition law in the 
countries examined. She also highlighted the need to use criminal sanctions against 
individuals in order to raise deterrence levels. She also shed light on the fact that despite the 
existence of criminal sanctions in the UK and France they are barely used. She also questions 
the need of introducing criminal sanctions at a European level. The author recommended the 
introduction of criminal sanction at a European level;
11
 she also recommends that criminal 
                                                          
5
 David Henry, ‘Leniency programmes: an anaemic carrot for cartels in France, Germany and the UK?’ 26(1) 
European Competition Law Review 2005, 13; P.21-22 
6
 David Henry, ‘Leniency programmes: an anaemic carrot for cartels in France, Germany and the UK?’ 26(1) 
European Competition Law Review 2005, 13; P.21-22 
7
 The Leniency notice was issued after the publication of Henry’s paper.  
8
 See the FCA’s Procedural notice relating to the French Leniency Programme issued on March 2, 2009; 
paragraph 48.  
9
 Patricia Harffi Rosochowicz, ‘Deterring Cartel and Abuse of Dominant Position Activity in the European 
Union A Comparative Study’ ,The University of Reading December 2005 
10
 Reference is made to the US when discussing criminal sanctions and private enforcement of competition law.  
11
 The author highlighted the difficulties in introducing criminal sanctions against individuals.  
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sanctions against individual in the UK and France should be used more in order to achieve 
deterrence, in both countries criminal sanctions have rarely been applied.
12
  
A very recent study has been conducted by Buigues and Meiklejohn which examines the 
resources, independence and enforcement in the UK, France and Germany.
13
 It reviews the 
human resources and the budget of the CAs under examination for the year 2010. It also 
reviews specific issues, such as: Economics and legal services, centralised vs. decentralised 
decision making and the length of the mandate.
14
 This article also provides the way in which 
mergers are dealt with by each CA and what are the major differences.
15
 It then went on to 
review the amount of fines and the number of decisions produced by each CA, finding that 
the FCA has concluded the highest number of cases and imposed the highest amount of fines 
while the OFT concluded the fewest number of cases and the lowest amount of fines.
16
 
Attention has been paid to specific enforcement procedures, such as settlements and leniency 
procedures.
17
  It concludes by highlighting some open questions that require further research. 
This study, according to the authors, is written in a descriptive/comparative approach which 
aims to identify questions that require further research.
18
 
                                                          
12
 The issue of criminal sanctions will be discussed further below. 
13
 Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ Competition Policy International Antitrust 
Chronicle, August 2013. 
14
 Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ Competition Policy International Antitrust 
Chronicle, August 2013 4-9. 
15
 Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ (August 2013) Competition Policy 
International Antitrust Chronicle9-11. 
16
 Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ (August 2013) Competition Policy 
International Antitrust Chronicle12-16. 
17
Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ (August 2013) Competition Policy International 
Antitrust Chronicle 16-17 (the authors only provided numbers taken from the GCR survey, comments on the 
numbers are not provided).  
18
 Pierre-André Buigues & Roderick Meiklejohn, ‘National Competition Authorities in France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ (August 2013) Competition Policy 
International Antitrust Chronicle, 18  
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This chapter starts by reviewing and commenting on the enforcement activities of the three 
CAs. Section 3 presents and comments on the non-enforcement activities, it aims to give 
reasons behind those activities and tries to explain the magnitude of them. Section 4 
examines the capabilities of the CAs and provides information about other activities, such as 
mergers and state aid activities. Section 5 discuses and analysis issues gleaned from this 
chapter and the previous chapters that affect competition law enforcement and how 
shortcomings can be remedied. Section 6 provides some concluding thought and highlights 
the main issues that have reached.  
6-2: Enforcement activities 
6-2-1: Cases concluded 
The number of cases concluded by each CA varies substantially from one to another. Table 1 
below shows the number and the outcome of the investigations concluded by each CA, 
between May 2004 and December 2012.  The FCA concluded the highest number of cases 
(383) cases, while the OFT concluded the lowest number of cases (24 cases) and the EC 
concluded 102 cases. In terms of the nature of the concluded cases; three quarters of the cases 
concluded by the OFT where declared as infringements of competition law, the EC declared 
over a half of its cases as infringements, just over the third of the cases concluded by the FCA 
were declared as infringements of competition law. These findings do not represent the 
performance of any of the CAs examined. These findings should be taken into consideration 
with other issues in order to understand what could be the reason (s) for the high/ low number 
of cases. This will be examined below when considering the specifics of the enforcement 
activities of each CA, the non-enforcement activities, the capabilities and the legislations in 
each jurisdiction.     
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Infringements Non- infringements Commitments Interim measures Total 
EC 63 13 26 0 102 
FCA 138 173 46 26 383 
OFT 18 5 1 0 24 
Table 1: Number and outcome of investigations concluded by the EC, the FCA and the 
OFT (May 2004- December 2012) 
 
6-2-2: Duration of investigations 
From table 2 below it can be observed that the overall average duration of all investigations 
in each jurisdiction it is fairly similar, where the overall average duration for all 
investigations is over 40 months and less than 44 months. However, one needs to look at the 
number of cases concluded when looking the duration of investigations. It has been noted that 
the OFT concluded the least number of cases, this seems to not affect the duration of 
investigations when comparing it to the situation in France or in the EU. In general, and 
before considering other issues, it seems that the outcomes of a given CA do not have an 
effect on the duration of investigations.  This is the case when considering the overall average 
of investigations for all cases. However, when looking at commitments and non-infringement 
decisions; it seems that the caseload may play a role in this, as the OFT has the lowest 
average duration for investigations.  It also apparent when looking at the non-infringements 
decisions of the EC compared to the FCA, where the FCA concluded much more cases than 
the EC. Still, the difference in the duration of investigations between the three jurisdictions is 
not too high and it cannot be concluded that the caseload is the reason behind it. This will be 
examined further when examining the whole activities and the capabilities of the CAs.  
 
Infringements 
Non-infringements & 
commitments 
Interim 
measures 
Overall 
EC 51.9 30.7 no 41.3 
FCA 49.6 37 6 
30.6  (without interim 
measures 43.3) 
OFT 45.9 25.8 no 40.7 
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Table 2: Average Duration of investigations in the EU, France and the UK, in months 
6-2-3: Sources and nature of investigations 
Table 3 shows the sources of investigations in each jurisdiction, i.e. on what basis the 
investigations were opened. At the outset, it is important to highlight how much discretion 
each CA has in opening its investigations. 
 On the one hand, in the EU and the UK, the CAs have full discretion on what cases to carry a 
full investigation on (i.e. to issue a formal decisions). Thus, the cases concluded by the EC 
and the OFT represent the discretion of each CA, regardless of the source of the 
investigations. In other words, the cases concluded represent the cases that each CA has 
chosen to investigate. On the other hand, in France, the FCA has to investigate and issue a 
formal decision if it receives complaints or if cases referred to it by ministries or regulators. 
Thus, the discretion of the FCA is more restricted than in the case of the EC and the OFT.  
In France, it can be seen from the sources of investigations that most of the cases were 
investigated because of complaints and referrals, over three quarters of infringement 
decisions. This cannot be said in the case of the EU and the UK, because all of the 
investigations are started on the CAs’ choice even if the source of the investigation is not the 
CA own initiative. Hence, in the EU and the UK, all of the cases concluded represent how the 
CAs prioritise their enforcement activities. However, in France, only in the cases where the 
source of the investigation is the FCA’s own initiative is the cases where it represents the 
FCA’s prioritisation of its enforcement activities. From the infringement decisions, the 
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FCA’s discretion represents around 13% of the overall number of the decisions (i.e. the cases 
where investigated on the FCA’s own initiative).19 
It is important to examine which tools have been used most by CAs to open their 
investigation as this may have some implications on the overall performance of the CA, as 
will be shown below. There was a wide variation of the sources of investigations that each 
CA relied upon to open its investigations. In the EU, leniency applications and own initiative 
were the source of investigation for most of infringement decisions. In France, referrals from 
ministries and complaints were the main sources of investigations, but this not controllable by 
the FCA as mentioned earlier. In the UK, there is no single mean that can be said that it has 
lead to most of the investigations, because of the low number of cases.   This may give an 
idea how much discretion the CA has and how it has used this discretion. 
It can be observed from table 5 that the discretion given to the EC and the OFT may have 
played a role in the type of the investigations conducted by the CAs. It can be seen very 
clearly that there is a focus on agreement cases more than abuse of dominance cases. Further, 
many of abuse of dominance cases have been concluded by either not finding an infringement 
or accepting commitments from parties.  Although, the FCA has to investigate and issue a 
decision of any complaint or referral, still most of the cases where the source of the 
investigation was the FCA’s own initiative were agreement cases.20 As in the EU and the UK, 
most of abuse of dominance cases were concluded as non-infringements and commitments.
21
 
                                                          
19
 If one considers cases where leniency was the source of the investigation as own initiative cases, because they 
have been investigated because of the FCA’s leniency policy, then the percentage is around 17% of the overall 
number of infringement cases.  
20
 Abuse of dominance where the subject matter of Five out of 26 ‘own initiative investigations’. Compared to 
the EC and the OFT this can be considered as a large number.  
21
 In the EU, out of 39 cases there were 21 cases dealt with under 102 solely. In France, 118 cases where abuse 
of dominance cases, investigated only under L.420-2 and/ or L.420-5 and in certain cases 102.  In the UK, all of 
the commitments and non-infringements (5 cases) cases where abuse of dominance cases.   
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Also, it seems that whenever an abuse of dominance claims is investigated, alongside other 
claims, it is very likely that it will end up as non-infringement or commitments decision.       
This may indicate that abuse of dominance cases are more difficult than agreement cases, as 
most of abuse of dominance cases were concluded as non-infringement or commitments. Or 
it may be that because most of the cases where investigated because of complaints then it 
may be that these complaints are from actual or potential competitors who may not be able to 
compete with, or because such competitor is not efficient enough to compete with the 
existing players in the market, then he/she thought of competition law violation whereas it is 
just his/her inability to compete with them. 
However, one has to acknowledge that the low number of infringement decisions in the area 
of abuse of dominance indicates that the CAs are dealing with cases using softer tools (i.e. 
commitments) to remedy anti-competitive concerns. Where CAs are not entitled to impose 
fines when accepting commitments from parties; in addition, CAs do not conduct full 
investigations in commitment decisions.
22
 Thus, the full extent of the conduct investigated 
may not exposed and this would make private enforcement difficult for possibly affected 
parties of the conduct and would make it difficult to bring a follow on action.   This may have 
some consequences on deterrence; this will be discussed in greater detail below.
23
 
 
Complaint 
Own 
initiative 
Leniency 
Referral 
from 
ministries 
Sector 
studies 
ECN 
Notified 
agreement 
Media Total 
EU 9 14 37 0 1 1 1 0 63 
France 41 18 6 73 0 0 0 0 138 
                                                          
22
 Commitment decisions are based on a preliminarily assessment and not a full investigation as in the case of 
infringement decisions. See for example, Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] O.J. Ll/1. See also, Article L. 464-2 of the 
French Commercial Code. 
23
 See, section 6-5-4 below.  
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UK 3 5 5 0 0 0 2 2 17 
Table 3: Sources of investigations for Infringements decisions in the EU, France and the 
UK (May 2004-Deecmebr 2012) 
  
 Compliant Own initiative Notified 
agreement 
Referral Total 
EU 23 8 2 0 33 
France 170 8 0 42 236 
UK 6 0 0 0 6 
Table 4: Sources of investigations for non- infringements and commitments decisions in 
the EU, France and the UK (May 2004-Decmebr 2012) 
 
 
Agreements Abuse 
Both 
infringed 
No 
infringement 
(Agreement) 
No 
infringement 
(abuse) 
Commitment 
(Agreements) 
Commitment 
(abuse) 
Commitment 
(Agreements 
and abuse) 
No 
infringement 
(Agreements 
and abuse) 
Total 
EC 57 6 0 2 7 12 14 0 4 102 
FCA 99 20 19 44 77 10 22 11 55 357 
OFT 15 2 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 23 
Table 5: number and outcome of investigations concluded by the EC, FCA and the OFT 
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
6-2-4: Fines 
The existence of fine in any antitrust regime aims to prevent violations of competition law in 
the first place and if, however, violations took place then the CA may impose fines against 
violators. Wils states that fines against firms who are found to infringe competition law may 
contribute to preventing competition law volitions in three ways:  
‘First, it may have a deterrent effect, by creating a credible threat of being prosecuted and 
fined which weighs sufficiently in the balance of expected costs and benefits to deter 
calculating companies from committing antitrust violations. Secondly, it may at the same 
time have a moral effect, in that it sends a message to the spontaneously law-abiding, 
reinforcing their moral commitment to the antitrust prohibitions. Thirdly, through leniency 
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policies and through the use of other aggravating or attenuating circumstances affecting the 
amount of the fine imposed, the cost of setting up and running cartels can be raised.’24 
Thus, when the CA uses its powers to impose fines it would help the CA to recover the losses 
incurred because of the anti-competitive behaviour and it will also send a message to 
undertakings that it will not tolerate anti-competitive behaviour in its jurisdiction.
25 
If the fine 
imposed by the CA outweighs the expected benefits (profits) from the infringement then the 
CA’s actions have a deterrent effect that may alter the infringers’ and other undertakings’ 
behaviour to comply with competition law. It has to be noted that the matter of an optimal 
fine is very difficult to be determined, i.e. a fine that would deter.
26
   
The CAs under examination in this thesis use very similar fining guidelines for punishing 
anti-competitive practices.
27
  As it can be seen form Table 6, the EC has imposed the largest 
fines compared to the FCA and the OFT. This can be explained by the size jurisdiction of 
each CA. The EC deals with infringement that affects trade between Member States, in most 
of the cases the size of the market is the EU, the European Economic area or Worldwide.
28
 
Thus, as the fines are based on the amount of sales in the market under investigation (with a 
cap of 10% of the firm’s worldwide turnover),29 the possibility of the fines imposed being 
                                                          
24
 Wouter Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ 2006 World Competition 29(2). Available at 
SSRN, p.11 
25
 Wouter Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ 2006 World Competition 29(2). Available at 
SSRN. See also, Alberto Heimler and kirtikumar Mehta, ‘Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal Level 
of Fine for Achieving deterrence’ 2012 35 (1) World Competition 103.  
26
 Wouter Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ 2006 World Competition 29(2). Available at 
SSRN. See also, Alberto Heimler and kirtikumar Mehta, ‘Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal Level 
of Fine for Achieving deterrence’ (2012) 35 (1) World Competition 103. 
27
 European Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006; FCA Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating 
to the Setting of Financial Penalties; OFT 423, ‘OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty’ 
September 2012. 
28
 See the EU chapter for the dimension of the infringements.  
29
 In all jurisdictions, the upper limit of the fine imposed is 30% of sales in the concerned market with an upper 
limit of 10% of the annual world-wide turnover. See,  European Commission Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 1/2003 Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006; 
FCA Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial Penalties; OFT 423, ‘OFT's 
guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty’ September 2012. 
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when the EC is investigating a case is higher than in the case when National Competition 
Authority (NCA) investigates a case. NCAs (the FCA and the OFT) mainly deal with cases at 
a national level; European competition rules would be applicable where the alleged 
infringements affects trade between member states.
30
 Therefore, the size of the market that 
will be scrutinised by the EC is much larger than the ones by NCAs, hence, the amount of 
sales in the investigated market may be higher and this is reflected by the fine imposed. 
This can be seen very clearly when looking at the fine imposed in each year by the EC, even 
though the EC did not conclude the highest number of cases. The number of infringement 
decisions is much higher in France than in the EC, however the overall fines imposed are 
much less. In the UK, the amount of fine imposed is far less than in France or the EU.
31
This 
is may be back to the number of concluded cases and to the fact there are many cases where 
the fine was low or the OFT did not impose any fines despite finding infringements of 
competition law.  
If one looks at the FCA and the OFT where both CAs are monitoring similar economies size 
and with similar characteristics, then it can be seen very clearly that the number of cases 
concluded has made a clear difference between both CAs. Also, as it will be shown below, 
the OFT, for most of the years under examination, has better capabilities than the FCA. Also 
according to the Competiveness reports (produced by the World Economic Forum), the UK 
and France has close rankings in what matters/affects competition law enforcement.
32
  
 
EU France UK 
Year Fine (€) cases Fine (€) Cases Fine (£) cases 
2004 372,911,100 9 24,604,628 19 1,707,000 2 
                                                          
30
 NCAs may apply European Competition rules, if the infringement has affect on trade between member states. 
See Article 11 of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] O.J. Ll/1. 
31
 Leave alone that many of the fines were reduced substantially or repealed on appeal.  
32
 The issue of competiveness will be discussed further in Section 6-5-6.  
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2005 668,597,000  6 743,768,014 27 696,897 4 
2006 1,857,167,500 6 128,210,780 13 3,486,396 4 
2007 3,475,190,500 11 219,114,350 24 0 0 
2008 2,271,177,400 9 648,237,990 15 0 1 
2009 2,600,134,400 6 206,627,250 15 168,470,000 2 
2010 2,852,138,533 7 387,322,400 9 225,000,000 1 
2011 741,607,194 5 389,715,790 6 88,300,000 3 
2012 1,653,176,000 4 537,055,690 10 0 0 
Total 16,492,099,627 63 3,284,656,892 138 487,660,293 17 
Table 6: fines imposed and the number of infringement decision by the EC, FCA and 
the OFT (May 2004- December 2012) 
 
6-2-5: Success rate on appeal 
As it has been explained in Chapter 2, the appeal system is a very unique test that examines 
and evaluates CA decision making on a case by case basis (for the appealed cases) that is 
hardly to be found with any other method of evaluation or assessment.
33
 Furthermore, the 
success of the CA depends heavily on its success on appeal, as the appeal courts examine the 
CA decision and decide if it is right or wrong. Thus, the CA when deciding on cases will 
have in mind that its decisions will be reviewed by the appeal courts.
34
  
For the purpose of calculating a percentage for success rate on appeal, appealed decisions 
will be treated as follows: any case that has been lost entirely on appeal will be considered as 
‘lost’ for the CA in question; while partial upheld and fully upheld cases will be considered 
as a ‘win’. 35  This is because the CA in bringing the cases it has found and sanctioned an 
                                                          
33
 In chapter 1, an assumption is made that the outcome on appeal is taken as a measure of the rightness of the 
CA decision without going into detail with the appeal court judgment. In other words, it is assumed that the 
Court of Appeal judgment is right, in any jurisdiction. The Appeal Court is the place where the decisions will be 
declared as right or wrong. 
34
 Despite the importance and the role of the appeal Court and that its judgments has to be taken into account in 
the assessment process it has some limitations that have been highlighted earlier in the thesis. For example, the 
appeal court is assessing a case that has been produced by the CA but not the CA as an institution. 
35
 In the countries chapters the following terminology was used to the outcomes of the appeals of CAs decisions: 
Upheld: the Court upheld the findings of the CA on liability and fines entirely. Largely upheld: The Appeal 
Court upheld the CA findings on liability but amended the fine imposed. Partial upheld: The Appeal Court 
251 
 
unlawful behaviour that occurred in its jurisdictions despite not fully winning the case. Table 
7 below shows how percentage for the success rate on appeal is calculated.  
In the EU, around 54% of the cases appealed can be considered as wins, as the EC findings 
were mostly confirmed on appeal. If one added the cases that have not been appealed, then 
the EC’s success rate on appeal is around 68%. Around 32% of the cases are still pending on 
appeal. For the period under examination there were no cases where the EC lost any case 
entirely on appeal. Thus, its success rate is 100%. 
In France, over 53% of the cases appealed the PCA found that the FCA was right in finding 
violations of competition law. If one added the cases that have not been appealed at all, then 
the overall success rate on appeal for the FCA is around 87%. There are 10% of the appealed 
cases are still pending on appeal. Around 3% of the FCA’s cases where annulled on appeal. 
Thus, the overall success rate on appeal for the FCA is 97%.  
In the UK nearly half of the cases were not appealed, which according to the criteria 
employed in this thesis; those cases are considered as won by the OFT. Around 12% of the 
cases were annulled on appeal. The rest of the cases (around 41%) were fully or partially 
upheld on appeal. This makes the overall success rate to around 88%.  
The issue of appeals will be discussed in greater detail below, in section 6-5-1. 
Jurisdiction Upheld 
Largely 
upheld 
Partial 
Upheld 
Annulment Settlements 
Not 
appealed 
Pending 
Overall 
success rate 
EU 
12 cases 
(19%) 
11 
cases 
(17.4%
) 
7 cases 
(11.1%) 
0 
4 cases 
(6.3%) 
9 cases 
(14.3%) 
20 cases 
(31.7%) 
100% 
France 
37 
Cases 
(26.8%) 
 
12 
cases 
(8.7 %) 
11 
cases 
(7.9%) 
4 
cases 
(2.9%) 
14 
cases 
(10.1%) 
46 
cases 
(33.3%) 
14 cases 
(10.1%) 
97% 
UK 3 cases 1 case 3 cases 2 cases 0 8 cases 0 88% 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
upheld the CA’s finding with respect to some of the appellants and annulled the CA’s findings with respect to 
other appellants. Annulment: Annulling the CA’s decision entirely.  
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(17.6%) (5.8%) (17.6%) (11.7%) (47%) 
Table 7: Appeal outcome for infringement decisions concluded by the EC, the FCA and 
the OFT (May 2004- December 2012) 
 
6-3: Non- enforcement activities  
CAs are established for the sake of protecting competition law and assuring that firms are 
complying with competition laws within its jurisdiction. To do so, CAs may achieve this 
through three possible functions:
36
 (1) clarifying what could constitute an infringement of 
competition law, (2) assuring that competition laws are not infringed, and (3) dealing with 
firms who violate competition law.
37
 Two approaches can be used to achieve these functions. 
The first approach, by enforcing competition law against infringers where the three functions 
can be accomplished. The enforcement of competition law against infringers helps in: (1) 
clarifying the prohibitions of competition law, (2) assuring that competition rules are not 
infringed, and (3) dealing with the violators of the law.  The second approach that can be 
used by CAs to achieve the first two functions, but not the third, is through non-enforcement 
activities. This can be achieved by issuing explanatory documents that highlights the 
boundaries of competition law prohibitions and through conducting studies into 
markets/sectors to review if there are any competition problems in the investigated 
market/sector, non-enforcement activities.  If a non-enforcement activity reveals the existence 
of a suspected violation then the CA needs an enforcement tool to remedy any competition 
concerns.
38
  
                                                          
36
 In the area of enforcing antitrust rules, i.e., rules that deal with anticompetitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance.   
37
 Wouter Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ 2006 29(2) World Competition Available at 
SSRN, p.5. 
38
 In some jurisdictions, at the end of a sector inquiry, the CA may impose remedies but not penalties. This is the 
case in the EU and the UK (by the Competition Commission).  
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Thus, non-enforcement activities are important to be considered when assessing CAs because 
they can explain how the CA’s resources were distributed and focused. Non- enforcement 
activities for the purpose of this thesis means, as explained earlier in the thesis, any activity 
undertaken by the CA that does not result in an enforcement action. This includes: 
market/sector studies/inquires; advocacy activities; the issuance of guidelines or explanatory 
notices; studies conducted by the CA or on its behalf to assess the impact of certain policies 
or decisions concluded; or any other form of activity that may use the CA capabilities (human 
capital and budget). These activities are taken into account in order to have an explanation(s) 
of the enforcement of competition law, and to understand, from a comparative view, what the 
CAs under examination can achieve in terms of enforcement and non-enforcement activities 
and what could be  the right balance for each type of activity. When doing so, the specifics of 
each CA and the procedures followed and rules employed will be considered and its possible 
affects on the enforcement of competition law.   
It has to be noted that in France, as it the case with enforcement decisions where the FCA is 
required to deal with any complaints or referrals, it is the same with market studies/inquires 
or opinions, where the FCA has to deal with any request from sector regulators, courts or 
ministries to issue an opinion or to conduct a market study/inquiry. It is only until recently 
where the FCA can conduct market studies on its own initiative, before the reform the FCA 
did not have the powers to conduct market studies. The FCA also produced a number of 
explanatory documents related to the enforcement of competition law. The vast majority of 
the opinions and the market/sector studies were because of referrals from governmental 
(small number from courts) bodies, as mentioned in chapter 5; most of the opinions/ market 
studies were very narrow and aim to answer very specific questions; as a result, many 
opinions and market studies were very similar in their nature.  
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In the EU and the UK, non-enforcement activities are conducted on the CAs own initiative; 
thus, both CAs have full discretion over their non-enforcement activities unlike the FCA.   
From table 8 below it can be seen that number of documents that represents the non-
enforcement activities varies between the jurisdictions under examination. Also, the effort 
spent on the types of non-enforcement activities varies (advocacy/ guidelines or market/ 
sector studies/ inquires/ opinions).  
In the EU, it can be seen that more effort has been made toward advocacy activities 
(guidelines and advocacy documents). However, if one looks at the size and the details in the 
sector inquires conducted by the EC, one can see the significance of these inquiries and the 
potential implications of these inquiries and their effects on the application of competition 
law.
3940
 For instance, some sector inquires revealed very serious infringement which enabled 
the Commission to punish the undertaking involved
41
, also it has play a role in shaping 
legislations. 
In France, most of the non-enforcement activities are directed toward market studies/opinions 
and few advocacy documents. A possible reason for this is that the FCA has to act if it 
receives a request for a market study or if a regulator (or court) asks for its opinion. Thus, this 
may have left little time and resources for advocacy activities and the FCA focused most of 
its non-enforcement activities to market studies/opinions.  
In terms of numbers, in the UK there is a balance of effort by the OFT between the two types 
of non-enforcement activities with more focus on the advocacy side.
42
  
                                                          
39
 See for example, the energy and the pharmaceutical sector.  
40
 See the EU chapter for the nature and the number of non-enforcement activities conducted by the EC. 
41
 E-ON/GDF. 
42
 The National Audit Office (NAO) reviews the state of competition in the UK, the report assessed some of the 
non-enforcement activities of the OFT. For example, the report discussed the issues of market studies and 
255 
 
If one compares the nature and the size of the sector inquires in the EU, UK and France,
43
 it 
can be seen very clearly that the size of the studies in the EU are the biggest followed by 
those conducted by the OFT and the smallest in size where the studies and opinions issued by 
the FCA. To illustrate this, the Commission’s sector inquiries usually examines a whole 
sector; the OFT reviews markets; while the FCA in many of its market studies and opinions 
aims to answer questions about a certain issue.
44
 Although, the number of inquiries is smaller 
than advocacy documents their impact is higher and it can be seen that the amount of 
resources put into sector inquiries is quite large. In France, as it has been explained, the 
number of opinions is not controlled by the FCA as it has to deal with referrals that ask for 
opinions. This may have resulted in a large number of opinions/ market studies and small 
number of advocacy documents. Many of the advocacy documents were produced after 2009, 
when the FCA was established. 
45
 
Non-enforcement activities EU France UK 
Number of guidance/advocacy documents 24 10 41 
Market studies/ opinions/ inquires 10 78 35 
Total 34 88 76 
Table 8: Non- enforcement activities concluded by the EC, FCA and the OFT  
(May 2004- December 2012) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
investigations and the only concern reported is the low number of references to the Competition Commission 
from the OFT and sector regulators to conduct market investigations. In the report, there was no link between 
enforcement and non-enforcement activities and if the non-enforcement activities could replace enforcement 
actions. However the report highlights the issue of the low number of Chapter I and II cases and states that over 
time the low number or the lack of infringement decisions cases could undermine the deterrence effect of 
competition powers in the UK. See, UK National Audit Office, ‘Review of the UK’s Competition Landscape’, 
March 2010; see pages 16 and 24-30.  
43
 See the previous chapters for a more detailed discussion.  
44
 If one looks at the most recent market investigation in each jurisdiction it can be seen very clearly the size and 
the extent of each study.  See for example, Inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector (EU) vs. Market study on 
Private motor insurance (UK) vs. Opinion on the food retail sector in Paris (France). It can be seen very clearly 
that the EC examined the largest issue and the largest size followed by the UK and France.  Unlike the EU and 
the OFT, the FCA examines very local issues.   
45
 See chapter on France.  
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If one compares, in terms of numbers, the enforcement and the non-enforcement of activities 
of each CA.
46
 Only in the UK, the number of non-enforcement activities is much higher than 
the enforcement activities of the OFT (infringements and non-infringements). Non-
enforcement activities are two times higher than the enforcement activities of the OFT and 
represent over three quarters of the overall activities of the OFT (in the area of antitrust). In 
the EU and France non-enforcement activities represent 25% and around 17%, respectively, 
from the overall activities of the both authorities.
47
 Based on this, it can be suggested that 
what the EC and the FCA are doing, in terms of distributing between enforcement and non-
enforcement, is the right thing to be done for a CA because CAs are established to be an 
enforcement authorities and their advisory role should not be the main target of its mission.
48
  
Thus, there is a clear contrast of what the OFT has been doing for the eight years under 
examination and what the other CAs were doing. This in its own right require a revision by 
the OFT (or the future CMA) to its enforcement policy and rethink about its non-enforcement 
activities.
49
 A possible explanation of the OFT’s non-enforcement activities might be that the 
OFT has a performance target agreed with HM Treasury of delivering direct financial 
benefits to consumers of at least five times its cost to the taxpayer.
50
  In such a scenario, the 
OFT aim is to achieve the target instead of putting real competition benefits. As a result, the 
CA will try to target easy cases in terms of finding infringement and show that it is achieving 
the target set by HM Treasury. Also the CA may justify that it is meeting the target through 
non-enforcement activities. In doing so, the CA may give less attention to controversial areas 
                                                          
46
 See Table 1 and Table 8 above.  
47
 The activities examined in this thesis, i.e. activities in the area of antitrust.  
48
 It has been suggested that advocacy activities are not as important as enforcement activates especially in 
developed countries. See, Abel M. Mateus, ‘Ensuring a more level playing field in competition enforcement 
throughout the European Union’ 2010 31(12) European Competition Law Review 514, 524   
49
 For a comprehensive discussion about the right balance between enforcement activities and market inquires; 
see, Tamar Indig and Michal Gal, ‘New Powers- New vulnerabilities? A critical Analysis of Market Inquiries 
Performed By Competition Authorities’ in Di Porto and Drexl (eds)  Competition Law as Regulation (Edward 
Elgar, 2013) Available at SSRN.  
50
 There is no such requirement that the EC of the FCA has to meet.  
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and where enforcing competition law is difficult, or it may deal with these areas through 
softer mechanisms which ultimately may not create a sufficient deterrence. The OFT also 
conducted a lot of studies to assess the impact of its action, this may have been done in order 
to prove that it has achieved the target. This target may have distracted the OFT’s attention. 
Of course the above mentioned is only one of the possible explanations that have been or will 
be provided.  
 
6-4: Capabilities of the CA 
6-4-1: Budget and staff 
In theory, the more the number of staff and specialists  working in the CA the faster and the 
better the quality of decisions produced, bearing in mind the size of the jurisdiction. Table 9 
below provides the number of staff and the budget for each CA.  For obvious reasons the EC 
has the largest budget and the highest number of staff and specialists. However in terms of 
allocation of budget to enforcement activities, the EC is allocating the least to enforcement 
activities of its budget on average; around three quarters of the EC’s budget goes to salaries. 
Strangely, the OFT has allocated the highest percentage of its budget to enforcement 
activities; even though it has produced the least enforcement activities compared to the EC 
and the FCA. The FCA for most of the years has the lowest budget and the lowest number of 
staff. The FCA, however, has concluded the highest number of cases and concluded the 
highest number of non-enforcement activities.    
Thus, it cannot be said that the amount of budget allocated to enforcement either as an 
amount of money or as percentage is the determinative factor in the number of concluded 
cases or if it has an effect on the length of investigations, as it has been highlighted earlier the 
average duration of investigations for all of the jurisdictions is fairly similar.  
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Furthermore, the number of staff at the CA seems to not affect the number of investigations 
and the duration of investigations. What can be learnt from this discussion from a 
comparative perspective, is that the FCA is the busiest CA, and that in light of what the FCA 
has achieved with its budget and staff; the EC and the OFT can do more than what they 
achieved but it is the legislations and the policies adopted by the FCA that helped it to 
achieve this amount of activities.  
6-4-2: State aid and merger cases 
When considering the capabilities of any CAs it is important to consider the whole activities 
of the CA, not only antitrust matters which are the main focus of this thesis. Mergers and 
state aid (for the EC) cases are important to be considered when talking about the capabilities 
of the CAs in order to see, form a comparative point of view, what each CA has done in the 
antitrust area in light of other activities conducted by each CA. Table 10 below presents the 
number of mergers filed (and the number of state aid cases for the EC) in each year for the 
CAs under examination. It has to be noted that before the creation of the FCA, the French 
Competition Counsel did not have any jurisdiction over mergers it has only an advisory role 
based on a request from the DGCCRF. Regarding mergers, in the EU and France pre-
nonfiction of mergers that meets a certain threshold is mandatory. In contrast, pre-nonfiction 
of mergers in the UK is voluntary. The consequence of such requirements can be seen very 
clearly reflected by the number of mergers filed, where the OFT has filed the fewest number 
of mergers. The EC by far has filed the highest number of merger. A possible explanation for 
this might be the size of the jurisdiction which results in more transactions or that because the 
UK does not have a notification regime for mergers.  
Year 
Number of staff Overall budget (€ Millions) 
Budget allocated to enforcement of 
the overall budget (%) 
EC FCA OFT EC FCA OFT EC FCA OFT 
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2004 272 50 243 79 8.5 47.7 32.6% 30% 43.4 % 
2005 382 53 242 90 8.6 50 30% 30% 39% 
2006 593 130 301 97 11.4 51 32.1% 22% 39% 
2007 633 129 259 71.7 12.8 40.2 12.1% 28% 16.1% 
2008 700 158 177 78.2 19.4 22.6 12% 28% 47.8% 
2009 757 190 189 89.4 19.4 22 14.2% 28% 47.2% 
2010 764 187 238 90.8 20.4 20 13.3% 26% 43% 
2011 749 200 121 93.5 20 15.5 16% 24% 47% 
Table 9: Capabilities of the EC, FCA and the OFT (2004- 2012) 
 
EU France UK 
Year Mergers (filed) State aid Mergers (filed) Mergers (filed) 
2004 249 - 0 192 
2005 313 - 0 267 
2006 356 60 0 150 
2007 402 47 0 104 
2008 347 91 0 96 
2009 259 79 137 66 
2010 274 72 246 77 
2011 309 90 255 111 
2012 283 66 214 98 
Table 10: Number of Merger and state aid decisions concluded by the EC, FCA and the 
OFT (January 2004- December 2012)
51
 
 
6-5: Discussion 
This section analysis issues related to the enforcement of competition law in the jurisdictions 
under examination, in light of the findings reached in this chapter and the previous chapters 
and examines if the results can be generalised to other jurisdictions.  
                                                          
51
 Source: Global Competition Review publications on ‘Rating enforcement’ (2004-2012). 
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6-5-1: Specialised vs. general courts
52
 
The number of jurisdictions that has a specialised appeal court is very limited. For the 
jurisdictions examined in this thesis, only in the UK there is a specialised judicial body that 
reviews competition law cases concluded by the OFT. The Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) is the only court the can fully review public enforcement of competition law in the 
UK. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords may review the CAT’s 
judgments only on points of law.
53
  
In France, public enforcement of competition law can be appealed to the Paris Court of 
Appeal (PCA). This appeal can be followed by another stage of appeal in front of the Court 
of Cassation, only on points of law. Therefore, there is some form of indirect specialisation in 
France where only the PCA is the only Court that reviews public enforcement and not other 
regional appeal court. Another form of indirect specialisation is the chamber in the PCA that 
reviews competition cases. For the cases that have been reviewed in this thesis it was 
Division 5- Chamber 5-7
54
 of the PCA that reviews all of competition cases.
55
 Hence, it can 
be seen that there is a form of specialisation in the French appeal system. Further, there is a 
high possibility that the judges in Division 5- Chamber 5-7 chamber are experienced judges 
in the area of competition law enforcement, or have gained experience from the cases that 
they have reviewed.  
                                                          
52
 For a general discussion about specialist and generalist application of competition law, see Joshua Wright and 
Angela Diveley, ‘Do expert agencies outperform generalist judges? Some preliminary evidence from the 
Federal Trade Commission’ 2013 1(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 82 
53
 Peter Freeman, ‘Competition Decision Making and Judicial Control- The Role of the Specialised Tribunal’ 
Speech Delivered at the Centre for Competition Policy Annual Conference June 2013 
54
 See for example, Paris Court of Appeal Judgment of 11 October 2012 with respect to the FCA decision 11-D-
02; see also, Paris Court of Appeal Judgment of 28 October 2010 with respect to the FCA decision 10-D-04; 
Paris Court of Appeal Judgment of 23 September 2010 with respect to the FCA decision 09-D-36; Paris Court 
of Appeal Judgment of 23 February  2010 with respect to the FCA decision 08-D-08;  
55
 Division 5 consists of 13 chambers, chamber 5-7 reviews economic regulation issues which includes 
decisions the FCA’s decisions. 
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The Commission’s decisions can be appealed to the European General Court (GC), a 
generalist court that reviews many other matters alongside competition cases. The GC’s 
judgment can be appealed to the European Court of Justice only on points of law. Hence, 
there is no any form of specialisation at European level.  
Thus, it can be said that there is specialist court that provide full review of CA’s decisions in 
the UK, and indirect specialist Court in France and general court that reviews the decisions of 
the Commission.    
Comparing the success rate on appeal for each CA may help in providing some explanations 
to whether the existence of a specialised appeal court would make a difference in the 
enforcement of competition law. The Commission success rate on appeal is 100%, where all 
of the cases that have been appealed confirmed the EC’s findings either fully of partly. The 
OFT’s success rate on appeal is about 90%, and of the FCA’s cases that have been appealed 
around 97% were won by the FCA.  
These percentages and the discussed above may provide some explanations as whether 
having a specialist court has any difference in the outcome of appeals. Two possible 
explanations can be provided.  First, a general court does not set high standards when 
reviewing CA decisions.
56
 On the other hand, a specialist court or an indirect specialist court 
provides an extensive review of the cases that it reviews because the judges are more trained 
and experienced with competition cases. Second, the outcome of appealed cases depends 
largely on the nature of the cases concluded by the CA. The matter of selecting cases to 
investigative has been highlighted in several places in this thesis. Therefore, the success on 
                                                          
56
 Foster observes that the GC did not use its full powers when reviewing competition cases and that its review 
cannot be seen as a review on the merits; in particular he was critical of the Court’s review regarding fines and 
suggests that its review should not be limited to reviewing the compliance of the Commission’s fining 
guidelines. Ian Foster, ‘A challenge for Europe's judges: the review of fines in competition cases’ 2011European 
Law Review 36(2) 185, in particular see page 206. 
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appeal depends largely on the nature of the cases concluded by each CA and the nature of the 
appeal court does not play a role with the outcome of the cases.   
Given the mentioned above and taking into account the nature of the cases in each 
jurisdiction, this thesis supports the second explanation, i.e. that the role of the nature of the 
cases and the selection of the cases investigated by the CA plays a major role in deciding the 
success on appeal. If this is truly the case, then there is a worrying issue from a deterrence 
perspective. For example, the EU in its recent cases, particularly infringement decisions, it 
has focused solely on cartel cases and based on leniency (and good proportion cartel 
settlements).
57
 Such enforcement policy of the EC would show, from the outside, that its 
sanctions and tackling of cartel activity is creating deterrence. However, from the inside, the 
EC is undermining deterrence in other areas, where its policy when dealing with other 
suspected infringements it uses softer tools such as commitments, especially in the area of 
abuse of dominance and in the agreement area. One may see the FCA success rate on appeal 
is very good given the huge caseload compared to the EC and the OFT, given that it has to 
persecute any case that is referred to it. 
 The issue of the selection of cases will be discussed further below.  
 
6-5-2: Non-ordinary procedures used to facilitate ending investigations (Leniency, 
settlements, commitments) 
The main task of CAs is to tackle anti-competitive behaviour in the market. CAs can achieve 
this through the ordinary way, i.e., to open an investigation and to carry on the full 
investigation without any co-operation from the investigated parties and it will issue its 
                                                          
57
 As it has been shown in the EU chapter, from 2010 until the end of 2012, the EC concluded 16 infringement 
cases; 15 of which were cartel cases opened because of leniency and only one abuse of dominance case (Intel). 
In five of the 15 cartel cases, the settlement procedure was applied.  
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decision based on its analysis. In such a case, the parties will not receive any reductions in 
fines
58
 and the parties may appeal the decision to the court of appeal, where the court will 
review the decision on the merits. This is a brief description of the ordinary way of CA 
decision making process. 
Most CAs adopt procedures and policies that help them in achieving their aims more easily 
and in a more efficient way. Most CAs have leniency programmes that can be used in cartel 
cases; also most CAs have settlement procedures and they also use commitment procedures 
to end investigations in a faster way. All of these procedures are introduced with the aim to 
conclude investigations quicker and to save resources and to help in tackling illegal conducts. 
There are some differences in the application of these procedure but they aim to similar 
objectives. Leniency is used to help in tackling illegal cartels where one (or more) of the 
cartelists may confess to the CA about the illegal agreement in order to get 
immunity/reduction of fine.
59
 Settlements can be used in investigation where the investigated 
parties (or some) did not contest the CA’s statement of objections in order to get a reduction 
in the fine imposed and the CA will have a final decision with regard to the parties who 
settled, i.e. in most jurisdictions settlements are not appealable. Commitment decisions are 
only appropriate in cases where the CA is not intending to impose fines, the aim of it is to let 
                                                          
58
 The fines in an ordinary procedure can be increased/ decreased based on mitigating (e.g. creating a 
compliance programme) and aggravating (e.g. repetition of the violation) circumstances. See,  European 
Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) (a) of Regulation No 
1/2003 Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006; FCA Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of 
Financial Penalties; OFT 423, ‘OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty’ September 2012. 
59
 See articles L464-2-II and L464-2-III of the French Commercial Code; Commission notice on immunity from 
fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, Official Journal C 298, 8.12.2006, OFT1495, Applications for 
leniency and no-action in cartel cases, July 2013. For a good overview for the three jurisdictions see, David 
Henry, ‘Leniency programmes: an anaemic carrot for cartels in France, Germany and the UK?’ 26(1) European 
Competition Law Review 2005, 13 
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the investigated parties to change their behaviour subject to binding commitments; failure to 
comply with commitment may result in the CA imposing fines.
60
 
Thus, in a nutshell, the main benefit of each procedure/policy is the following: 
 Settlements: reaching administrative efficiencies, speeds up the resolution of cases, 
frees up resources so that the CA may concentrate its efforts on the most serious 
 Commitment: speeds up the resolution of cases; the voluntary maintaining or  
restoring of competition in the marketplace in appropriate circumstances; frees up 
resources so that the CA may concentrate its efforts on the most serious violations; 
also, for the undertakings it brings the case to a close before any findings are issued or 
charges are brought; 
 Leniency: helping in tackling cartels activity. 
It has to be mentioned, that there are differences in the jurisdictions under examination 
regarding the settlement procedure, in particular with regard to which conduct the procedure 
can be applied and the percentage of reduction that can be given. In the EU, settlements are 
only available for cartel cases and the EC can give up to 10% reduction of the fine it intends 
to impose.
61
 In France and the UK, settlements are available to all type of cases and the 
                                                          
60
  See Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L1/1, 4 January 2003. See article of the French commercial code and The FCA Notice 
on Competition Commitments of April 3, 2008. See, OFT Guidance, Incorporating the Office of Fair Trading’s 
guidance as to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to accept commitments, December 2004 D. 
Waelbroeck, Le développement en droit européen de la concurrence des solutions négociées (engagements, 
clémence, non-contestation des faits et transactions): que va-t-il rester aux juges?, GCLC Working Paper 1/08, 
available at http://www.gclc.coleurope.eu; Wouter Wils, ‘Settlement of EU Antitrust Investigations: 
Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003’ (2006) 29 World Competition 345 
61
 See, the European Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of 
Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, Official 
Journal C 167, 2.7.2008. 
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reductions of fines can be up to 25% in France
62
 and 35%
63
 in the UK. It worth noting, that in 
all jurisdictions parties can be benefit from reductions because of leniency and settlements in 
the same case. 
This section examines if these special procedures and policies achieved their aims and what 
are the possible consequences for the use of such procedures. 
In the chapters 3, 4 and 5, it has been shown that these procedures, to some extent, have 
achieved their aims in terms of time and cost saving. However, what can be noticed is that 
there is a risk of over- reliance where some of the CAs rarely use the ordinary procedure to 
enforce competition law. On the one hand, as it has been pointed out earlier, that commitment 
decisions are mostly associated with abuse of dominance cases. On the other hand, 
settlements are mostly applied in agreements cases. This can be seen very clearly in the EU, 
such procedures have left out the CA to focus on certain areas to be dealt with an 
enforcement action while other areas have been dealt with without an enforcement action. 
In doing so, the CA is achieving its aims artificially. In other words, this would show that the 
CA is doing a good job by enforcing competition law and tackling anti-competitive practises 
while in reality the CA is only concentrating on cases that are too obvious and may not be the 
most harmful cases. This means that the CA is ignoring other areas where anti-competitive 
practises may exist or simply because the resources of the CA is limited and it is dealing with 
                                                          
62
 Companies choosing only not to contest the objections benefit in principle from a fixed fine reduction of 10%; 
if the companies offer commitments to their future conduct (in addition to not contesting the charges) can 
qualify for a fine reduction of 25%. If companies did not contest the charges and put in place of improve an 
existing compliance programme they can be awarded an additional fine reduction of 10%.   See Article L.464-2, 
III of the Commercial Code and the FCA’s procedural notice concerning the settlement procedure of 10 
February 2012.  
63
 In the UK, there is no formal guidelines for the ‘early resolution’ procedure, the OFT preferred the ‘learning 
by doing’ approach. See Evi Mattioli, ‘Commitments and settlements in the future UK competition regime’ 
European Competition Law Review  2013, 34(3), 160-168. 
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the obvious infringement or become more obvious because of the procedure that helps in 
revealing them. 
When reviewing the above mentioned to the data presented in the previous chapters, it can be 
seen that these procedures have achieved what the CAs intend to achieve in terms of time 
savings. In the jurisdictions under examination, commitments, settlements and leniency 
investigations have been concluded faster than ordinary procedures. 
Also, there are cost savings associated with the settlements; because these decisions are 
unlikely to be appealed then the CA will avoid the expensive appeal process.
64
 The data 
presented earlier suggested that the settlement procedure has achieved its task in terms of cost 
savings, as well. This has been done by calculating how much on average the fines has been 
reduced on appeal for of the appealed cases, where  it has been found that when the examined 
CAs entered into settlements agreements with the investigated parties and calculating the 
amount of reductions given as result of the settlements. On average, the amount of reductions 
given in settlements procedures is less than the amount that might be reduced because of the 
appeals. If one also added the costs associated with appeals then for sure entering into 
settlements would be much cheaper than the ordinary route. 
It is also important to shed light on the possible drawbacks of the use of these procedures. As 
with any enforcement tool, there are some disadvantages linked with these procedures, but if 
they are used in the right manner the advantages associated with their application would 
outweigh the disadvantages. For example, it has been said that leniency and settlements 
would hamper private enforcement of competition law.
65
 Furthermore, settlements and 
                                                          
64
 Nicolas Petit, ‘ Aperçu de la procedure communautaire de transaction’ (2009) Concurrences,  231. 
65
 In settlement cases, the settlement submissions will not be rendered accessible. See, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-458_en.htm,, accessed 15 December 2013. See also, Wouter 
Wils, “Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles” in C.D. Ehrlerman and M 
Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual (Hart Publishing, 2008). 
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commitments may have affects on the issue of the clarification of the law because in 
settlements the decision will not be comprehensive as in the case of ordinary procedure and 
settlements decisions are very unlikely to be appealed. With respect to commitments, the CA 
does not conduct a full investigation it only conducts a preliminary investigating.
66
  Thus, if 
CAs rely a lot on non-ordinary procedures this may create confusion with the clarity of the 
law and may undermine deterrence.  
Recently, the EC has relied heavily on these procedures where in most cartel cases both 
leniency and settlement procedure have been used together in the same cases. The literature 
suggests that both procedures should be used wisely; with regard to leniency it has been 
claimed that it is usually used with dying cartels
67
 and that there is a danger with settlements 
that if they are agreed early they may not reveal the full extent of the infringement.
68
  So 
there is a worry that this would undermine deterrence
69
 and may create confusion in the 
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 For a very good overview for commitments decision in abuse of dominance cases and the risk of over-reliance 
on them; see, Yves Botteman and Agapi Patsa, ‘Towards a more sustainable use of commitment decisions in 
Article 102 TFEU cases’ (2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1; in general see, Wouter Wils, ‘Settlement 
of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003’ (2006) 29 
World Competition 345. 
67
 Myong-Hun Chang and Joseph E. Harrington, ‘The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust 
Enforcement and Cartelization’ Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics Working papers 548, 
p.15. available at http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/leniency_4.10.pdf (accessed 15 December 
2013). 
68
 See, Roger Gamble, ‘Speaking formally with enemy-cartel settlements’ 2011 32(9) European Competition 
Law Review 449, 452-453. Gamble states   ‘if a settlement is reached early in the investigation the defendant 
may have more knowledge about the cartel and its extent and effects than the regulator and may be able to 
negotiate a more favourable settlement than it could have when the regulator may have a more complete 
understanding of the cartel and the defendant's role in it. In these circumstances, the negotiated penalty may not 
be sufficient for optimal deterrence. 
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 It has been suggested that the over-reliance on leniency would make the CA less aggressive toward other 
cases where leniency is not being used, hence, undermining deterrence.   Myong-Hun Chang and Joseph E. 
Harrington, ‘The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization’ Johns 
Hopkins University, Department of Economics Working papers 548, p. 24. Available at 
http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/leniency_4.10.pdf (accessed 15 December 2013). Also see the 
Canadian Commissioner of Competition on the danger of over-reliance use of settlements, Melanie L. Aitken, 
Interim Commissioner of Competition, Canadian Bar Association, Competition Law Section, 2009 Spring 
Forum, Toronto, Ontario, May 12, 2009, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03066.html  (Accessed 15 December 2013). Wils also highlighted that the CA needs to show that it 
can win cases through the ordinary procedure because it has a higher deterrent impact especially if it resulted 
with some private actions; and that judicial clarification is important from time to time. W. Wils, “Use of 
Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles” in C.D. Ehrlerman and M Marquis 
(eds), European Competition Law Annual (Hart Publishing, 2008), p.35 and 39.  
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market because of issue of clarifying the law. Ultimately the task of the CA is not only to 
punish but also to have a role in clarifying the prohibitions of competition law which can be 
done through infringements and non-infringement decisions which would create deterrence 
and compliance with the law.  
With respect to France, although the FCA has applied these procedures more than the EC and 
the OFT, the FCA seems to be using these procedures more wisely. The FCA is applying 
these procedures but at the same time it has used the ordinary procedure to enforce the law, 
which would result in achieving procedural efficiencies (through settlements, leniency and 
commitments) and would keep the law clarified on a regular basis.  
With respect to the UK, looking comparatively at the other jurisdictions and what has been 
observed in the individual chapter, it seems that the UK is the jurisdiction that needs 
clarification of the law the most and needs to show that the CA is capable of enforcing the 
law.
70
 It has been highlighted that the UK case law is not rich enough, such concern can only 
be remedied by enforcing competition law through the ordinary way where the courts’ view 
is as important as the CA. Courts judgments are the only place where clarity of the 
prohibitions can be sought as they represent a re-examination of the CA decisions and the 
Court’s final say on the issue. When non-ordinary procedures being used the possibility of 
appealing decisions is much lower than in ordinary route.  
6-5-3: Hybrid settlements and their effect on the procedure itself and the overall 
deterrence on competition law enforcement 
In all of the jurisdictions, it is possible that some of the investigated parties choose to settle 
their case with the CA and the other investigated parties choose not to settle where the CA 
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 Margret Bloom, ‘The Competition Act at 10 years old: enforcement by the OFT and the sector regulator’ 
(2010) Competition Law Review, 141 (emphasising on the importance of concluding and bringing more cases 
and that the OFT needs to open investigations based on complaints).  
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will continue with the ordinary route. This is known as ‘hybrid settlements’. In all of the 
jurisdictions examined, hybrid settlements have been used.
71
  
Thus, it is possible that those who did not settle to appeal the CA’s decision. This has 
happened in France and the UK. In France, in a case involving four employment agencies, 
three of them settled with the FCA while the fourth chose to follow the ordinary route and 
appealed the FCA’s decision to the Paris Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court. Both 
courts confirmed the FCA’s finding and the fine imposed, i.e. the Courts uphold the decision 
entirely.
72
 In the UK, in the Tobacco case, where the OFT imposed its highest fine ever 
against tobacco producers and retailers. Six parties settled with the OFT and six appealed the 
OFT’s decision to the CAT. All of the parties who appealed have won their appeals and the 
OFT’s decision was quashed.73  At the end, those who settled with the OFT and did not 
appeal their decision have lost compared to those who did appeal and won their appeals.  
What happened in France would give a boost to the system in France and would make firms 
have a belief that they would benefit when using the procedure.  But the same is not true in 
the UK as what happened on appeal would undermine the system in the UK and make 
investigated companies reluctant to use and cooperate with the CA. In the UK early 
resolution has been harmed because the parties who did not settle have won their cases.  This 
would have effects on the procedure itself and on deterrence levels in general. The OFT has 
chosen to take ‘learn by doing approach to ‘early resolution agreements’, there is no 
guidelines or notices that regulate the way in which it would be applied; this may have 
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 Animal Feeds cartel (EU); employment agencies (France); Tobacco case (UK). 
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 See Global Competition Review article of 4 April 2011, ‘French high court gives clarity on hybrid 
settlements’. 
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 See the OFT’s statement on the case. http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-
cartels/ca98/decisions/tobacco#.UtPhLdJdV14 (accessed 15 December 2013).  
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contributed to some disappointing results because of the lack of clarity on the side of the OFT 
and the parties investigated.  
All in all, it can be said that the procedures discussed above have achieved their aims in terms 
of time and cost savings. However, the over-reliance on these procedures can result in 
undesirable consequences that may affect the effectiveness of the competition regime and the 
levels of deterrence in the jurisdiction. The next section will further examine the issue of 
deterrence.   
6-5-4: Deterrence  
This section examines the issue of deterrence, it establishes what are the actions or the 
features of the CA or the enforcement actions of the CA that may create/ increase/ decrease 
deterrence levels. This will be done by reviewing the literature that discusses deterrence 
issues. It will then be applied to what have been observed earlier for the jurisdictions under 
examination. Based on this, the section concludes with what matters the most for deterrence 
levels.  
Buccirossi et al summarise the issue of deterrence in competition law by highlighting what 
deterrence depends on three general factors, they state   
“..... both good and bad deterrence depend on three general features of the legislation and its 
enforcement: 
1) the level of the loss that firms and individuals expect to suffer if they are convicted (rightly 
or wrongfully); 
2) the perceived probability of wrongdoers being detected and convicted; 
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3) the perceived probability of being wrongly convicted.”74  
According to Buccirossi et al what helps in achieving the above factors are six policy 
variables: (i) sanction policy, damages and market reactions; (ii) the probability of detection 
and convection; (iii) financial and human resources; (iv) power during investigations; (v) the 
probability of errors; (vi) quality of the law; (vii) independence of the CA; (viii) separation of 
powers (investigations and decision making).
75
  
The authors state that the sanction policy has the most apparent impact on deterrence as it has 
clear and direct impact on the three features stated earlier.
76
 They also highlight that it is not 
only the fine or other sanction (sanctions against individuals) but also other issues that would 
happen as a result of the sanction policy by the CA/Court (such as, damages repayments to 
the affected parties of the infringement, the loss of consumers who are unwilling to trade with 
a firm who violated the law, affects of the reputation of the firm and reduction of the stock 
market value of the firm). The fining policies in the jurisdictions under examination are very 
similar and they are in line with the EC policy. However, in terms of other sanctions, in 
France and the UK there are criminal sanctions against individuals which do not exist in the 
EU.
77
 
With respect to the financial and human recourses and the powers during investigations, the 
more the CA has the higher the probability of detection and convection will be. Also, the 
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 Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale, ‘Deterrence in 
Competition Law’, Discussion Paper SP II 2009 – 14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2009, p. 16. 
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 Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale, ‘Deterrence in 
Competition Law’, Discussion Paper SP II 2009 – 14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2009 P. 12- 17.  
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 Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale, ‘Deterrence in 
Competition Law’ Discussion Paper SP II 2009 – 14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2009 P.12. 
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 Criminal sanctions have rarely been used in France and the UK, and even when there were attempts to apply 
them it was unsuccessful. In France, there have been jail sentences against individuals but the charges against 
them were not solely because of infringements of competition law but alongside money laundry charges and 
corruption. See, Patricia Harffi Rosochowicz, ‘Deterring Cartel and Abuse of Dominant Position Activity in the 
European Union A Comparative Study’ ,The University of Reading,  December 2005, P. 317- 321; See also, 
Lucie Carswell-Parmentier, ‘Recent developments in French competition law - commitments, leniency and 
settlement procedures - the French approach’ (2006) 27(11) European Competition Law Review 616, 627-628 
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more resources the CA has the better the quality of the information is available for the CA. 
The stronger the investigation powers the better the information the CA can collect. Hence, 
the CA ability to detect and convict illegal conduct is better. In the context of investigation 
powers, it has been pointed out earlier in the thesis, that the three jurisdictions have very 
similar investigation powers.  
The sanction policy in any jurisdiction should not be viewed in isolation from other 
surrounding facts. The effectiveness of the sanction policy depends on two elements: the 
sanction policy on the books and the how it is enforced in practice. For example, if the law 
allows the CA/ court to impose high fines but the CA/court never reached the maximum level 
of the fines or rarely impose fines then firms will not expect that the maximum level would 
be applied against them. In any given system the sanction in most cases is subject to appeal. 
Therefore, the CA record in front of the appeal court is important when looking at deterrence 
levels. For instance, even if the CA imposes very high fines against violations of competition 
law, but it has a reputation of losing its cases on appeal or that the fines/sanction in many 
cases reduced substantially on appeal; this would undermine the deterrence created by the 
high fine imposed in the first place and firms would except that their fines would reduced and 
that they will not be hit with high fines ultimately. Thus, violators will not be deterred in the 
first place.   
Therefore, in trying to figure out what matters the most in constituting deterrence in practical 
terms and applying it to the data collected in this thesis; the following can be said to matter 
the most when trying to estimate deterrence levels: the number of cases matters, the outcome 
of investigations, success rate on appeal and  the amount of fines pre and post appeal; these 
issues are to be considered when trying to estimate the levels of deterrence or if the CA 
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actions can maintain or increase the levels of deterrence.
78
 This can be done in this thesis as it 
looks at these jurisdictions comparatively, although measuring deterrence is a very 
controversial issue and it is very difficult to be achieved. Thus, this thesis will not measure 
deterrence but will employ what have been identified in the literature, as described above, 
and from a comparative point of view one would be able to identify if the actions of the each 
CA would have a deterrent effect.  
Another issue that has to be taken into account when considering the levels of deterrence is 
the nature of the cases and asking if the CA has given enough attention to all anti-competitive 
practices.
79
 This issue has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The importance of having a 
wide mix of cases (i.e. actions against all practices) shows that the CA is willing to take a 
serious action against all potential violators of competition law. It is also important for the 
CA to show its willingness to take quick actions.  
Thus, if one looks at the number of cases, outcome of investigations, success rate on appeal 
and the fines pre and post appeal in the EU, France and the UK. One would be able to 
identify which actions of each CA fulfil the deterrence criteria, discussed above, the most. 
Table 11 below shows the number of successful investigations (i.e. investigations where an 
infringement have been found or ended with parties offering commitments) compared to the 
overall number of investigations, the overall amount of fine pre and post appeal (with the 
percentage of the reductions in fines after appeal).  
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 The suggested in this paragraph is consistent with what has been suggested in the literature‘...the level of 
sanctions and damages envisaged by the national legislation, together with the powers held by the CEAs during 
the investigations, seem to play the most important role in fostering competition’. See LEAR presentation ‘A 
Study on the Effectiveness of Competition Policy’ October 2008, Presentation delivered at European 
Commission Workshop ‘The Effectiveness of Competition policy’, Slide 36.  
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 Harington states that ‘CA chooses enforcement policy to maximize the number of successful cases’. see Joe 
Harrington, ‘The Battle Against Hard Core Cartels: Measurement and Incentive Challenges’ August 2011, 
Presentation delivered at Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Successful Leniency Programs Norwegian 
School of Economics; slide 44 available at http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/Bergen_8.11.pdf 
(Accessed 15 December 2013). 
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It can be observed from Table 11 that the EC is the CA that meets most of the main 
deterrence principles. Over 87% of the EC’s investigations ended with the remedy imposed, 
more importantly its success rate on appeal is 100% and overall there were only slight 
reductions of fines by the appeal court (only 9%). Further, At the EU level, there are no 
sanctions against individuals.  
According the deterrence principles, pointed out above, the FCA come second because it has 
a large number of investigations
80
 and the percentage of cases that have remedied anti-
competitive practices. This has been done through different means, for example the FCA 
ended investigations by issuing infringements decisions or parties offering commitments to 
remedy the FCA’s concerns. Also, the FCA used interim measures as tool to end disputes in a 
quick manner; the FCA is the only CA that used its powers to issue interim measures 
decisions. Interim measures can be seen as a very good tool for the CA to use in order to raise 
deterrence levels, it shows that the CA is prepared to take quick actions.
81
 Also, the success 
rate on appeal of the FCA is very good as it is over 97%; overall the fines were reduced by 
less than 20% after appeal. In France, there are sanctions against individuals but they have 
never been used in the period under examination. The non-use of sanctions against individual 
despite their existence would undermine the value and the deterrence levels that the legislator 
would expect to achieve from them. 
The OFT has concluded the least number of cases, it has imposed the least amount of fines 
also many of the infringement decisions were concluded without imposing any fines. 
Regarding success rate on appeal, as a percentage the OFT has a good record on appeal 
(around 90%), however, the reductions of fines were very high compared the EC and the 
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 Remember that the FCA has to investigate any case that comes to its attention. Thus, as it has been said earlier 
there were a lot of complaints that ended as non-infringements decisions. 
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 Wouter Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ 2006 29(2) World Competition Available at 
SSRN, p.9 
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FCA; the fines were reduced by around 54% after appeal. Given, the small number of cases 
concluded by the OFT and its enforcement policy, by being very selective and focusing on 
high impact cases, one would expect a better performance on appeal. In addition, the 
imposition of sanctions against individuals in the UK was unsuccessful. Form a comparative 
overview, the situation of competition law enforcement in the UK seems to be the least that 
fulfil the deterrence criteria discussed above. 
Before concluding on the issue of deterrence, it is important to mention the role of private 
enforcement of competition law on deterrence for the jurisdictions examined. It has been 
highlighted in the individual chapter of each country that according to the available empirical 
evidence, private enforcement is still weak in all of the jurisdictions.
82
 Furthermore, all of the 
CAs are trying to find ways to encourage and facilitate private enforcement of competition 
law. Thus, it cannot be said that private enforcement is playing a major role in increasing the 
levels of deterrence in the jurisdiction under examination. In addition many commentators 
have highlighted that in the EU public enforcement is more capable of remedying anti-
competitive practices and protecting consumers.
83
 Thus, it can be suggested, in light of weak 
private enforcement, that public enforcement is the only effective tool that antitrust regimes 
can rely upon to enforce competition law in the EU.   
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 See previous chapters.   
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 Declan J. Walsh, ‘Carrots and sticks: leniency and fines in EC cartel cases’ 2009 European Competition Law 
Review 30(1) 30, 31. See also, A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: 
Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 3 Competition Law Review 5. For a strong defence of the superiority of public 
enforcement, see Wouter Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement be encouraged in Europe’ (2003) 26 
World Competition 567. 
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 Number of 
investigations (% of 
finding infringement) 
Overall amount of fines 
imposed 
Overall amount of fines 
imposed after appeal (% 
of reduction) 
Success rate on 
appeal 
EU (EC) 102 (63) (61.7%) € 16,539,409,627 € 15,050,414,889 (9%) 100% 
France 
(FCA) 
383 (138) (36%) € 3,284,656,892 € 2,633,084,492 
(19.8%) 
97% 
UK (OFT) 23 cases (18) 
(78.2%) 
£ 488,127,793 £ 225,301,654 (53.8%) 90% 
Table 11: The percentage of infringement decisions from the overall number of cases; 
the overall amount of fine pre and post appeal and success rate on appeal for the EC, 
FCA and the OFT (May 2004-Decmebr 2012) 
It is important to note an interesting issue in the literature that discusses deterrence issues, 
that it did not give weight to non-enforcement activities of CAs. The role of non-enforcement 
activities is important to be considered when examining deterrence. To illustrate this, if 
undertakings are aware that the CA may investigate their market/sector (through a non-
enforcement tool) this would increase the probability of firms complying with competition 
law. However, if firms are aware that the CA will not take an enforcement action against 
them, then this will lead to undermine the deterrence effect of non-enforcement activities. 
One should also state that CAs are entitled to take an enforcement action based on the results 
of the non-enforcement activities, this has rarely happened for the cases examined in the 
thesis. In the EU, there was only one case where a case was opened because of the sector 
inquiry in the energy sector
84
. In France and the UK, there were no cases where the source of 
the investigation was a market study or an opinion issued by any of the CAs.
85
  
The other type of non-enforcement activities is issuing guidelines and other forms of studies. 
This may play a role in clarifying the law and when it would be applicable, it may also play a 
role in deterrence by highlighting clearly what are the consequences for breaching 
competition law.  Non-enforcement activities may have a deterrent effect, but not as much 
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 EON/GDF.  
85
 This is based on the author’s examination of all the cases concluded between May 2004 and December 2012.   
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enforcement actions, because what create deterrence is punishment, if there is no punishment 
then such activities will not have the same affect on deterrence levels.
86
  
Thus, non-enforcement activities may complement enforcement activities but may not 
replace it or achieve the same levels of deterrence as its success is dependent on the 
enforcement actions of the CA.  
6-5-5: Selection of cases  
It is worth commenting on the issue of selecting cases, where there are two approaches 
invoked by the jurisdictions examined: First, the EU and the UK approach where the CAs 
have full discretion on selecting cases. Second, the French approach where the CA has to 
respond to complaints and referrals in the form of formal decisions.
87
   
The number of cases in France, all type of cases, represents the whole caseload on the CA. In 
terms of transparency, the French regime is more transparent than in the EU and the UK 
because it deals with all cases it receives and the amount of cases is publicly known; whereas 
in the EU and the UK no one knows about the exact number of complaints the CAs receive 
apart from the CAs themselves.
88
 However, for France this not the ideal situation for an 
institution with limited resources that has to be managed for the best interest of the economy. 
The ideal situation is that the CA has the discretion to pursue the most harmful cases and 
what could create deterrence to the economy in order to achieve the best of its resources. 
However, in order to achieve this and to make sure that the CA is allocating its resources to 
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 For a good overview on the selection of cases; see Wouter P.J. Wils, ‘The Use of Settlements in Public 
Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles’ (2008) 31 (3) World Competition Available at SSRN, P.15 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135627.  
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is ignoring complaints. See for example, Financial Times ‘Competition complaints hit record high’ (9 December 
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Bloom, ‘The Competition Act at 10 years old: enforcement by the OFT and the sector regulator’ (2010) 
Competition Law Review, 141. 
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the interest of the economy and consumers; one needs to know what cases have not been 
investigated at all, and this is not available in all jurisdictions. For example, in the case of the 
OFT it has been shown and claimed
89
 that the OFT is not brining enough cases and it is not 
relying on complains as the source of investigations. If the French approach is applied for a 
certain period of time, then this may remedy the concerns expressed in the UK. It can also be 
noticed with the selection of the EC where it focused most of its resources to cartel cases.
90
  
In the case of the French approach, the CA may miss out important cases, that is to be 
investigated on its own initiative, because there may be no enough resources for the CA to 
investigate these cases because it has to deal with complaints and referral; hence, there might 
be no time or resources left. It can also be argued that there might some cases missed out 
under the EU and the UK approach if complaints are not dealt with. However, the possibility 
of missing out cases under the EU/UK approach is lower because it is assumed that the 
complaints should be examined by the CAs in order to be pursued or ignored, however, it is 
not known if CAs examine complaints properly or not.   
In light of this, it would be suggested that the EU/UK approach is better to employed by CAs 
in light of the limited resources available to CAs and if the CAs are doing well in terms of 
bringing cases. However, if there is a drop in the number of cases/ or there is no diversity 
with the cases prosecuted it would be advisable to use the French approach in order to keep 
deterrence levels. It also advisable that the use of the French approach should be for a limited 
time so the CA has its ‘own time’ afterwards. This may help in clarifying the law and its 
prohibitions and shows that the CA is willing to enforce competition rules. Although, it is 
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 Margret Bloom, ‘The Competition Act at 10 years old: enforcement by the OFT and the sector regulator’ 
(2010) Competition Law Review, 14.1 
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 Temple Lang pointed out to this point where he states: “The result of Reg. 1/2003 was to allow the 
Commission to decide its enforcement priorities, for the first time. It was understandable that it chose to give 
priority to price-fixing and market-sharing, which are relatively easily proved as a result of leniency and 
immunity applications.” See, John Temple Lang, ‘Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of The 
European Commission in Competition Cases Under Regulation 1/2003’ available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996510, p. 229. 
279 
 
suggested that French approach may consume the resources of the CA, by time it may prove 
helpful as the enforcement of the law would clarify the law further; as a result unnecessary 
complaints may stop as complainants may have a clearer picture of what constitute lawful 
and unlawful conduct.  One also should not forget the importance of both infringement and 
non-infringement decisions in setting the boundaries of the law and setting precedents. 
6-5-6: Competiveness of France and the UK 
If one thinks of the geographical market as a reason for the low number of decisions 
produced by the OFT compared to France is that the OFT is monitoring a more competitive 
market than the FCA. An answer to this concern may be found by reviewing the ranking of 
each country as provided by the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competiveness 
Reports.
91
 Where, as explained in the criteria chapter, it provides rankings to issues related to 
the level of competition in many countries. It can be observed from Table 12, that the UK has 
been ranked higher for most of the aspects that may affect competition law enforcement than 
France. Also form the WEF ranking it can be seen that France is getting lower in the ranking 
a year after year. Can this tell that the UK is more competitive than France?  
Although questions may be raised about the ranking itself and how it changes considerably 
from one year to another, given that the report itself is not solely focused on competition 
enforcement but about the competiveness of countries. Another issue about the WEF ranking 
is that even if the ranking of the country is high it does not mean that it is competitive but it 
means that the country in question is more competitive compared to the other countries 
examined. Thus, according to this it seems that the UK as a country, for the years under 
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 World Economic Forum, Global Competiveness Reports (2008-2012). After 2008, the methodology of the 
Global competitiveness report has changed; therefore the reports for pre- 2007 are no longer available. The 
information obtained from personal communication with Cecilia Serin, Team Coordinator, Global 
Benchmarking Network, World Economic Forum. 
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examination, the intensity of local competition is higher, the extent of market dominance is 
lower, has more effective anti-monopoly policies and trade barriers is lower than in France.  
If one aims to examine if the rankings given by the WEF’s report reflects the existence of 
anti-competitive practices or reflects on the deterrence levels in each jurisdiction. Then, if 
one takes the biggest economy in the EU and one of the countries that has been ranked higher 
than the UK and France, Germany.  Germany’s CA has concluded the second highest number 
of cases in the EU since Regulation 1/2003
92
  came into force and it has scored better than 
France and the UK.
93
 Thus, the argument that the low number of cases in the UK is back to 
the competiveness of its markets or that there is a high level of deterrence is an invalid one, 
according to the figures provided in the WEF report. Thus, it seems in the UK, as predicted 
earlier in the thesis, that the problem in the UK is a policy issue rather than a competitive or 
very high deterrence levels.  
The WEF report does not provide ranking for the EU. That is why it is not included in this 
section. In addition, if one calculates the ranking of the EU by calculating the ranking of the 
EU Member states, this will not be realistic. Because, the level of developments in Member 
states is not equal and the maturity of the competition regimes varies substantially; simply 
summing up the ranking of the EU member states will not give a precise measure.  
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Germany concluded 88 cases, France concluded 95 and the UK concluded 16 cases. According to the ECN 
statistics, this only includes decisions that fulfil the criteria in Article 11 (4) of regulation 1/2003; it only 
includes decisions were Article 101 and 102 where applied.   
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 Germany is used an example because of the size of its economy and its ranking in the WEF report. 
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Intensity of local 
competition  
(Ranking) 
Extent of market 
dominance 
(Ranking) 
Effectiveness of 
anti-monopoly 
policy (Ranking) 
Prevalence of 
trade barriers 
(Ranking) 
Year France UK France UK France UK France UK 
2008 12/ 134 10/134 13/134 16/134 11/134 15/134 27/134 33/134 
2009 15/133 6/133 25/133 14/133 10/133 17/133 29/133 28/133 
2010 17/139 8/139 22/139 10/139 10/139 8/139 27/139 21/139 
2011 12/142 3/142 24/142 6/142 10/142 3/142 32/142 17/142 
2012 28/144 5/144 33/144 6/144 20/144 9/144 35/144 13/144 
Table 12: WEF’s ranking of the UK and France for issues that may affect competition 
law enforcement (2008- 2012) 
 
6-6: Concluding remarks, findings and observations 
This chapter has provided comparative analysis of public enforcement of competition law in 
the EU, France and the UK. It has highlighted, from a comparative standpoint, the 
enforcement, non-enforcement and the capabilities of each CA. The chapter also provided 
explanations for some of the outstanding issues from the previous chapters.  
Before highlighting the main observations and findings gleaned from the analysis; it is 
important to highlight the main issue with each CA and how it can overcome its 
shortcomings.  
The main issues with the EC are the over-reliance on non-ordinary procedures, in particular 
leniency and settlements in cartel cases and commitments in abuse of dominance cases. This 
can be remedied if the EC starts to open investigations on its own initiative. Also, the number 
of infringement decisions has dropped in recent years despite the increase in the budget and 
staff.  
For the FCA, the main weakness is not within the CA itself but with the legislations.  The 
FCA has to act based on complaints and referrals, this is the case in enforcement and non-
enforcement activities. This has increased the caseload of the CA and left too little for the 
FCA to prioritise its activities.  
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The OFT has to rethink about its enforcement activities, it produces the fewest number of 
cases in the EU. Given its budget and competent staff the OFT has to shift its focus to 
enforcement actions. Employing the French approach may prove helpful in forcing the OFT 
to remedy the concerns expressed.  
The following are the main findings and observations reached: 
- It can be observed that in all jurisdictions that the number of unilateral conduct cases 
is fewer than agreement cases. Also in investigations where unilateral conduct issues 
where investigated the duration of investigations is always higher than in 
investigations where agreements, solely, where the subject matter of the investigation. 
This may have some possible explanations: first, that CAs are allocating more 
resources to agreement cases and in particular to cartel cases; second, CAs find it 
more difficult to investigate abuse of dominance cases than agreement cases. The 
outcome of unilateral conduct cases  may indicate the difficulty of these cases or that 
CAs do not like to go in depth with these cases; many abuse of dominance cases 
concluded as non-infringement decisions or concluded with CAs accepting 
commitments from parties involved which may indicate that CAs want to end disputes 
in a more peaceful way.   
- The size of the firm investigated and the amount of fine imposed seem to play a big 
role in appealing the CA decision. The lowest percentage of not appealed decision is 
in the EU, where the fines were comparatively low and the sizes of the firms 
condemned with violations of competition law are comparatively small. In general, 
where the fine is high the possibility of appealing the decision becomes higher.   
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- The available remedies and sanctions are important to be considered as remedies can 
help in achieving deterrence and help in increasing the efficiency of the system. With 
regard antitrust enforcement, the three CAs have similar remedies. In France and the 
UK criminal sanctions against individuals are available to be used. However, they 
have rarely been used. If the CA is not using or unsuccessfully trying to bring 
criminal sanctions this would undermine the effectiveness of such a remedy.  In 
Europe, there are no criminal sanctions against individuals for antitrust violations. 
The most used remedy for antitrust infringements is the fine. In the EU and the UK, 
mostly fines are the only used remedy for antitrust violations. In France, however, in 
addition to fines, in some cases, the CA orders the infringers to publish in the daily 
newspapers, on their expense, that they have violated competition law and ordering 
them to state the amount of fine being imposed. This would give publicity to the CA’s 
actions and may help in bringing private actions.    
- The use of interim measures by CAs varies. In the EU and the UK, interim measures 
were not used at all in the period under examination (May 2004- December 2012).
94
 
Interim measures have been used widely by the FCA in reaching temporarily 
solutions for suspected infringements of competition law, especially with abuse of 
dominance cases.  Interim measures and their possible implications in raising 
deterrence, as it shows that the CA will take quick and timely action. The use of this 
tool may end suspected infringements without conducting full investigations where 
the parties in which the interim measure is used against will offer commitments that 
                                                          
94
 Interim measures have been used in the EU and the UK in competition matters but were not issued by CAs 
but Courts.  
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will eliminate the CA’s concerns;95 there are many cases in France were this route 
was successful in reaching commitments.
96
   
- Success rate on appeal: the only CA that did not lose any case of liability is the EC, 
where most of the cases concluded where either not appealed or were upheld entirely 
on fines and liability.
97
 In France, most of the FCA’s decisions were upheld on 
liability but there were some reductions in the fines imposed. For the OFT, many of 
the cases where the fine imposed were high, compared to the OFT’s cases, the fines 
were reduced substantially. In addition, the OFT’s biggest case (Tobacco) was lost 
entirely on appeal.  
- Based on the discussion about the selection and the sources of investigations, CAs 
should aim to start investigations on their ‘own initiative’ because of its implications 
on deterrence. 
- Based on the discussion about the duration of investigations, an assessment of public 
enforcement of competition law should be done every four to five years. This would 
ensure that there are activities that the CA has concluded, because on average 
investigations four to five years to be concluded.   
- Based on the discussion about non-ordinary procedures, CAs have to be aware when 
using these procedures as the over-reliance on them may force the CA to relax its 
actions in other areas because it may use a large amount of the CA’s capabilities when 
                                                          
95
 Bruno Lasserre Keynote speech at the  GCR Live conference: Telecoms, Media and Technology, 2 July 2013, 
available at  http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/33741/lasserre-praises-use-interim-relief-
improving-telecoms-competition/  
96
  For example this was the case in the selling of the current and the future generations of iphone exclusively 
through Orange.  
97
 As shown earlier, there was only small number of cases where the fine was reduced on appeal.  
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applying them, this may lead that the CA either not prosecuting other anti-competitive 
behaviour or it may be forced to resolve the concerns using softer tools.  
- Regarding the capabilities and merger and state aid activities of the CAs under 
examination. The only explanation that one can give for what has been observed 
earlier is that legislation and policies employed by the CAs has the decisive role of its 
outputs and performance.
98
 One may argue that the size and the cost of the outputs, 
not only the number of the outputs, of the CAs is important to be considered before 
reaching such a conclusion. An answer has been given indirectly earlier in the 
previous chapters and above in this chapter. It has been noted when discussing the 
non-enforcement activities (market/sector inquires/ studies/ opinions) to this point 
where the size and the possible implications of such activities. With regard to 
enforcement action, the matter of estimating the size of the cases has been done based 
on the fine imposed, as fines are based on the amount of sales in the affected market 
with a cap of the firm’s worldwide turnover.   
 
 
 
                                                          
98
 The EC and the FCA concluded much more merger cases than the OFT, which it seems that the OFT do not 
want to intervene too much in both merger and antitrust matters.   
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- Chapter 7- Conclusion 
The main concern of this was to assess public enforcement of competition law. More 
specifically, it aimed to answer the following general question: Why and how public 
enforcement of competition should be assessed? The motivation of answering this question 
was the lack of accepted constantly applied criteria for assessing public enforcement of 
competition law.  This present work offered suggested criteria for assessing the enforcement 
activities in the area of anti-competitive and unilateral conduct areas. The reason of excluding 
Merger and state aid, as explained in chapter2, is that these cases require separate criteria 
because of the very different way in enforcing the related legal provisions and the aim of the 
enforcer. Mergers and state aid cases are usually notified to the enforcer and the enforcer 
aims to predict the future; whereas in anticompetitive practices and unilateral conduct cases, 
the enforcer has to investigate and discover these practices and aims to investigate the past or 
the present conduct of the investigated parties.  
Chapter 2 of the thesis showed that there are no clear or applied criteria for the assessment of 
competition law enforcement, and highlighted the importance and the benefits of the 
assessment process and why it has to be undertaken. The present work argued that the lack of 
a consistently applied standard for the assessment of public enforcement of competition law 
is lacking because of the suggested standard in the literature have many shortcomings and are 
not comprehensive enough. The first part of chapter 2, showed that the issue of assessing 
public enforcement has not been given enough attention in the literature; other issues, such as 
optimal enforcement of competition law, that should be dealt with after assessing the 
enforcement of the law have been given more weight, as this thesis argued.  There are a 
handful number of studies that explicitly introduce assessment criteria, and the suggested 
assessment criteria in these studies have not been tested empirically. 
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Based on the analysis of the existing literature in the area of assessing public enforcement 
and to what have observed from the literature review, chapter 2 provided set of criteria for the 
assessment of public enforcement of competition law.   The suggested criteria are based on 
the whole activities of the CA, where the criteria take into account the following main 
aspects: (i) Outputs of the CAs [enforcement and non-enforcement activities]; (ii) 
Capabilities of the CAs [Budget and Human Capital]; (iii) Surrounding circumstances and 
facts about the CA and the jurisdiction [legislations and any studies about the CA or the 
jurisdiction].   
As it has been explained, the main focus of the criteria is the outputs of the CAs and the other 
aspects of the criteria are taken into account in order to understand what could affect the 
outputs of the CA. For the CA, its outputs are the most important as this what would create 
deterrence levels in the market. Such outputs have to be balanced as each of them 
(enforcement and non-enforcement) has a role to play in achieving CAs goals. Also, the 
quality of the outputs is an important aspect that has to be considered when assessing public 
enforcement of competition law. The suggested criteria aimed to cover these important 
aspects and many other aspects as it have been shown. Furthermore, the comparative aspect 
of the criteria helped in revealing issues that would not been exposed without comparing the 
jurisdictions and assisted in offering suggested solutions to the revealed issues. In addition, 
the comparative aspect offered suggestions on the distribution of the budget and the human 
capital of CAs.  
The present work has provided implementable, acceptable and comprehensive criteria for the 
assessment of public enforcement of competition law. The criteria are implementable because 
its application mainly relies on publicly available data and it can be conducted by the CA 
itself or externally. The criteria are acceptable as it includes aspects that the literature called 
288 
 
for and add to it in order to be comprehensive and aimed, to the possible extent, to alleviate 
any possible bias when analysing the variables.  
Having established criteria for the analysis, the present work then moves to apply the criteria 
to the EU, UK and France. This has required data collection from the three jurisdictions, the 
data have been collected from different sources such as: cases concluded by the CAs, 
appealed decisions, websites of the CAs, annual reports and any previous studies. The data 
have collected for the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 December 2012.  
For the EU (Chapter 3), the thesis noted that the EC is giving particular attention to cartel 
cases in terms of the number of cases the outcome of its decisions. The EC took a tough 
approach toward cartel cases, unlike abuse of dominance.  One of the main reasons of this 
was its leniency programme where it has relied heavily on this instrument and the settlement 
procedure for cartel cases. This has resulted in a very high success rate on appeal where the 
EC did not lose any case on appeal entirely. The EC took a very different approach with 
abuse of dominance cases where most of the cases were concluded as commitments 
decisions. As pointed out earlier, this may have some undesirable implications on deterrence 
levels; the EC is focusing and punishing certain type of cases (cartels based on leniency) 
which may affects the deterrence levels on other area, i.e. other anticompetitive practices and 
abuse of dominance, where the EC was either not examining these cases or dealing with them 
using softer tools.  
A possible explanation for the focus of the EC on these cases may be the reason of limited 
resources and that the EC wants to focus on most harmful cases and cases that are nearly 
guaranteed on appeal, hence the EC may save associated costs with appeals.  
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Chapter 3 noted that the source of the investigation has an effect on the duration of 
investigations, the EC concluded investigations quicker when the source of the investigation 
was the Commission’s own initiative.  
Chapter 4 dealt with public enforcement of competition in the UK, where for the whole 
period examined May 2004- December 2012 the OFT was in charge for the enforcement of 
competition law in the UK. One of the main findings in this chapter was that the OFT’s non-
enforcement activities were much more than its enforcement actions; in some of the 
examined years the OFT did not take any enforcement action (i.e. did not produce any 
decision). In addition, that there were a very high number of non-infringement decisions 
compared to the overall number of decisions concluded by the OFT. It has been noted that the 
reason for this is the enforcement policy of the OFT, where it targeted high impact cases and 
overlooked small cases. This policy has resulted in some undesirable results where the OFT 
failed to successfully prosecute high impact cases and it did not bring small cases that may 
enrich case law in the UK. 
 Previous work conducted by the National Audit Office have noted that the OFT concluded 
small number of cases and took too long to reach its final decision and that the case law in the 
UK is not rich enough.    
In addition, the legislators in the UK have recently brought changes to the UK competition 
regime. This might be a sign that legislator believed that structural changes are required for 
the UK competition regime to perform better. It has been noted in Chapter 4 when discussing 
the changes brought in by the ERRB, that it did not tackle one of the very important issues 
that this work identified; namely the issue of opening investigations. If the ERRB contained 
provisions that requires the CMA to respond to complaints by formal decisions for a limited 
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period of time, this would help in increasing the caseload and would enrich the case law in 
the UK. This approach is taken by the French legislator as mentioned in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5, dealt with public enforcement of competition law in France. The French 
competition regime is different in the enforcement of competition law, where the FCA has to 
respond to complaints and referrals by a decision and has to respond to referrals for opinions. 
This is why the FCA has concluded the largest number of cases and issued largest number of 
opinions. As a result, the FCA has declared many decisions as non-infringement decisions 
especially in the area of abuse of dominance. Also, it is noted that the limited resources has 
affected the issuance of guidelines that clarifies certain procedures where the FCA issued a 
limited number of guidelines after it was established, when its budget was increased.  
This peculiarity in the French competition regime has implications on how the FCA 
prioritises its activities. This is obvious form the sources of the investigations where the FCA 
conducted only few ex-office investigations compared to the overall number of investigations.  
Complaints and referrals were the source of investigations for most of the cases.  
In order to offer suggestions for the concerns highlighted in the countries chapters, this thesis 
conducted an empirical comparative analysis for the three jurisdictions. Chapter 6 applied the 
criteria for the three jurisdictions where the data have been analysed comparatively. The 
comparative aspect of the thesis has helped in offering solutions to identified problems from 
the application of the criteria. Chapter 6 highlighted the main results of the data analysis, 
pointed out the issue that has to be resolved and offered suggestions on how each CA can 
improve its performance.  
As with any other research project, this thesis can be improved if other data have been 
available. This thesis would have offered more precise results if the following data are 
291 
 
publicly available: (i) data on the distribution of the budget are available; (ii) precise data on 
the enforcement policies of CAs; (iii) data on how CAs deal with complaints and how much 
complaints it receives. Such data would allow giving more robust results and precise results 
to the jurisdictions examined.  
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